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Preface. 
Most of the work f o r t h i s t h e s i s was c a r r i e d out 
between October 1969 and June 1970, d u r i n g my f i n a l year 
a t St. Chad's College, Durham,prior t o o r d i n a t i o n . The 
f i n a l w r i t i n g was resumed a f t e r a break of f o u r t e e n months 
due t o personal circumstances, and has been completed i n 
the w r i t e r ' s spare-time. 
Note should be taken of the f a c t t h a t q u o t a t i o n s are 
given i n English i n the t e x t . Where the English t r a n s l a t i o n 
i s my own the French o r i g i n a l i s given i n the f o o t n o t e s . 
My sincere thanks are due t o Dr. Heywood Thomas who 
has acted throughout as personal supervisor, g i v i n g much 
encouragement and guidance. Thanks are also due t o my w i f e , 
C i l i a , f o r t y p i n g the manuscript. 
D a r l i n g t o n , 
A p r i l 1972. 
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— — - - • Abstract. 
The purpose of t h i s study i s t o examine the nature 
of the i n f l u e n c e of the philosophy o f Josiah Royce (1855-1916) 
upon £he thought o f Gabriel Marcel (1889- ). I n f o l l o w i n g 
the development of Marcel's philosophy i t i s p o s s i b l e t o see 
how h i s acquaintance w i t h Royce's philosophy was the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l counterpart t o the i n f l u e n c e on him o f h i s 
experience as a Red Cross worker d u r i n g the Great War. 
Royce's p e c u l i a r s t y l e o f i d e a l i s m was both the p o i n t of 
contact w i t h Marcel's i d e a l i s t background and the source of 
i n s p i r a t i o n f o r h i s new p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n d i t i o n . 
Marcel's main concern was t o e s t a b l i s h a philosophy of 
personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s which would d i s t i n g u i s h personal 
knowledge from e m p i r i c a l knowledge. He achieved t h i s i n 
h i s n o t i o n o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , w i t h i t s d i s t i n c t i o n between 
I - i t r e l a t i o n s h i p s and the I - t h o u encounters. The l a t t e r are 
the realm o f a l l personal values such as f i d e l i t y , love and 
hope. C ; 
From an a n a l y s i s o f Marcel's study of Royce, made d u r i n g 
the Great War, one can see how Marcel was impressed by Royce, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y by h i s theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . From a survey 
of both Marcel's n o t i o n of i n t e r s u b J e e t l V i i t y and Royce's 
theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n common aims and i n t e r e s t s are 
c l e a r l y seen. But the main i n f l u e n c e o f Royce's Work stems 
from Royce's theory o f t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n s , which made i t 
pos s i b l e f o r Marcel t o r e i n s t a t e the c e n t r a l importance of 
personal values. 
- I l i -
Abbrevlatlons. 
B.H. Being and Having. (Marcel) 
E.B.H.D. The E x i s t e n t i a l Background o f Human D i g n i t y . (Marcel) 
H.V. Homo V i a t o r . (Marcel) 
M.A.H. Men against Humanity. (Marcel) 
M.B. The Mystery of Being - G i f f o r d Lectures.(Marcel) 
M.J. Metaphysical Journal. (Marcel) 
P.C. Problem of C h r i s t i a n i t y . (Royce) 
P.E. Philosophy of Existence.. (Marcel) 
P.I. Presence and I m m o r t a l i t y . (Marcel) 
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R.M.M. Revue de Metaphysique e t de Morale. 
W.I. The World and the I n d i v i d u a l - g i f f o r d Lectures. (Royce) 
CHAPTER ONE 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 
A cursory perusal o f Marcel's philosophy may lead one 
to suggest t h a t there i s l i t t l e p o i n t i n embarking upon such 
a study as t h i s . . I t may appear p o s i t i v e l y presumptuous t o 
claim t h a t Marcel was indebted t o Royce, when there seems t o 
be l i t t l e evidence t o support the c o n t e n t i o n . I n a l l h i s 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i a r i e s " and essays only t h i r t e e n references t o 
Royce can be found, and nine of these are t o be found i n the 
Metaphysical J o u r n a l . . Nor i s there any support forthcoming 
from those scholars who have w r i t t e n about him. A l l , e x c e p t 
one, are s i l e n t on t h i s issue. There i s no mention o f Royce*s 
name i n any o f the s t u d i e s by Marcel de Corte ( 1 ) , P i e t r o 
P r l n i ( 2 ) , Eduard S o t t i a u x ( 3 ) , Roger T r o l s f o n t a i n e s 
John 0 ,Malley (5) and Sam Keen ( 6 ) . F.H.Helnemann ( 7 ) , i t 
I s t r u e , does suggest t h a t Marcel considered h i s c r i t i q u e o f 
i d e a l i s t s such as Bradley, Bosanquet and Royce very s i m i l a r 
t o Kierkegaard's own a p p r a i s a l o f Hegel. Yet Heinemann does 
not see Royce as i n any way an e s p e c i a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t I n f l u e n c e 
on Marcel's development as a philosopher. 
There are o f course other p i t f a l l s i n v o l v e d i n t h i s 
exercise. I n d i s c u s s i n g the i n f l u e n c e o f one t h i n k e r upon 
another I t i s very easy t o imply t h a t the work o f one person 
has been t r a n s f e r r e d 'en blo c ' by someone else i n t o h i s own 
w r i t i n g s . One must never f o r g e t t h a t whatever has been adopted 
has u s u a l l y been f u l l y i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the w r i t e r ' s o v e r a l l 
Cl; De Corte (1939) 2. P r i n l (1953) 3- S o t t i a u x (1956) 
^ . . T r o i s f o n t a l n e s (1953) 5 . 6'Malley (196'6) 6. Keen (1966) 
7. Heinemann (1958) 
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scheme. Therefore, I f there are any themes or ideas w i t h i n 
Marcel's w r i t i n g s t h a t have been i n s p i r e d by Josiah Royce, $ 
they w i l l have been a s s i m i l a t e d i n t o h i s own philosophy. ' 
Again, i t i s very d i f f i c u l t t o assess the extent o f such an 
in f l u e n c e w i t h i n a philosophy, and Marcel was aware o f t h i s 
h i m s elf. Although The Philosophy o f Existence was w r i t t e n 
s h o r t l y a f t e r Marcel's study o f Jasperf'c philosophy, John 
O'Malley p o i n t s out t h a t Marcel could n o t t e l l the e x t e n t o f 
Jasper^*: i n f l u e n c e : " he cannot say how f a r t h a t work 
favoured the development o f i t s p r i n c i p a l themes." (8) This 
a c t s as a warning n o t t o ov e r s t a t e the case f o r any possi b l e 
i n f l u e n c e o f Royce, and t o proceed w i t h extreme caution. 
Another d i f f i c u l t y a r i s e s from the very nature o f Marcel's 
work. I n expanding Marcel's philosophy i t would be so easy t o 
look f o r a p r i n c i p l e upon which the development o f h i s work 
proceeded. Marcel h i m s e l f repeatedly emphasized t h a t t h i s i s 
Impossible, f o r such a p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r i n c i p l e would suggest 
t h a t one's conclusions were reached by preconceived assumptions. 
Any d i s c u s s i o n o f how h i s thought developed must guard a g a i n s t 
such dangers. 
Raving admitted a t the out s e t the hazards i n v o l v e d i n 
t h i s study, i t i s now possi b l e t o consider the encouraging 
arguments f o r proceeding. Admittedly there are few references 
t o Royce i n Marcel, but t h i s i s hot n e c e s s a r i l y an i n d i c a t i o n 
o f the e x t e n t o f h i s i n f l u e n c e . Moreover, Marcel d i d w r i t e a 
se r i e s o f four, a r t i c l e s c a l l e d La Metaphyslque de Josiah Royce 
and they appeared a t an Important p o i n t I n h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
career. Surely I t may be poss i b l e t o d e t e c t an a p p r e c i a t i o n 
by Marcel o f the American philosopher. 
8. O'Malley (1966),page 6. 
I t has already been mentioned t h a t there i s one 
exception t o the l a c k o f evidence from commentators, and 
t h i s one i s very s i g n i f i c a n t . I n 1930 Jean Wahl produced 
an a r t i c l e f o r the Revue de Metaphyslque e t de Morale 
concerning Marcel's p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i a r i e s , Le Journal 
Metaphyslque de G a b r i e l Marcel. I n a f o o t n o t e he admits 
t h a t he d i d not have time t o deal w i t h c e r t a i n very important 
aspects o f Marcel's philosophy. Among the l i s t o f t o p i c s 
t h a t he r e f e r s t o i s "the n o t i o n o f the t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n s h i p , 
i n s p i r e d by Royce, but i n many ways d i f f e r i n g from Royce" ( 9 ) . 
Wahl a t l e a s t recognised t h a t Marcel was Indebted t o Royce, 
although he d i d n o t develop the theme. 
Marcel's philosophy cannot be systematised, b u t i t i s 
p o s s i b l e t o recognise an u n d e r l y i n g harmony. Indeed, O'Malley 
claimed t h a t the concept o f person was j u s t such an important 
f a c t o r i n Marcel's work. He was concerned t o f i n d a way o f 
understanding the human being as a person t h a t escaped the 
dangers and f a i l u r e s o f empiricism or Idealism. I n t e r -
s u b j e c t i v i t y became an important p r i n c i p l e I n h i s t h e o r i e s . 
The concept o f the t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n proved t o be c r u c i a l i n 
understanding the r o l e o f o b j e c t i v i t y i n connection w i t h 
human r e l a t i o n s h i p s and values, as they are found i n the 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e bond. I n t h i s study we s h a l l seek t o show 
how c e n t r a l these arguments are t o understanding Marcel. 
r -
I n the sentence quoted Jean Wahl adds the p r o v i s o t h a t 
the concept o f the t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n found i n Royce d i f f e r e d 
from i t s f u n c t i o n i n Marcel. Obviously i t i s not enough t o 
9. R.M.M. 2Z,p. 105 :. • l a conception du r a p p o r t t r i a d i q u e , 
i n s p i r e e de Royce, mals assez d i f f e r e n t e de c e l l e de Royce". 
demonstrate t h a t Marcel d i d read Royce's views and was 
impressed by them. I t i s als o necessary t h a t one understands 
j u s t how Marcel made use o f Royce f o r h i s own purposes. An 
i n q u i r y i n t o these issues may. help towards a g r a t e r under-
standing o f Marcel. 
A f t e r a s h o r t summary i n the f o l l o w i n g chapter o f Marcel's 
l i f e , chapter three t r a c e s the development o f h i s philosophy 
from i t s beginnings through the p e r i o d when he abandoned 
i d e a l i s m t o the time when h i s theory o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y 
came t o f r u i t i o n . A f t e r t h i s there f o l l o w s an examination o f 
La Metaphyslaue de Josiah Royce. from which i t may be p o s s i b l e 
t o a s c e r t a i n the impression t h a t Royce l e f t upon Marcel. I n 
chapter f i v e the theory o f i n t e r s u b j e c t l v i t y i s surveyed, i n 
an attempt t o see how important i t was t o Marcel. The s i x t h 
chapter discusses t h a t p a r t o f Royce's work whjch p a r t i c u l a r l y 
impressed him. The l a s t chapter summarises how Marcel's 
theory o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y was In f l u e n c e d by the p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
observations o f Josiah Royce. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The b i o g r a p h i c a l background o f Marcel. 
I n 1889 Gabriel Marcel was born I n t o a middle-class 
home I n P a r i s . His f a t h e r held v a r i o u s posts I n the C i v i l 
Service, and h i s work brought him I n t o close contact w i t h 
the c u l t u r a l world o f t h a t time. Having given up Catholicism 
e a r l y I n h i s l i f e Marcel's f a t h e r was s t r o n g l y I n f l u e n c e d by 
c u r r e n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l w r i t e r s such as Taine, Spencer and Renan. 
I n other words, h i s p o s i t i o n was t h a t o f a nin e t e e n t h century 
a g n o s t i c , i n whom the a e s t h e t i c had replaced the r e l i g i o u s . 
Gabriel's mother, however, d i e d when he was only f o u r years 
o l d , and her place was taken by h i s aunt, who soon afterwards 
married h i s f a t h e r . Although she was a P r o t e s t a n t convert 
her o n l y r e l i g i o u s a l l e g i a n c e was t o a very l i b e r a l form o f 
C h r i s t i a n i t y , i n which dogmatic b e l i e f was o f no importance; 
r e l i g i o n f o r her was a matter o f s t r i c t m o r a l i t y . 
Neither a e s t h e t i c s nor e t h i c s was s u f f i c i e n t f o r the :-• 
r e s t l e s s c u r i o s i t y o f young Marcel, as h i s a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l 
essay i n Philosophy o f Existence makes q u i t e p l a i n ( 1 ) . I n t o 
the atmosphere of h i s e a r l y background there came another, 
even more Important, i n f l u e n c e . He had few v i s u a l memories 
o f h i s deceased mother, but he was always a c u t e l y conscious 
o f her a b i d i n g presence. This experience presented the young 
boy w i t h a v i v i d c o n t r a s t t o the p h y s i c a l presence of h i s step-
mother. This personal awareness w i t h i n Marcel was t o remain 
w i t h him throughout h i s l i f e , and i t probably was an Important 
f a c t o r i n the development o f h i s philosophy. 
Marcel's experiences o f school were no l e s s a r i d than 
those o f home ( 2 ) . His f a t h e r and step-mother had a genuine 
1. P.E. pV82. Much o f the m a t e r i a l I n t h i s chapter I s d e r i v e d 
from t h i s essay. 2. SP.E. p.84 
concern f o r the "boy, but n e i t h e r o f t h e i r a t t i t u d e s was able 
to help him w i t h regard t o the experience o f h i s deceased 
mother. School was e q u a l l y u n h e l p f u l , as i t stressed the 
importance o f academic achievement, and paid no heed t o h i s 
own personal growth. The lycee had l i t t l e t o o f f e r him i n 
comparison t o the experiences o f h i s v i s i t t o Sweden a t the 
age o f e i g h t , when h i s f a t h e r was f o r a sho r t time M i n i s t e r 
P l e n i p o t e n t i a r y a t Stockholm: 
"the Swedish landscape o f t r e e s , water and rocks, o f 
which I was t o keep a n o s t a l g i c memory, symbolised f o r 
me, I think,-my own s o r r o w f u l inward world."(3) 
These f e e l i n g s o f d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h h i s own personal 
l i f e were accompanied by an impatience w i t h the s o c i e t y i n 
which he l i v e d . Prance, i n the days before the Great War, r 
had a l l the outward appearances o f s t a b i l i t y , but d u l l n e s s 
and drabness c h a r a c t e r i s e d i t s p u b l i c l i f e . The p r e v a l e n t 
dreariness o n l y aggravated Marcel's f e e l i n g s : 
" I saw the banal and f e a t u r e l e s s p a r t o f P a r i s i n which 
I l i v e d as an outward expression o f a dehumanised c o l o u r -
l e s s w o r l d i n which greatness and the t r a g i c had no place. 
I n r e v u l s i o n from such p e d e s t r i a n surroundings my thought 
soared towards metaphysics."(4) 
As he grew up i n these e a r l y days h i s f i r s t p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
attempts were a r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t h i s experiences o f the d u l l n e s s 
of l i f e . Metaphysics was a means o f transcending the tensions 
and dreariness o f everyday l i f e . 
However, i n 191& the Great War overtook H a r c e l ^ . B e was 
unable, because o f poor h e a l t h , t o enter the army, and so he 
3. P.E. p.84 4. EiTB^ H.D. p. 19 
Joined the Red Cross, I n which he served as an o f f i c i a l . He 
took h i s place, along w i t h Xavler Leon, a t the head o f the 
I n f o r m a t i o n Service; h i s work Involved o b t a i n i n g news o f 
missing men, and o f t e n the news t o be r e p o r t e d was the death 
o f the person concerned. Every day he was confronted w i t h 
v i s i t s from the f r i e n d s and r e l a t i v e s o f these missing men. 
With the outbreak o f war the s t a b i l i t y and complacency 
of France were shattered. H i t h e r t o Marcel had seen h i s 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l quest as an attempt t o transcend the mundane 
t r i v i a l i t i e s o f everyday l i f e w i t h a l l i t s boredom and 
o r d i n a r i n e s s . But such an a l o o f standpoint seemed no longer 
e i t h e r necessary or j u s t i f i a b l e . The I d e a l i s t biographer, 
Romain Rolland, as an ardent i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t , had remained 
i n Switzerland throughout the F i r s t World War, and t h i s 
appeared reprehensible t o Marcel ( 5 ) . These traumatic 
events seemed t o demand h i s deepest concern, f o r the d i s a s t e r 
t h a t had overtaken mankind c a l l e d not f o r h i s withdrawal but 
f o r h i s commitment. His experiences i n the I n f o r m a t i o n 
Service made i t impossible f o r him t o remain detached from 
such personal tragedy: "so t h a t i n the end every index card 
was t o me a heart-rending personal appeal. N o t h i n g , I t h i n k , 
could have immunised me b e t t e r a g a i n s t the power o f effacement 
possessed by a b s t r a c t terms which f i l l the r e p o r t s o f 
j o u r n a l i s t s and h i s t o r i a n s o f the war" ( 6 ) . The e f f e c t s o f 
these experiences were c r u c i a l t o the development o f Marcel's 
thought. The contrast, between the impersonal i n f o r m a t i o n 
contained i n the f i l e s and questionnaires o f the I n f o r m a t i o n 
Service and the personal tragedy t h a t each Inv o l v e d l e d Marcel 
i n t o new paths o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l thought. 
5. E.B.H.D. p.36 6. P.E. p.90 
Henceforth he saw h i s philosophy as a quest t o under-
stand the basic experiences o f human existence, such as 
f i d e l i t y , f a i t h and lo v e . Areas o f concern such as these are 
very close t o r e l i g i o u s thought and experience, and Marcel 
d i d attempt t o e s t a b l i s h the v a l i d i t y o f r e l i g i o u s experience 
even though he was not a t t h a t stage a b e l i e v e r . I n 1929 
he became a Cat h o l i c convert, w i t h the.help and encouragement 
o f Charles Dubois and Francois Maurlac. 
His conversion d i d n o t a l t e r the course o f h i s philosophy 
f o r he had already admitted t h a t a philosophy must take f a i t h 
and hope I n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n as important f a c e t s o f human 
experience. I n recent years he has taken an a c t i v e i n t e r e s t 
i n Moral Rearmament. 
Marcel's c h i e f work has been i n philosophy, but mention 
must be made o f h i s other I n t e r e s t s - drama and music. Unlike 
Sartre he d i d not use h i s plays as dramatic i l l u s t r a t i o n s o f 
h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r i e s . Rather,they were p a r t i c u l a r 
Instances o f the complexity o f human r e l a t i o n s h i p s . They 
were concerned w i t h the same experiences as h i s philosophy, 
but they were independent o f any preconceived n o t i o n s . His 
dramatic work d i d a n t i c i p a t e h i s philosophy, f o r before the 
Great War h i s plays were a means o f e x p l o r i n g the depths o f 
human existence. I n these e a r l y years h i s f a t h e r , as an 
Important o f f i c i a l i n the Beaux-Arts, s t i m u l a t e d i n him a 
love o f the a r t s and t h i s came as a welcome r e l i e f from the 
impersonal educational system. Drama, w i t h i t s i n s t i n c t i v e 
r e f u s a l t o ignore the concrete r e a l i t i e s o f human l i f e , 
created a te n s i o n i n the young Marcel between i t s own concerns 
and the a b s t r a c t i o n s o f h i s philosophy. The plays from t h i s 
e a r l y p e r i o d , Le Quatftor en f a dieze and L'Iconoclaste. 
published under the t i t l e Le S e u i l I n v i s i b l e , explore the 
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c o m p l e x l t i e s o f human r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Although they are n o t 
based on any p h i l o s o p h i c a l assumptions, they do a n t i c i p a t e 
a much l a t e r p h i l o s o p h i c a l development. At the same time they 
provided a channel o f escape from "the l a b y r i n t h i n t o which 
I had been l e d by my a b s t r a c t t h i n k i n g " ( 7 ) . 
His music i s a l s o o f some i n t e r e s t . Marcel's e a r l y l i f e 
was one o f ten s i o n s , and i n h i s plays i t i s evide n t t h a t the 
st r u g g l e s o f d i f f e r e n t p e r s o n a l i t i e s could not be n e a t l y 
res&Lved a t the end o f three a c t s ; human existence cannot be 
comprehended so e a s i l y . But i n music i t i s p o s s s i b l e t o f i n d 
and create a harmony t h a t cannot be found I n l i f e or drama. 
Marcel's t a l e n t s and I n t e r e s t s ace wide.and v a r i e d . He 
has never been an 'academic philosopher', and inv'fact he only 
h e l d an academic post, teaching philosophy, f o r a s h o r t time. 
He has earned h i s l i v i n g as a f r e e lance w r i t e r , e d i t o r , c r i t i c 
p l a y w r i g h t and l e c t u r e r . Perhaps i t i s t h i s v a r i e t y o f 
experience t h a t has made Marcel's p h i l o s o p h i c a l w r i t i n g s so 
f r e s h and i n v i g o r a t i n g . 
7. P.E. p.20 
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CHAFTER THREE 
The development o f the philosophy o f Marcel. 
Having been brought up I n a f a m i l y t h a t was f a m i l i a r 
w i t h the w o r l d o f philosophy and l i t e r a t u r e , Marcel very 
soon became w e l l acquainted w i t h those w r i t e r s who enjoyed 
great favour I n France a t the end o f the ni n e t e e n t h century. 
Doubtless h i s f a t h e r ' s i n t e r e s t i n philosophy played a very 
important p a r t i n Marcel's development.- That i n t e r e s t i s 
cha r a c t e r i s e d i n the a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l essay where Marcel 
describes h i s f a t h e r as "imbued w i t h the ideas of Taine, 
Spencer and Renan, h i s p o s i t i o n was t h a t o f the l a t e n i n e t e e n t h 
century a g n o s t i c s " ( l ) . The s p i r i t o f s c i e n t i f i c i n q u i r y 
dominated the a r t i s t i c and p h i l o s o p h i c a l l i f e o f France a t 
t h a t time. Herbert Spencer's e m p i r i c i s t thought was enj o y i n g 
great p o p u l a r i t y ; r e f u s i n g t o grant any s i g n i f i c a n c e t o what 
could n o t be v e r i f i e d s c i e n t i f i c a l l y he claimed t o e l i m i n a t e 
any metaphysical speculation. P o s i t i v i s m , the a n t l - m e t a p h y s i c a l 
movement, derived from the s o c i a l philosopher Auguste Comte 
and Tecognislng only the evidence o f f a c t s , had spread i n t o 
the world o f l i t e r a t u r e . Hippolyte Taine regarded the w r i t e r 
as w h o l l y determined i n h i s c r e a t i v i t y by h e r e d i t y , environment 
and the time o f h i s w r i t i n g . The r i g o u r o f h i s theory provided 
Zola w i t h a philosophy f o r h i s own na t u r a l i s m . Ernest Renan 
ap p l i e d a s c i e n t i f i c approach t o the h i s t o r y o f r e l i g i o n , 
e s p e c i a l l y i n h i s famous book H l s t o l r e des orlgines du 
chr 1stlanlsme., 
P o s i t i v i s m had enjoyed a gre a t vogue i n n i n e t e e n t h 
- century France, but i t d i d not s a t i s f y , the young Marcel. 
l.P.E.p.81 
Marcel f e l t h i s l i f e t o be a d r i l l one, and h i s schooling o n l y 
served t o i n t e n s i f y t h i s f e e l i n g . Els experience o f the 
presence o f h i s deceased mother created i n him a deep yearning 
t o break out o f the narrow confines o f what he was taught a t 
home and school. He turned t o philosophy - not t o t h a t o f 
s c i e n t i f i c empiricism, b u t t o t h a t o f metaphysics, which had 
asserted i t s e l f i n France i n r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t the scepticism 
of p o s i t i v i s m . 
Both i n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l and l i t e r a r y worlds the 
Importance of determinism was replaced by an emphasis upon 
consciousness and freedom i n c r e a t i v e work. As the Impetus 
o f t h i s movement: increased scholars and w r i t e r s turned t o the 
grea t German i d e a l i s t s as a source o f I n s p i r a t i o n . The works 
of Kant, F i c h t e , S c h e l l i n g , Hegel and Schopenhauer were 
t r a n s l a t e d i n t o French, and were w i d e l y read. Also the works 
of E n g l i s h i d e a l i s t s , such as C a r l y l e , Tennyson and Buskin, 
were a v a i l a b l e . I n the l i t e r a r y w o r l d the novels o f Huysmans 
and Barres were a s t a r t l i n g c o n t r a s t t o those, o f Zola, w h i l e 
the symbolist movement shows the same r e a c t i o n i n poetry. 
However, i t was Henri Bergson (1859-1941) who made the 
most Important attempt t o r e j e c t the claims o f p o s i t i v i s m i n 
philosophy. By a s s e r t i n g the s u p e r i o r i t y o f i n t u i t i o n over 
i n t e l l e c t as a means o f apprehending r e a l i t y , and by h i s I n s i s t 
ence on human freedom from systems o f m a t e r i a l i s t i c determinism 
Bergson challenged the fundamental assumptions o f s c i e n t i f i c 
philosophy. His t h e o r i e s were expounded i n Les Donnees 
Immediates de l a conscience ( I 8 8 9 ) , Matlere e t memolre (I896) 
and L 1 E v o l u t i o n c r e a t r l c e (1907). The I n f l u e n c e o f h i s views 
on other w r i t e r s o f t h i s p e r i o d was immense, f o r they were no 
longer l i m i t e d t o a s t a t i c view o f psychology, nor t o a 
mechanistic a n a l y s i s o f the world. He gave t o philosophy a 
s p l r l t r i a l view o f the universe t h a t was no longer dominated 
by p o s i t i v i s m and n a t u r a l i s m . The young Marcel came i n t o 
contact w i t h Bergson*s thought a t the h e i g h t of the l a t t e r * s 
career, and he admitted t h a t the gr e a t philosopher's work 
presented a r e f r e s h i n g c o n t r a s t w i t h the r e s t o f contemporary 
French thought: "apart from Bergson's l e c t u r e s a t the College 
de France* which I f o l l o w e d w i t h a passionate i n t e r e s t and 
a d m i r a t i o n , the o f f i c i a l philosophy o f the time was not a 
grea t deal more i n s p i r i n g than the p o l i t i c a l l i f e . " ( 2 ) 
Bergson was undoubtedly the most s i g n i f i c a n t o f French 
philosophers d u r i n g Marcel's youth, but there were others. 
Renouvier was one o f them. He was concerned t o u n d e r l i n e the 
importance o f the human p e r s o n a l i t y i n the problem of 
knowledge. R e j e c t i n g the Kantian n o t i o n o f a " t h i n g I n i t s e l f " 
he maintained t h a t knowledge was l i m i t e d t o the scope o f the 
knowing mind. Renouvier understood a l l knowledge t o be personal, 
as what one knows and b e l i e v e s are personal c o n s t r u c t i o n s . I n 
h i s d o c t r i n e o f t r u t h and c e r t i t u d e he was n e i t h e r a 
s u b j e c t i v l s t nor an i n d i v i d u a l i s t , but r a t h e r , showed a f f i n i t i e s 
w i t h pragmatism. Indeed, W i l l i a m James g r e a t l y admired 
Renouvier and c o n t r i b u t e d v a r i o u s a r t i c l e s t o h i s C r i t i q u e 
phllosophlque. He had begun h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l career as an 
Hegelian, but soon abandoned Hegel*s synthesis o f opposites 
as an i m p o s s i b i l i t y . His f i n a l p o s i t i o n was the very opposite 
of t h a t o f Hegel; the t h e s i s and a n t i t h e s i s cannot be r e c o n c i l e d 
f o r one must be r e j e c t e d . This law o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n became 
the b a sis o f h i s philosophy. (3) 
The term "pragmatism" was used by another Frenchman, 
Blondel, t o describe the nature o f h i s thought, but he 
abandoned I t when he became acquainted w i t h the work o f Peirce 
2. E.B.H.D. p.19 3. Gunn (1922),p.6? 
4 Smft f.Hr 
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and James, both o f whom used the term i n a d i f f e r e n t manner. 
According t o Blonde1, man's l i f e I s p r i m a r i l y one o f a c t i o n , 
sp philosophy must concern I t s e l f w i t h the a c t i v e l i f e as w e l l 
as thought. A c t i o n cannot be reduced t o other f a c t o r s , 
c e r t a i n l y not t o p o s i t i v e knowledge.. But t h i s i s no 
s u b j e c t i v i t y , as i t i s a c o n t i n u a l s t r i v i n g beyond on e s e l f , 
and t h e r e f o r e presupposes a r e a l i t y beyond. 
Another i d e a l i s t philosopher a t t h a t time i n France was 
Le'oh Brunschvicg. I n 1897 he produced a work t h a t d i s p l a y e d 
considerable Kantian i n f l u e n c e . La m o d a l l t / du Jugement. I n 
h i s l a t e r works Les Etapes de l a p h l l o s o p h l e mathematlque and 
La v i e de l ' e s p r l t . he attempted, f o l l o w i n g Boutrouz, t o reach 
an i d e a l i s m balanced by p o s i t i v i s m . 
Marcel, I n these e a r l y days before the Great War, turned 
to t h i s I d e a l i s t philosophy, p r e v a l e n t i n France i n t h i s p e r i o d . 
Maybe t h i s would provide him w i t h the richness of experience 
denied him by h i s f a t h e r ' s outlook. He t e l l s us a t the 
beginning o f h i s a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l essay t h a t he eagerly read 
the works o f post-Kantian philosophers, and S c h e l l i n g 
p a r t i c u l a r l y impressed him. However, he grew very suspicious 
o f the systems o f Spinoza and Hegel, and the reasons he gives 
are very i n t e r e s t i n g : 
"both seemed t o me t o immerse the r e a l i t y and the 
d e s t i n y o f the i n d i v i d u a l I n t o an absolute I n which 
they were i n danger o f becoming l o s t " (4) 
Marcel's schooling was an impersonal one. As has been 
mentioned e a r l i e r , he f e l t t h a t the educational system was 
only concerned t o t e s t h i s academic achievement and was not 
i n t e r e s t e d i n h i s personal growth. His freedom was impaired 
4. P.E. p.78 
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and I t made a s t a r k c o n t r a s t w i t h the happier experiences o f 
the personal freedom he enjoyed i n Sweden. Marcel's r e a c t i o n 
a g a i n s t h i s education d i s p l a y s the same concern w i t h personal 
freedom. Whatever weight one attaches t o t h i s i t i s c l e a r from 
phe comment on Hegel and Spinoza t h a t i n h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
quest h i s concern was t o discover an area o f experience where 
the i n d i v i d u a l was respected. Obviously empiricism d i d not 
f u l f i l t h i s need, b u t n e i t h e r d i d the Hegelian systems. 
Where Hegel was unable t o answer h i s needs, the philosophy 
of an English I d e a l i s t proved t o be more appealing. He admits 
t h a t i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o assess the e x t e n t o f Bradley's I n f l u e n c e , 
but c l e a r l y i t answered "a fundamental concern already manifest 
f o r a number of years - not i n my p h i l o s o p h i c t h i n k i n g , but 
i n the working out o f my plays"(5). The English I d e a l i s t 
movement was known i n France, and Talne himself had w r i t t e n 
a book c a l l e d L'Ideallsme A n g l a i s , although i t was p r i m a r i l y 
concerned w i t h C a r l y l e . However, i n the l a s t two decades o f 
the n i n e t e e n t h century,England was the scene o f important 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l a c t i v i t y . I n 1876 Bradley(6) published h i s 
E t h i c a l Studies, f o l l o w e d by P r i n c i p l e s o f Logic i n 1883. I n 
the same year Green's Prolegomena t o E t h i c s (?) appeared, and 
i n 1885 Bosanquet's Logic. Bradley's most Important work. 
Appearance and R e a l i t y was published i n 1893. and Ward's 
Naturalism and Agnosticism (8) i n 1899. Marcel, i n h i s study 
o f i d e a l i s m , was concerned t o f i n d a way o f transcending the 
r e s t r i c t i o n s o f the p o s i t i v i s t outlook. For Marcel Hegelian 
i d e a l i s m d i d not do j u s t i c e t o the importance o f the person 
as an i n d i v i d u a l , and i t was t h i s concern t h a t l e d him t o 
5. E.B.H.D. p.21 6. M.J.pp.xll,9.^1,102,171,190-3,239 7. M.J. p.37 8. M.J. p.231 
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examlne c a r e f u l l y t h e work of Bradley. 
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Marcel's p h i l o s o p h i c a l e f f o r t s i n 
these e a r l y years (approximately 1910-191*0 presents 
formidable d i f f i c u l t i e s , f o r i t i s not easy t o d e t e c t a c l e a r 
progression o f thought. He describes t h i s e a r l y work as a 
"droning o p e r a t i o n " , f o r a t t h i s stage he was i n no£way 
concerned t o w r i t e a systematic p h i l o s o p h i c a l work. There 
are tensions i n h i s thought, f o r , w h i l e he was resolved t o 
transcend the e m p i r i c i s t assumptions, he d i d not wish t o 
f o r g e t about the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f human existence: 
" I was h e s i t a t i n g between an i d e a l i s m t o which I 
s t i l l remained f a i t h f u l , and the t r e n d o f my thought 
toward transcending t h i s i d e a l i s m i n the d i r e c t i o n 
of an attempt t o r e i n s t a t e existence "(9) 
However, a t t h i s stage i n h i s development, Marcel saw 
the plane o f Immediate exi s t e n c e , the area o f e m p i r i c a l 
a n a l y s i s , as incapable o f g i v i n g any meaning t o the world. 
Philosophy, then, must search f o r i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y on higher 
planes o f being (10). His c h i e f aim was t o formulate these 
l e v e l s o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l thought, transcending mere e m p i r i c a l 
I n t e r e s t s , w h i l e a v o i d i n g the p i t f a l l s o f a b s t r a c t s u b j e c t i v i s m . 
Empiricism sought t o e s t a b l i s h the area o f knowledge t h a t 
could be v e r i f i e d . _Anything t h a t l a y outside t h i s f i e l d was 
not t r u e . I f an o b j e c t d i d not f a l l w i t h i n the scope o f 
v e r i f i c a t i o n , i t d i d not e x i s t . The philosopher Leon 
Brunschvicg accepted the i n t i m a t e connection between t r u t h 
and v e r i f i c a t i o n , and Marcel admitted t h a t he agreed w i t h him(11) 
Marcel accepted t h a t an o b j e c t could only be said " t o e x i s t " 
9.' E.B.H.D. gp.29-30 10. M.J. p . l 
ll.E.B.H.D. p.25 
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when i t l a y w i t h i n the scope of v e r i f i c a t i o n . But he 
staunchly supported the view t h a t there were areas o f 
experience t h a t , f a l l i n g outside the p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
s c i e n t i f i c o b s e rvation, d i d i n f a c t transcend existence. 
What were these areas of thought ? Marcel took the 
n o t i o n o f " c r e a t i o n " and examined i t . According t o s c i e n t i f i c 
a n a l y s i s man I s c a u s a l l y determined and conditioned by the 
b i o l o g i c a l development t h a t has gone before him. But i s t h i s 
an exhaustive e x p l a n a t i o n o f what man i s ? Marcel was c r i t i c a l 
o f the whole idea o f c a u s a l i t y , seeing i t as no more than an 
a b s t r a c t r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n o f a world i n process o f becoming. 
Science can discuss observable causes, but i t cannot get back 
t o the beginning o f the whole c r e a t i v e process. I t I s 
impossible t o t h i n k of time w i t h o u t a beginning, y e t such 
a beginning i s unthinkable i n e m p i r i c a l terms. The concept 
of time cannot be r e s t r i c t e d t o s c i e n t i f i c I n v e s t i g a t i o n ; 
Marcel c a l l e d i t "the i d e a l i t y o f time"(12). P o s i t i v i s m may 
r e t o r t t h a t , as such questions are unanswerable, t h e r e f o r e 
they are I r r e l e v a n t . * - But the problems o f the o r i g i n o f time 
and o f c r e a t i o n i n e v i t a b l y a r i s e . How i s one t o demonstrate 
t h a t such Issues are meaningless ? Surely o n l y by " a r e a l 
employment o f pure thought and t h a t transcends a l l 
p o s i t i v i s m " ( 1 3 ) . 
The demonstration o f the o r i g i n o f time i s beyond the 
scope o f e m p i r i c a l v e r i f i c a t i o n , and t h e r e f o r e transcends 
the realm o f t r u t h and f a l s i t y . 
"We are incapable o f not t h i n k i n g t r u t h about t h a t 
which e x i s t s , but t o speak o f t r u t h r e g a r d i n g what 
I s outside existence i s . a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n terms"(1*0. 
12. M.J. pp.,5,7.9,11-13 13. M.J. p.11 14. M;J. p.29 
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Metaphysics was an attempt t o understand those realms t h a t 
l a y beyond a n a l y s i s and reductionlsm, above the plane o f 
what merely e x i s t s . 
Although Marcel was brought up I n a d i s t i n c t l y agnostic 
m i l i e u , h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the tedium o f l i f e aroused 
i n him an i n t e r e s t i n r e l i g i o u s experience; doubtless h i s 
experience o f the "presence" o f h i s deceased mother made an 
Important c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h i s a t t i t u d e . Surely the claims 
o f r e l i g i o n could not be understood from an e m p i r i c a l stand-
p o i n t , and l a y beyond t r u t h and the realm o f existence. As 
t r u t h could only be found where v e r i f i c a t i o n was a p o s s i b i l i t y , 
Marcel i n h i s i d e a l i s t days could not have subscribed t o the 
n o t i o n o f " r e l i g i o u s t r u t h " . He d i d not conceive o f h i s 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l task as one o f e s t a b l i s h i n g f a c t u a l c o n d i t i o n s 
t h a t would make r e l i g i o u s f a i t h p o s s i b l e ; t h i s would be t o 
introduce elements of contingency.and p o t e n t i a l i t y i n t o an 
area t h a t transcends such f a c t o r s . No s c i e n t i f i c treatment 
i s adequate. 
"To.posit as poss i b l e a science o f what i s a c t u a l l y 
an o b j e c t o f f a i t h i s n o t t o t h i n k f a i t h , b ut t o go 
back t o what f a i t h has l e f t f o r ever behind i t . " ( 1 5 ) 
R e l i g i o u s thought, belonging t o the a b s o l u t e l y u n v e r i f l a b l e , 
such 
transcends the c o n d i t i o n s o f exis t e n c e , and as^exceeds the 
bounds o f o b j e c t i v i t y . Since i t I s impossible t o decide by 
o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i a whether r e l i g i o n i s t r u e or f a l s e , one 
cannot t a l k about God as e x i s t i n g . How i s i t p o s s i b l e , t h e n , 
t o p roclaim religious b e l i e f s ? C e r t a i n l y not by o b j e c t i v e 
knowledge, b u t by f a i t h . Now, care must be taken i n t h i s 
case not t o see the r e l a t i o n s h i p between f a i t h and knowledge 
15. M.J. p.97 
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as p a r a l l e l t o t h a t between p r o b a b i l i t y and c e r t a i n t y . 
"Only i f i t transcends knowledge c a n . f a i t h j u s t i f y 
I t s e l f - otherwise when we assign existence t o God 
we are r e a l i s i n g him i n space and t i m e n ( l 6 ) . 
I t i s as misleading t o deny the existence o f God as i t i s t o 
a f f i r m i t . I n agreement w i t h Jules Lagneau and Brunschwicg, 
Marcel denied the existence o f God, but t h i s d i d n ot a r i s e 
out o f an a t h e i s t i c p o s i t i o n , b ut out o f a concern t o 
emphasise the transcendental nature o f r e l i g i o u s f a i t h . For 
Marcel f a i t h was not an a f f i r m a t i o n o f the existence o f a 
d e i t y ; even as e a r l y as h i s Fragments Bhllosophlques 1909-1**-
he had t h i s t o say: 
"the problem o f the existence o f God - a problem 
completely devoid o f metaphysical meaning - could 
only have occurred t o a crude i n t e l l e c t u a l l s m 
imprisoned i n e m p i r i c a l modes of thought concerned 
w i t h contingent o b j e c t s " ( 1 ? ) 
I n other words, i n Marcel's i d e a l i s t days h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
attempts were concerned w i t h transcending the plane o f 
everyday experience; t h i s was the o n l y area t o which existence 
belonged,as i t was the one i n which s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t i v i t y was 
pos s i b l e . Therefore, when he denied the existence o f God 
Marcel was i n no way adopting an a t h e i s t i c p o s i t i o n . 
" I n t h i s way the negation o f the existence o f God 
i s converted i n t o an a f f i r m a t i o n o f the power o f 
God as transcendent as regards a l l t h a t i s e m p i r i c a l l y 
p o s s i b l e " ( 1 8 ) 
To deny the existence o f God i s t o deny him as an e m p i r i c a l 
16. M.J. p.32 1?."Fragments Phllosophiques 1909-1^".(Louvaln, 
Nai*«laerts,1962),p.93, quoted i n E.B.H.D. p.27 18.M.J.p.34 
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o h j e c t , w h i l e a t the same time I t I s t o deny t h a t a n y t h i n g 
I n e m p i r i c a l experience, anything t h a t e x i s t s , i s Incompatible 
w i t h God. 
Although, however, he a f f i r m e d the realm o f f a i t h as 
transcending the scope o f o b j e c t i v i t y , t h i s does not Imply 
t h a t I t i s merely s u b j e c t i v e . I f the o b j e c t o f f a i t h I s 
t r u l y transcendent then I t must be r a d i c a l l y Independent o f 
the a c t o f f a i t h . The r e l a t i o n between God and the. b e l i e v e r 
i s one o f l i b e r t y and l o v e , i n which the b e l i e v e r i s f r e e t o 
accept or r e j e c t God. Marcel puts i t t h i s way: 
" I n other words, between God and me there must be a 
r e l a t i o n o f the k i n d t h a t love e s t a b l i s h e s between 
lovers".(19) 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p , being one o f love and freedom, d e f i e s a l l 
o b j e c t i v e a n a l y s i s . F a i t h and i t s o b j e c t cannot be r e l a t e d 
I n the same way as the p e r c e i v i n g s u b j e c t and the o b j e c t 
perceived. , 
I n h i s e a r l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l papers Marcel developed the 
theory o f a n o t i o n which he c a l l e d " p a r t i c i p a t i o n " , and he 
r e a l i s e d t h a t t h i s t h e s i s made sense o f r e l i g i o u s f a i t h . 
Looking back on h i s y o u t h f u l work Marcel saw t h i s as an 
a n t i c i p a t i o n o f h i s l a t e r work. 
"When I r e f e r t o t h a t e a r l y p e r i o d o f my thought, my 
attempt t o conceive p a r t i c i p a t i o n as transcending 
p o s i t i v e knowledge appears as an a n t i c i p a t i o n of the 
i n s i g h t which came t o me a l i t t l e l a t e r t h a t existence 
p r e c i s e l y cannot be reduced t o o b j e c t i v i t y " ( 2 0 ) . 
Fundamental t o t h i s theory was h i s r e c o g n i t i o n o f the 
19. M.J. p. 58 20. E.B.H.D. p.26 
c r u c i a l mistake o f both i d e a l i s t s and r e a l i s t s who divor c e 
the subject from the o b j e c t . Their e r r o r l a y i n at t e m p t i n g 
t o t r e a t the o b j e c t as a separate e n t i t y , " w i t h o u t p e r c e i v i n g 
t h a t the r e a l i t y i n question owes i t s being t o the p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
o f the one who i s t h i n k i n g i t " ( 2 1 ) . The b e l i e v e r cannot 
o b j e c t i v i s e the " o b j e c t " o f h i s f a i t h . Neither the sub j e c t 
nor the o b j e c t can be separated from the f r e e a c t o f f a i t h . 
Nor i s the a c t o f f a i t h , which i s p r i m a r i l y an a c t of love 
and freedom, one o f judgement. C e r t a i n l y a l o v e r can judge 
the person he loves f o r what he or she a c t u a l l y i s , but 
inasmuch as he loves he goes beyond judgement. I n other 
words, love and f a i t h transcend the l i m i t s o f o b j e c t i v e 
a n a l y s i s . 
"The 'Thou s h a l t not judge* o f C h r i s t i a n m o r a l i t y 
must be viewed as one o f the most important metaphysical 
formulae on e a r t h " ( 2 2 ) . 
The a c t o f f a i t h and love puts W«M&belngs beyond a l l d e t e r m i n a t i o n . 
Marcel's theory o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n emphasised the bond t h a t 
e x i s t s between those concerned. For ins t a n c e , the subject o f 
f a i t h cannot be understood when i t I s d i s s o c i a t e d from the 
o b j e c t o f one's f a i t h . I t i s misleading t o t a l k o f "the 
o b j e c t o f f a i t h " , f o r i t cannot be p b j e c t i v i s e d . For Marcel 
God i s the r e a l i t y o f f a i t h . Speaking p a r a d o x i c a l l y he even 
suggests t h a t one should t h i n k i n terms o f a "r e a l i s m o f the 
o b j e c t " and "an i d e a l i s m o f f a i t h " . Marcel was concerned not 
to introduce any o b j e c t i v e n o t i o n i n t o h i s view o f God as the 
r e a l i t y o f f a i t h , because t h i s would be t o confuse f a i t h and 
c e r t i t u d e . 
21. "Fragments Philosophlques 1909-14" ( o p . c l t ) , p . 4 3 , quoted 
i n E.B.H.D. p.22 22. M.J. p.64 
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I n these e a r l y speculations Marcel faced the question : 
what I s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between " I t h i n k " ( c o g i t o ) and " I 
b e l i e v e " ? For, j u s t as the subject o f r e l i g i o u s f a i t h cannot 
be o b j e c t i v i s e d , so the ego w i t h i n the c o g i t o i s u n v e r i f l a b l e , 
f o r the c o g i t o i t s e l f i s a f r e e a c t . Moreover, Marcel r e a l i s e d 
t h a t there was no o b j e c t i v e l i n k between the t h i n k i n g ego and 
ego t h a t can be o b j e c t i v e l y examined; the r e l a t i o n i s e s t a b l i s h e d 
by an a c t o f f a i t h , a f f i r m i n g t h a t they are u n i t e d transcend-
e n t a l l y . This d i s s o c i a t i o n may appear a r b i t r a r y , b ut i t i s 
i n e v i t a b l e when one r e f l e c t s about i t . The subjects o f b e l i e f 
and the c o g i t o are both t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l y a f f i r m e d , b ut Marcel'1 
saw t h a t they f u n c t i o n e d i n a d i f f e r e n t way. The c o g i t o i s 
concerned w i t h the absolute ego, w h i l e r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f sees 
the s u b j e c t as c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o i t s experience. 
"Through f a i t h I a f f i r m a transcendental f o u n d a t i o n f o r 
the union o f the world and my thought"(23). 
I n the a c t o f f a i t h and l o v e , as p a r t i c i p a t i o n , the su b j e c t 
i s no a b s t r a c t i o n , h o l d i n g i t s e l f a l o o f from i t s experiences 
o f r e a l i t y , nor i s God t o be I s o l a t e d from the a c t of f a i t h . 
The theory o f . p a r t i c i p a t i o n , w i t h i t s deep concern t o 
ensure the f u l l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f f a i t h and love ( 2 4 ) , sought 
t o weld the r e l i g i o u s a c t and the r e a l i t y t h a t i t a f f i r m e d 
i n t o an i n d i s s o l u b l e transcendental u n i t y , a u n i t y t h a t 
transcended the realm o f exis t e n c e . Marcel was not concerned 
t o e s t a b l i s h a r e l i g i o u s philosophy, nor was he concerned t o 
J u s t i f y r e l i g i o u s a c t i v i t y . His aim was t o understand the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the human person, and any philosophy w i t h t h i s 
i n t e n t i o n must n o t ignore f a i t h and love. His theory o f 
23. M.J. p.45 24. E.B.H.D. p.2? 
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p a r t l c i p a t i o n , although not I n t e n t i o n a l l y r e l i g i o u s , d i d 
c l a r i f y f o r him the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f r e l i g i o n I n human 
experience. 
I t could be argued t h a t the theory o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
developed d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d r e f l e c t s the monist t h e o r i e s 
o f Anglo-Saxon philosophers, since i t can be shown t h a t t h i s 
was p r e c i s e l y the time when Marcel was most profoundly 
In f l u e n c e d by post-Kantian idealism. I n the thought of 
Bradley, f o r instan c e , a l l r e l a t i o n s , categories and concepts 
are seen t o be t o t a l l y inadequate i n d e f i n i n g absolute r e a l i t y . 
The e m p i r i c i s t categories of " f a c t " and " p a r t i c u l a r judgement", 
are f o r Bradley mere a b s t r a c t i o n s . Use o f such words as 
" a b s t r a c t i o n " and " m u t i l a t i o n " I s o f t e n made i n order t o 
pour scorn on the attempt t o see the world d i v i d e d i n t o 
separate, detachable p a r t s . I n f a c t there i s only one t h i n g 
- the w o r l d i t s e l f . The Absolute i s a t t a i n e d through 
Immediate Experience, by d i r e c t contact w i t h t h i n g s i n 
sensation. There are no r e l a t i o n s or f e e l i n g s , but simply 
f e e l i n g . 
" A l l i s f e e l i n g i n the sense, not o f pleasure or p a i n , 
but o f a whole given w i t h o u t r e l a t i o n s , and given 
t h e r e f o r e as one w i t h i t s own p a i n and pleasure"(25). 
The immediacy o f the experience o f the Absolute suppresses 
a l l e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s . 
Despite the f a c t t h a t I n h i s e a r l y work Marcel f o l l o w e d 
post-Kantian i d e a l i s m , he already had grave m i s g i v i n g s about 
the work o f philosophers be l o n g i n g Jibo t h i s movement. As e a r l y 
as 1911* i n an essay, Marcel faced the problem posed by the 
25. Bradley,F.H. "Collected Essays'" .p.220-i. quoted by Richard 
WoBhelm (1969),P.128 
-23-
Hegellan- n o t i o n o f "Absolute Knowledge" and Bradley's 
"Absolute Experience". His c h i e f aim was t o show t h a t 
n e i t h e r could be regarded as a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t whole, the 
p r i n c i p a l mistake being t o hyp o s t a t i s e what was r e a l l y only 
a requirement o f thought. One could not i s o l a t e i t and regard 
i t as a r e a l i t y i n i t s e l f . The theory o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n had 
i t s o r i g i n I n t h i s very observation.(26) 
But i t was the metaphysical optimism o f the I d e a l i s t s 
t h a t most annoyed Marcel, even a t t h i s e a r l y stage. He judged 
t h e i r , attempt t o i n t e g r a t e a l l "phenomenal appearances" i n t o 
.the absolute as an e n t e r p r i s e strewn w i t h dangers. 
"The l o g i c a l f a i t h w i t h which a philosopher such as 
Bradley p o s i t s the u n i t y and the transmutation o f 
appearances i n the h e a r t o f the r e a l I s only an appeal 
t o the u n i n t e l l i g i b l e " ( 2 7 ) . 
Admittedly the o r i g i n a l purpose o f these d i a r y notes, contained 
i n h i s J o u r n a l , was t o prepare f o r a proposed systematic 
f o r m u l a t i o n o f h i s philosophy. But he became i n c r e a s i n g l y 
aware t h a t t h i s was Impossible, although he admits t h a t i t 
was not u n t i l 1923 t h a t he f i n a l l y gave up the attempt.(28) 
But Marcel, i n h i s search f o r a transcendental 
philosophy, was s t i l l f i r m l y under the I n f l u e n c e o f post-Kantian 
i d e a l i s t s such as Bradley. I n the f i r s t p l ace, Bradley's 
t h e s i s t h a t the su b j e c t o f every judgement i s u l t i m a t e 
R e a l i t y i n s p i r e d Marcel's view o f the u n i v e r s a l i t y o f the 
subject o f the c o g i t o , although the l a t t e r saw t h a t r e l i g i o u s 
a f f i r m a t i o n s could not be understood on t h i s l e v e l . Secondly, 
Bradley's understanding o f the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f f e e l i n g I n i t s 
26. see note 17 above,p!8 27. M.J. p.9 28'. M.J. p . v l i 
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r e l a t i o n t o Absolute Experience c l e a r l y appealed t o Marcel 
and was r e f l e c t e d i n h i s discussions o f the Importance o f 
"sensation" and "the body" i n human consciousness. But i t 
i s i n h i s treatment o f the problem o f r e a l i t y t h a t h i s a f f i n i t y 
w i t h i d e a l i s m i s most c l e a r . Objective a n a l y s i s belongs t o 
the realm o f existence, t o the area o f appearances, but 
metaphysical s p e c u l a t i o n l i e s beyond t h i s l i m i t e d sphere; 
r e a l i t y can only be understood on a transcendental plane. 
R e a l i t y i s not something t h a t can be o b j e c t i v e l y v e r i f i e d , 
b ut i n v o l v e s the subject. The r e a l i t y o f God cannot be 
separated from the r e a l i t y o f the b e l i e v e r . Bradley's thought 
of a t h i n g ' s essence i s not t h a t o f a n a t u r a l i n g r e d i e n t which 
thought u n v e i l s , but as something imposed upon i t by thought 
i n accordance w i t h i t s purpose and i n t e r e s t . 
" I n b r i e f , the i d e a l i t y o f a t h i n g l i e s i n the view 
which you take o f i t " ( 2 9 ) . 
Although Marcel was not unaware o f the dangers o f t h i s p o s i t i o n , 
he was i n sympathy w i t h such a standpoint;"the idea o f an 
element out o f which thought i s made seems e n t i r e l y meaningless" 
(30). 
Nevertheless, des p i t e Marcel's l i n k s w i t h i d e a l i s t 
philosophy, h i s m i s g i v i n g s , already a l l u d e d t o , do a n t i c i p a t e 
h i s l a t e r r e j e c t i o n o f i d e a l i s m . I n Bradley's philosophy a l l 
e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s are thought t o be i l l u s o r y , and are only 
r e a l i n the absolute i n t e r i o r ! t y o f the One. This view 
g r e a t l y d i s t u r b e d Marcel. 
"The idea o f suppression thus appears as the fundamental 
c o n s t i t u e n t c o n d i t i o n and monism cannot be d e f i n e d a p a r t 
from i t " ( 3 1 ) . 
29. Bradley,F.H. "Appearance and Reality",p.63, quoted by 
Richard Wplheim (1969),p.29. 30.M.J. p.91 31. M.J.pp.94-5 
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The crux o f the argument between monism and p l u r a l i s m hinges 
on the question o f whether j u x t a p o s i t i o n has any place I n the 
r e a l . 
The p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f was r u l e d out f o r 
Marcel by both solipsism(32) and absolutism. I n other words, 
' i 
f a i t h , as p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the r e a l i t y o f God, i s Impossible 
where i n d i v i d u a l s remain i s o l a t e d from one another, o r where 
the I n d i v i d u a l I s submerged i n the being o f the Absolute. This 
concern o f Marcel demonstrates how complex and ambiguous was 
Marcel's p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s the i d e a l i s t standpoint. 
"The monists, I t h i n k , are thoroughly i n t h e i r r i g h t s 
as l o n g as they l i m i t themselves t o s t a t i n g t h a t the more 
we elevate ourselves I n being, the more the p u r e l y 
juxtaposed tends t o be eliminated"(33). 
Both the s t r i c t e x t e r i o r i t y o f the p l u r a l i s t s and the 
i n t e r i o r ! t y o f the monists are an inadequate b a s i s f o r under-
standing the r e a l i t i e s o f the s p i r i t u a l l i f e , or f o r expressing 
the f u l l r e a l i t y o f God. 
I n h i s e a r l y t h e o r i e s Marcel saw p a r t i c i p a t i o n as a 
process i n which e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s , although necessary, are 
l e f t behind as the i n d i v i d u a l partakes I n the f u l l l n t e r i o r l t y 
o f the transcendent. Marcel appreciated the p r o f u n d i t y o f 
Hegel's observation t h a t the l i f e o f the mind i s the suppression 
of e x t e r i o r i t y . I t i s r e a l i s e d " i n and beyond e x t e r i o r i t y " ( 3 4 ) 
Marcel could not agree w i t h the e m p i r i c i s t s t h a t know-
ledge merely r e f l e c t s the r a t i o n a l i t y o f the w o r l d , fcut 
n e i t h e r d i d he understand i t as the product o f a p r i o r i 
understanding. The r e l a t i o n between knowledge and the r e a l i t y 
32. M.J. p.61 33. M.J. p.95 34. M.J. pp.102-3 
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o f the world i s more subt l e than e i t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e . Rather 
i t suggests "the idea o f a thought which i s discovered i n 
d i s c o v e r i n g the world and has i t s l i f e i n t h a t very d i s c o v e r y " , 
(35). The options presented by the i d e a l i s t - r e a l i s t 
p o l a r i s a t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l a t t i t u d e s would make the r e a l i t y 
o f the world and of the causal r e l a t i o n s p u r e l y s u b j e c t i v e 
or else p u r e l y o b j e c t i v e . This, however. Marcel r e j e c t s ; f o r 
the mind does not create the w o r l d , i t "discovers" i t , and i t 
i s only i n t h i s discovery t h a t i t sees i t s e l f as independent. 
Thought i s not something t h a t i s there already; i t s i n t e r n a l 
content i s deri v e d from e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y . That thought i s 
not p r e - e x l s t e n t t o i t s content was w e l l appreciated by the 
English I d e a l i s t s . ( 3 6 ) 
The r e a l i t y o f the mind, then, i s c o n s t i t u t e d by i t s 
r e l a t i o n t o the world o f e x t e r i o r i t y , i n which a l l can be 
analysed and explained i n causal terms. As the mind transcends 
t h i s realm, such-external causal r e l a t i o n s are " i n t e r i o r ! s e d " . 
"Now the i n t e l l i g i b l e , as I point e d o u t , i s defi n e d 
i n r e l a t i o n t o the r a d i c a l e l i m i n a t i o n o f the pure 
causal"(37). 
The more the mind p a r t i c i p a t e s i n being the more e x t e r i o r i t y 
i s i n t e r i o r i s e d . i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y i s c o n s t i t u t e d as transcend-
i n g causal e x i s t e n c e , outside time and space, but only on 
c o n d i t i o n t h a t i t has passed through time and space. 
One o f the p r i n c i p a l concerns o f Marcel i n these e a r l y 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s was t o preserve the human subject as s u b j e c t 
a g a i n s t a l l o b j e c t i v i s a t i o n . When the i n d i v i d u a l i s i n v o l v e d 
i n p a r t i c i p a t i o n he cannot be o b j e c t i v i s e d . Only when the 
35. M.J. p.108 36. M.J. p.113 37. M.J. p.121 
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subject I s r e i n s t a t e d i s i t p o s s i b l e t o understand the nature 
o f human freedom. O b j e c t i v i t y and ne c e s s i t y are l i m i t e d t o 
the confines of p o s i t i v e knowledge. The n o t i o n o f 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n being provided Marcel w i t h a p r i n c i p l e whereby 
he was able t o escape the reductioni^sm o f e m p i r i c i s t philosophy. 
He saw t h a t the r e a l i t y o f human values l a y beyond the plane 
of mere existence where p o s i t i v e knowledge o f t r u t h and f a l s i t y 
was imprisoned. 
Looking back on these e a r l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l attempts 
Marcel sees them as d u l l and u n r e l a t e d t o everyday existence. : 
On the other hand, h i s e a r l y plays ajfee more concerned w i t h 
human experience. I n h i s metaphysical work h i s i n t e r e s t I n 
human and r e l i g i o u s values w*«c$ worked out i n d u l l and a b s t r a c t 
terms, as h i s only means of meeting the demaads o f empiricism; 
but h i s plays provided an o p p o r t u n i t y t o explore these f i e l d s 
w i t h o u t recourse t o i d e a l i s t schemes o f thought: 
"what seems t o me now t o be s t i l l worthy o f i n t e r e s t i s 
the way i n which, on the dramatic l e v e l , I t r i e d t o 
counteract t h i s almost bloodless speculation"(38). 
Marcel h i m s e l f f e e l s t h a t these dramatic works were concerned 
w i t h those areas o f experience t h a t he was soon t o t u r n t o 
i n h i s philosophy. I n h i s E x i s t e n t i a l i s t Background o f 
Human D i g n i t y he chooses h i s unperformed p l a y , Le P a l a i s 
de Sable, w r i t t e n j u s t before the F i r s t World War, as a c l e a r 
example o f h i s i n t e r e s t s . The a c t i o n takes place i n a French 
p r o v i n c i a l town j u s t before the Great War. The p r i n c i p a l 
character i s a p o l i t i c i a n , Roger Molrans, who i s dedicated t o 
the cause o f Catholicism. However, when h i s daughter, C l a r l s s e , 
38. E.B.H.D. p.27 
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t e l l s him of her wish to be a Carmelite, the shallowness 
of his position comes to l i g h t when he recoils i n horror 
at the thought of his attractive daughter shutting herself 
away. Clarlsse, deeply shocked by his reaction, pleads 
with him to withdraw from p o l i t i c a l l i f e and give up this 
hypocritical stance. Moirans, however, w i l l only comply 
i f she gives up her vocation. In confusion, consulting 
the worthless counsel of a priest, she persuades herself 
that yielding to her father's wishes i s her f i r s t duty. 
He would have liked her to marry a young'doctor, but she 
i s convinced that she i s not f i t t e d for the normal role 
of a woman. She feels herself condemned to l i v e with her 
father for the rest of her l i f e . At the end of the play 
Moirans realises that up t i l l then he has overlooked the 
obligations...and responsibilities of the bond that Is created 
when two people love each other. 
"What i s presented here as a definite r e a l i t y i s 
the bond between beings - what I later called 
intersub3ectivlty w(39). 
Marcel recognised i n these early plays an outworking of 
an area of experience that he was unable to approach i n 
his philosophical writings. 
However, i t was the outbreak of the Great War that 
f i n a l l y made Marcel abandon i d e a l i s t metaphysics. His 
search for transcendent values, above the plane of existence, 
was rudely shattered by the human cataclysm that shook the 
s t a b i l i t y and complacency. of France... Existence was no longer 
the sphere of the mundane and the t r i v i a l , but of the 
important and the tragic; The disaster that had overtaken 
mankind called for,, not his withdrawal, but his commitment; 
39. E.B.H.D. P-3^ . 
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the aloof attitude of someone^.like Romaln Rolland appeared 
to Marcel as ut t e r l y reprehensible.CV^A) 
His work i n the Information Service of the Red Cross 
brought him*Into direct contact-with the many personal 
tragedies of the Great War. This was to have far-reaching 
implications for the development of his philosophy. His work 
consisted of gathering information about those missing i n 
the war, and this Involved the keeping of f i l e s and 
questionnaires. These rather impersonal records formed a 
vi v i d contrast with the personal encounters-.-w.lth the people 
concerned. This profound experience raised i n Marcel the 
whole question of the significance of human existence. I f 
these, dossiers., i n which people had answered questions 
concerning their loved ones, could hot reveal the f u l l r e a l i t y 
of these personal tragedies, i n what way i s i t possible to 
understand human experience % This was a painful problem, 
but i t was one Marcel f e l t his philosophy ought to attempt 
to answer. The information that he gathered In f i l e s and 
his personal encounters with many of these unfortunate people 
made him ask himself - what was the significance of "information" 
and "the question and answer" I n human existence. 
"Interrogating, making inquiries, and responding -
these were my a c t i v i t i e s , and, as a philosopher, I 
tr i e d to throw some l i g h t on them."(40) 
The answer, the type of Information given, depends on 
the kind of question asked. Every question Is an attempt to 
resolve a state of indetermlnation (41). A disjunctive 
judgement i s Involved, Implying that only one of the judgements 
40. E.B.H.D. p. 37 41. For details of these arguments see 
E.B.H.D. pp.37-39, and M.B.I pp.138-45. 
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i s correct, and that the subject involved i s incapable of 
determining which one i t 1/sg Marcel i l l u s t r a t e s this principle 
with the example of a person confined to bed asking I f i t i s 
raining. For an answer to be given the question must be 
understood and the person providing the information must be 
i n a position to give i t . In order to understand the question 
he must put himself i n the position of the questioner. 
"The consciousness of the answerer i s the meeting-ground 
of the question and answer..... "(4-2). 
Certainly this Is an obvious consideration when a person 
i s attempting to gain information from another, but there i s 
a d i f f i c u l t y when one considers the more complex a c t i v i t y of 
the scientist. How can nature answer the question put to i t 
by the scientist ? The instrument does not "answer" him any 
more than the thermometer answers the doctor. \A process of 
selecting the suitable elements necessary for a specific 
reading i s Involved here. In a. sense the questioner makes 
the reply, but only by a mediating process. The scientist 
must eliminate everything that would make the answer appear 
arbitrary. The question must be free from ambiguity, for 
ambiguity i n the question results i n the impossibility of 
answering the problem. . . 
Objectivity, then, i s bound up with a world of questions 
and answers.v The answer to any question i s given by way of 
dialectics,"through the medium of a thou; that i s to say, by 
coming into communication with a wider and complementary 
experience"(^3). A person may ask himself where his watch i s . 
Possibly a friend knows where i t i s , or he may remember of 
42. M.J. p.139 43. M.J. p.1^0 
-31-
of his own accord. In either case, the objective Information 
required Is mediated through his questioning of himself or 
someone else. There I s , however, a dist i n c t i o n between the 
fact and the answer that conveys I t . The answer acts as a 
mediator between the Information and those Interested. Nor 
can this distinction be eliminated, for mediation Is always 
Involved (44) . Hence, In regard to sc i e n t i f i c Inquiry, the 
experiment acts as the mediator and Interlocutor. 
"In other words I t seems that for us r e a l i t y Is something 
that never answers but from which a l l answers must be 
derived"(45). 
When someone asks "when did Descartes die?" and one replies 
"In 1650", I t Is not the fact that answers, but the tr u t h "as 
transformed In an Interlocutor"(46). A l l objective truths, 
such as the statement "Descartes died i n 1650" are defined -
as an answer to a possible question. 
"Knowledge, the knowledge of someone, can thus only be 
considered as a t o t a l i t y of answers susceptible of 
being liberated i n this.or that given situation" ( 4 7 ) . 
Marcel's discussion of the implications of the question and 
answer had important bearings on his understanding of 
objectivity and i t s relation to human dialogue. A question 
can only be answered by a being capable of answering; and 
therefore a l l objective information i s mediated by such a 
person. The information that Marcel had gathered i n his f i l e s 
was brought to him by people. Such data could not be divorced 
from the source from which i t came. Already he had established 
a principle that was of the utmost importance for the 
44. M.J..p.l42 45. Hri&fe. 46. M.J.p.l43 47.M.J.p. 143. 
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development of his thought. 
His concern was to t r y and understand the significance 
of one's knowledge of one's fellow-men. How much of i t could 
be set out i n terms of impersonal information? The 1914-18 
war marks the turning-point i n his philosophical development. 
Until then his philosophical efforts were based on idea l i s t 
assumptions. He had sought to establish the nature of 
transcendent r e a l i t y . Man's beliefs and values belonged to 
this metaphysical order, above the plane of everyday t r i v i a l 
experience.;; In other words, philosophy was a means of escaping 
from the boredom of existence. However, the human tragedy of 
the Great War set Marcel on a new philosophical course. His 
primary concern from then onwards was to understand, philos-
ophically, the f u l l significance of human existence. This i s 
the r e a l i t y that the philosopher must investigate. Empirlcismii 
had already been seen to empty human experience of a l l 
significance. A philosophical approach was needed that would 
not attempt to understand human existence according to 
preconceived metaphysical conceptions, while at the same time, 
not reducing everything by empirical analysis. Marcel's 
philosophical aims were directed towards understanding .the 
r e a l i t y of human existence according to one's, experiences. 
Neither subjectivism nor objectivism was able to meet th i s 
challenge. His understanding of the significance of the 
questionnaire meant that any objective information concerning 
human beings was to be found within the personal encounter 
between people. Existence was no longer seen as the plane 
of mundane objectivism, but was an area that opened up for 
philosophy a whole area of experience that could not be dealt 
with by mere sc i e n t i f i c analysis. 
His philosophical effort s at this time are contained i n 
the Metaphysical Journal. The f i r s t part contains diary entrie 
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of those months just before the outbreak of war. These notes 
were intended to form a systematic philosophical work. The 
second part, which dates from after the outbreak of war u n t i l 
1923, i s similar i n i t s layout. These were s t i l l intended as 
the basis of a larger work, and as late as October 31st 1922 
he was s t i l l considering the nature of his proposed book. 
" I am s t i l l thinking about my introduction - i t 
might perhaps be called Metaphysics and Reality"(48). 
But he soon realised that large-scale treatises were not i n • 
keeping with the exploratory nature of his work. There was 
something a r t i f i c i a l and dishonest In the wish to "encompass 
the universe with a set of formulas"(49). His reaction 
against idealist philosophy brought i n i t s t r a i n an instinctive 
fear of assembling any "system", of imposing an a r t i f i c i a l 
unity and structure on r e a l i t y . His concern to give p r i o r i t y 
to concrete existence made the search for a metaphysical unity, 
a rational principle, whereby everything else could be log i c a l l y 
inferred, appear a r t i f i c i a l . His Intention from now onwards 
was to examine the concrete nature of human existence, or to 
put i t i n his own words,"to inquire more and more thoroughly 
into the intimate nature of experience, my own experience"(50). 
The inconclusive and fragmentary nature of his philosophical 
results i s no accident, but i n fact reflects the r e a l i t y of 
man's existence; "for our condition i n t h i s world does remain, 
i n the last analysis, that of a wanderer, an Itinerant being 
48. M.J. p.292 49.R.I. p.84:"encapsuler 1*universe dans unr 
ensemble de formules". 50. R.I. p.23*" a m'interroger de plus 
en plus anxleusement sur l a structure intime de 1'experience, 
de mon experience". 
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who cannot come to absolute rest except by a f i c t i o n , a 
f i c t i o n which i t i s the duty of philosophic reflection to 
oppose with a l l i t s strength"(51). Marcel set out to examine 
those intimate and personal experiences that make up every 
human individual, without introducing a p r i o r i presuppositions 
as to how man Is to be understood. 
The difference between the two parts of the Journal i n 
philosophical approach Is evident. This can be demonstrated 
by examining one of his earlier entries i n the second part. 
In the notes for February 1917 Marcel discusses the question 
of immortality. He admits that before the Great War he would 
have considered the problem i n a t o t a l l y different l i g h t . At 
that time he regarded immortality, l i k e religious f a i t h i t s e l f , 
as beyond the truth of ver i f i c a t i o n . B e l i e f In Immortality 
could not be proved' for I t was an affirmation of f a i t h ; Indeed 
i t arose from f a i t h . Belief In immortality, l i k e belief i n 
God., was involved i n the act of freedom that transcended 
material conditions. His only comment on this now i s that 
the s p i r i t u a l order seemed to be nothing but the eternity of 
Ideas. Now, however, he feels the problem i s to be treated 
more and more i n personal terms. A tentative suggestion Is 
made that the subject may best be understood i n terms of love 
- that love wishes for the eternity of i t s object. He 
understands himself to be appealing to a common human experience 
which would then be sufficient v e r i f i c a t i o n , but he admits 
that this i s a l l very ambiguous. But this new mood seems to 
Indicate the direction i n which Marcel was now turning. He 
was now adopting a new form of realism, where immediate 
51. M.B,l3;,p.l33. 
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experlence was of prime significance. 
"Immortality, understood not In the hyper-ldeallst 
sense we were just dealing with, but i n the Kdtealist sense 
can only be absolutely personal"(52). 
His understanding of religious belief took on a new 
significance. Previously, In his concern to preserve the 
non-objective nature of God, he had stressed his transcendence. 
Religious f a i t h was a question-of participating i n the trans-
cendent being of God. But now Marcel expressed man's 
relationship with God i n personal terms. He cannot be 
objectified, he can never be a t h i r d person. In other words, 
God i s the absolute "thou" that can never become a "him". One 
cannot obtain information about God as a "him" through another 
person. One can only address God face to face, and this must 
be the principle with which to understand prayer. In contrast, 
sc i e n t i f i c knowledge i s limited to the realm of the t h i r d 
person. 
Marcel's investigations lntcvthe significance of the 
question-answer a c t i v i t y had led him into a full*examination 
of the nature of the second person which u n t i l then had only 
been understood as being of grammatical significance (53) . As 
his philosophical work gathered momentum, once the war was 
over when he would presumably have had more time, he worked 
out the far-reaching significance of these preliminary 
observations. The function of the "thou" and i t s relation to 
the "he" or " i t " opened up the whole question of the nature 
and significance of human existence and i t s connection, or 
rather contrast, with the realm of objectivity. 
52.M.J. p.134 53. E.B.H.D. pp. 38-9 
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The . realm of objectivity i s the realm of the t h i r d 
person. Religious belief i s not.to he understood, as I t was 
i n the earlier period^ as a mode of transcending this realm. 
Rather, f a i t h and belief- i n God are to be expressed i n terms 
of the second person - the "I-thou" dialogue; God Is no 
longer to be understood transcendentally, but i n personal,. 
existential terms, and those terms are prior to, and provide 
the context for, objective Judgements. Again, previously 
f a i t h , l i k e love, could not be subjected to judgement because 
i t transcended the objective sphere; now, however, judgement 
i s ruled out because i t only belongs to the t h i r d person. 
When one talks with someone for whom one has no. particular 
affection or attachment, that person appears as someone 
possessing answers to questions concerning himself - In other 
words, he i s treated as a source of Information as required 
on a questionnaire. -tBut clearly t h i s way of approaching 
a person Is ruled out i n a relationship of love. 
"The more I love a being and the more I participate 
In his l i f e the less adequate this way of thinking 
i s shown to be"(54). 
Such data, as where he or she lives or was born, are irrelevant. 
The "thou" can never be a mere store of common facts, to be 
ransacked by anyone who happens to come along. The notion of 
"answer" i s closely bound up with the "thou", although the 
"thou" i s that which one can invoke rather than judge to 
be capable of answering me. Any judgement of a person Is 
concerned with "him" as a th i r d person, and does not take 
the "thou" into account. Someone who loves this person may 
54. M.J. p.158 
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accept the judgements, but, because he loves, he goes beyond 
them. He sees his beloved as an Individual, and an.Individual, 
as a unique person, cannot be compared with another. Love, 
then. Is Intimately connected, not with judging or comparing, 
but with seeing the other person as a unique Individual. For 
Marcel love Is an appeal of the " I " to the " I " . 
Marcel made use of the term "appeal" to safeguard the 
personal relationship of the "I" and the "thou". God Is the 
absolute appeal, and prayer Is an Invocation of God as 
absolute appeal. Marcel was at pains to stress the incompatib- . 
l l l t y of prayer and speculative thought. When one addresses 
God as "Thou" no place can be given to such questions as 
"what Is God's attitude towards my prayer?" Such an attitude 
Immediately reduces God to the level of a t h i r d person, and 
then we cease to treat God as God. The question of prayer 
underlines the problem of how one can speak about God. The 
attitude of prayer precludes speculative Inquiry. God Is 
Ineffable, not because of his transcending a l l knowledge, but 
because he Is related to the Individual as a second person. 
However, the constant danger here Is of l i m i t i n g God to his 
relations with believers (55). God Is a "thou" for the f a i t h f u l 
because they matter to him, but the objective world i s seen 
as an " i t " , because no direct dialogue can take place with i t . 
Yet i t i s pertinent to ask whether the world.can be wholly i n 
the t h i r d person to^God, and therefore foreign to him. To 
think that the world could be an object to God i s to deny God 
as God. But i s i t not natural to understand f a i t h as l i f t i n g 
oneself up to the l i v i n g God for whom one i s a thou", away 
from the idea of the world for which one i s of no concern? 
55.M.J. p.273 
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But Marcel would reply.that one must beware of elevating 
God above the universe. 
" I tend to think that this elevation of the soul to 
to God above a l l that happens Is transitory and i s 
only a preliminary step and a preamble so to speak 
of religious l i f e " ( 5 6 ) . 
God, as the absolute"thou", answers prayer, invocation, 
appeal; but the object, as the "he" or " I t " , can only be 
thought of as Indifferent to the act In which I t i s thought 
of. In th i s respect Marcel saw the value of the Insight of 
realism. 
" I can only think the object as object In r e a l i s t terms, 
- and as soon as I think a subject as object exactly 
the same applies" (57) . 
Realism i s implied i n the very concept of an object. No 
longer was Marcel concerned merely to transcend the realm 
of the v e r i f i a b l e , but set himself the task of inquiring 
into the precise nature of objectivity.. In fact, r e l i g i o n 
i t s e l f did not entirely escape the bounds of realism. In 
an entry for March 17th, 1920, Marcel admitted the l a t t e r ' s 
importance for the believer; " a certain type of v e r i f i c a t i o n 
Is possible or at least postulated"(58) . However, Marcel 
was constantly aware of a twofold danger here. On the one 
hand, i f the absolute "thou" Is not to appear arbitrary, he 
i s not to be enclosed within the relation he has with me; on 
the other hand, there i s a danger of restoring an objectivity 
to God that has r i g h t l y been banished.from his sphere. 
Marcel saw human existence as characterised by dialogue, and 
56. M.J. pp.229-30 57. M.J. p.161 58. M.J. p.238 
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l n ^ t h i s theory he sought to resolve the age-old tension 
between subjectivism and objectivism* Human r e a l i t y i s 
no longer seen as necessitating the transcendence above 
existence, but i s intimately bound to existence i t s e l f . 
Clearly the contrast that he established between the second 
and th i r d persons made I t impossible to maintain the confusion 
between existence and objectivity, for objectivity i s only 
to be understood as a th i r d person i n relation to the "I-thou" 
dialogue, which i s at the basis of human existence. In thi s 
l i g h t the following passage takes on significance: 
"For more than a year (and In a confused way doubtless 
for much longer) I have been inclined to effect a 
radical dissociation between the ideas of existence and 
objectivity" ( 5 9 ) . 
His experiences during the war had led him to see how 
inadequately the ide a l i s t philosophies dealt with the 
significance of existence, for there i t was reduced to a 
minimum role for the sake of rational principles and definitions. 
The more the object i s emphasised "as object" the more the 
existential aspect i s l e f t out. The object Is treated with 
a certain "Insularity", I t s existence not being taken Into 
account. "In r e a l i t y existence and the thing that exists 
cannot be dissociated" (60) . Marcel was acutely aware of the 
chasm that existed between i d e a l i s t philosophy and Integral 
human existence." 
But existence i s not some obscure abstraction that has 
been somehow l e f t aside by the idealists. Bather, i t was i t s 
Immediacy that had been overlooked. There i s i n fact an 
59. M.J. p.281 60. M.J. p. 321 
unquestionable assurance concerning existence, and i t i s to 
be considered primary - i n other words,. I t cannot be reduced 
or derived. The immediate experience of existence automatically 
rules out any proof or demonstration. A judgement i s concerned 
with an object d i s t i n c t from I t s e l f , but there i s no question 
of this here: "the fundamental assurance we are dealing with 
here Is of the order of sentiment or feeling"(6l). Existence 
belongs to a realm beyond objectivity. Where immediate 
apprehension and participation render the t r a d i t i o n a l relation 
between subject and object inapplicable. Jean Wahl, In his 
study of Marcel's journals (62), compared these theories with 
those of his earlier work. Instead of what Wahl described 
as the "immediate capable of i n f i n i t e mediation" Marcel was 
now propounding a notion that could only be described as 
"the non-medlatible Immediate". This theory of participation 
i s not to be confused with anything in.his earlier work. Marcel 
was now concerned to understand personal experience, and t h i s 
was seen as participation I n the immediacy of existence, not 
i n the transcendent. "FbetOrie>${&oketei df' "In the Fi r s t 
Fart of the Journal i s not IsirtajcSJLy transcendent, for we are 
immanent within i t s being i n the Second Part i s not purely 
immanent; by i t we reach beyond ourselves; we are Involved i n 
something that i s beyond us"(63). Existence, as participation 
In the immanent. Is identified i n the primary order of feeling 
or sensation, and this i s radically opposed to objective 
analysis. Hence, the foundation of objectivity and i n t e l l i g i b -
i l i t y i s basically u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
The Importance that Marcel gave to feeling and sensation 
i n human experience Is closely a l l i e d to the significance he 
61. M.J. p.324. 62. WahlU930)p.S6 -."l'lmme'dlat inflnlment med-latlsable","l'immedlat non-mediatlsable". 63.Wahl p.91:"L?Un de la Premiere Partie du Journal n'est pas purement transcendent, nous sommes immanents en l u i ; l * S t r e de l a Deuxieme Partie n'est pas purement immanent; par l u l nous nous depassons nous mimes; nous plongeons dans quelque chose qui nous depasse." 
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attached to the notion of presence. I t i s possible to trace 
these theories back to his constant awareness of the presence 
of his deceased mother. I t i s also possible - and for the 
purposes of philosophical study more important - to recognise 
an Indebtedness to Bradley. Indeed Wahl suggested (64) that 
Marcel's philosophy of existence was merely a development, or 
continuation, of the line that leads from Hegel to Bradley. 
Wahl maintained that Marcel drew much inspiration from Bradley's 
view of the subjective ego, involving a stress on the importance 
of sensation; also Bosanquet's theory of the unity of the 
world and the ego made an impact on him. Marcel, according to 
Wahl, f i n a l l y reached a position that was i n fact the very 
opposite of neo-hegelianism, i n a restoration of the "Immediate". 
"G.Marcel i s going to unite the idea of the Immediate 
and the idea of the absolute, which, according to Bradley, 
were the very opposite of each other".(65) 
One cannot doubt that the Anglo-Saxon idealists made an 
important contribution to the development of Marcel's thought. 
But Wahl's view takes no account of the impact of such an 
important h i s t o r i c a l event as the Great War. I t i s hoped to 
show that these shattering events compelled him to look for 
philosophical inspiration elsewhere. Bradley and Bosanquet 
did not help him to answer the c r i t i c a l questions of human 
experience that the war brought to the fore. 
That Marcel s t i l l appreciated certain aspects of id e a l i s t 
thought can be seen i n his arguments concerning the significance 
of feeling. Intimately connected with Marcel's understanding 
64.Wahi,p.77 65. Wahl, p.77:"G.Marcel va unlr l'idee d'lmmediat 
et l'idee d'absolu qui, chez Bradley, etalent encore les 
contraires l'une de 1'autre". 
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of feeling was his examination of the role of the bodys both 
were not to be treated objectively. He admits his Indebtedness 
to Bradley, but Marcel's aims were somewhat different. 
"We are concerned essentially with determining the 
metaphysical conditions of personal existence"(66). 
Such conditions involve the primacy of sensation: "existence 
can only be sensed, as sensation i s the mode i n which the 
continuity of.anything whatever with my body can be given to 
me as a datum."(67) 
Consequently, an objective representation of the nature 
of feeling i s misleading, and any analogy with the notion of 
a message.is to be avoided. I t i s natural to consider sensation 
as a kind of communication between two telegraph stations, or to 
Imagine i t to be l i k e the scent of a flower - i n other words, 
to think of i t as a transmission. But for the event to be 
translated into such language, i t would be necessary for i t to 
be given as a datum, and this i s clearly not the case. Bather, 
sensation, as a pure Immediate, i s incapable of being designated 
or characterised, and this i s doubtless incompatible with the 
nature of any object. The existential immediacy of sensation 
must not be thought of as an abstract immanence, but rather 
as "an effective presence"(68). This presence i s not the 
presence of someone or something, for that would be to reintroduce 
a duality, a distin c t i o n between subject and object. Instead, 
i f sensation i s not to be conceived of as a message, as a 
communication between two stations, but as absolute presence, 
then " I t must involve the Immediate participation of what we 
normally c a l l the subject i n a surrounding world from which 
no veritable frontier seperates i t " ( 6 9 ) . As mentioned already, 
66. M.J. p.255 67. M.J.p.269 68.M.J.p.331 69.M.J.pp.331-2 
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Marcel's examination of sensation was accompanied by a 
consideration of the significance of the body. Being 
incarnate, l i k e feeling, Is a mode of existence; i t i s 
indispensable to being i n the world. f. 
Inasmuch as a human being communicates with others 
I t would appear that his or her body i s interposed between 
them, as a mediator. But the relation between the self and 
the body i s an elusive one, for there are as many dangers 
involved i n thinking of one's body as an instrument or a 
machine as there are i n imagining sensation as a kind of 
message. Nor. can i t be treated objectively as one's possession 
as i f i t can be disposed of at one's own w i l l . The po s s i b i l i t y 
of suicide underlines the problem here, for to dispose of 
onetsJhBody. i s to dispose of oneself. Incarnation i s a condition 
of human existence. Admittedly, the person and the body are 
not identical, but they cannot be separated. To consider 
the body as an instrument i s similarly misleading. An 
instrument as such i s an extension of the function of the 
body. But this would imply that the body i s an extension 
of something else. I t may be suggested that i t Is the soul& 
but this would be to convert the soul into another body. The 
notion of instrumentality, then, involves an i n f i n i t e regress. 
Instrumental mediation belongs to the world of objectivity. 
The significance, for Marcel, of the body i s not that i t i s 
objective, but that i t i s the precondition of objectivity: 
"The world exists i n the measure i n which I have 
relations with i t which are of the same type as my 
r e l a t i o n s with my own body that i s to say, inasmuch 
as I am incarnate"(70). 
The body, then, i s a condition of our existence i n the world. 
The immediate experience of being bound to one's own body, 
which i s an object(body) and a non-object (one's own body), 
constitutes the way existence i s defined. There i s something 
i n one's own body that cannot be reduced to i t s objective 
q u a l i t i e s . At the same time, the world only e x i s t s insofar 
as one acts upon i t , and t h i s action i s dependent on the f a c t 
that one has a body. An object i s something th a t does not 
take one i n t o account, and Insofar as i t does not take one 
i n t o account, one's body does not seem to be one's own body. 
I n these philosophical i n q u i r i e s Marcel was attempting 
to c l a r i f y how sensation and the ro l e of one's body were 
conditions of human existence; ; As a consequence of his 
examination of the significance of question and answer, 
dialogue and communication were seen to have central 
significance i n e x i s t e n t i a l experience. A l l objective 
knowledge i s understood- as a t h i r d party i n relation- to 
t h i s dialogue. Therefore existence, as i t i s f e l t and 
experienced, does net belong to the realm of the " i t " , and 
i s thus incapable of being objectivised. 
The question now arises: how did Marcel conceive of the 
rel a t i o n s h i p between existence and the realm of the "thou"? 
The person to whom one ref e r s as "him" has been relegated 
to an object. There i s no d i r e c t awareness of tha t person, 
as knowledge of him i s mediated by someone else. Only i n the 
d i r e c t e x i s t e n t i a l encounter can personal values be found. 
I n other words, love and intimacy w i l l not be discovered 
where men t r e a t each other as mere objects, f o r true human 
70. M.J. p.269 
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relatlonships are based on a d i r e c t awareness of personal 
q u a l i t i e s . The bond between the " I " and the "thou" i s where 
the depths of human existence are to be found; here the closfeiy 
connected notions $o£. presence and value are to be understood. 
Existence i s no longer f o r Marcel the place of reductionist 
o b j e c t i v i s a t l o n , but the guarantee of worth and value,"for 
our worth i s decreased to the extent to;£which our a f f i r m a t i o n 
of existence i s l i m i t e d , pale and hesitant"(71)- Man can only 
be examined objectively i f one only takes his external 
characteristics i n t o account; but these considerations are 
subordinate-fc the profound re a l i . t l e s of man's inner l i f e . 
Sottiaux has described Marcel as a philosopher of the inner 
l i f e (72). The f u l l a c t u a l i t y of t h i s inner being, t h i s 
i n t e r i o r i t y as Marcel c a l l s I t , i s only recognised i n the 
dialogue of one human subject to another. External i n t e r e s t s 
take place only as a t h i r d party i n r e l a t i o n to t h i s dialogue. 
The development of Marcel's philosophy especially I n the 
years j u s t a f t e r the Great War, was both a struggle w i t h and 
a development of i d e a l i s t themes. I n his concern to penetrate 
the hidden depths of human experience he reacted w i t h the 
I d e a l i s t s against the m a t e r i a l i s t view that man i s a mere 
body to be examined. Nevertheless he realised that i d e a l i s t 
philosophy was too s u b j e c t i v i s t . The answer to positivism 
was not s u b j e c t i v i s t idealism, but an examination of personal 
values as they are experienced. Man l i v e s by a constant 
process of dialogue and a l l objective knowledge i s mediated 
w i t h i n t h i s context. His experiences i n the Red Cross led 
him i n t o new philosophical paths where his primary concern 
71. M.J. p.317 72. Sottiaux (1956),p.9. 
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was to establish'a v a l i d theory of personal knowledge. The 
theory of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , the encounter between people, 
f i t t e d neither i n t o the p o s i t l v i s t nor the I d e a l i s t categories. 
Marcel's point was th a t knowledge of human beings belongs to 
a domain of i t s own. 
These preoccupations can be traced back to 191^-i yet, to 
Marcel's own astonishment, i t was not u n t i l July 23rd 1918 
that he undertook to expound the subject, the war years 
i n t e r r u p t i n g his w r i t i n g . The paucity of entries i n his 
metaphysical d i a r i e s demonstrate t h i s f a c t . During these years 
a f t e r the Great War h i s theory of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y was 
developed. His concern to elucidate the significance of 
human dialogue was accompanied by a determination to define 
the l i m i t s of o b j e c t i v i t y . These themes were to preoccupy 
him from then onwards; indeed i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y was to assume 
a central r o l e i n his philosophy (73). 
We have seen that the war years were a turning point I n 
Marcel's philosophical development. His experiences i n the 
Bed Cross coincided with his study of Royce's philosophy. 
His philosophical development cannot be explained as a simple 
development of Hegel or Bradley's Idealism, coloured by h i s 
experiences during the war. His work i n the Information 
Service gave him a new awareness of the purpose of philosophy, 
;and Eoyce opened up f o r Marcel, i n t h i s new s i t u a t i o n , a 
whole new f i e l d of philosophical understanding. Royce's 
great work, The Problem of Christianity.appeared a t t h i s 
c r i t i c a l time i n Marcel's thought. The notion of i n t e r -
s u b j e c t i v i t y was only possible through his study of Royce, 
73. The theory of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y w i l l be expounded i n 
chapter f i v e . 
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f o r I t w i l l be shown i n t h i s work that Royce's theory 
of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n lay behind Marcel's own theories. 
Indeed, as Marcel returned to serious philosophical 
study, the name of Josiah Royce f i r s t appeals i n his 
Journal, and t h i s was i n connection w i t h the question 
of human dialogue and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h o b j e c t i v i t y . 
I n his entry f o r August 23rd 1918 he touches on Royce's 
notion of t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n s . 
"Here l i e s the profound Importance of Royce's 
triadIsm and I think i t has never been made 
s u f f i c i e n t l y e x p l i c i t " ( 7 ^ ) . 
This reference can be coupled w i t h a similar comment i n 
his essay Existence and O b j e c t i v i t y , w r i t t e n i n 1925t i h 
which he discusses the t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n between subject 
and object. The r e l a t i o n may look dyadic, but t h i s i s 
only so i n appearance: 
"Only : as Royce pointed out w i t h admirable c l a r i t y 
i n his l a t e r philosophical work, t h i s i s only i n 
appearance; the r e l a t i o n i s i n r e M i t y a t r i a d " ( 7 5 ) . 
During the war years Marcel had made a close examination 
of Royce's work. The l a t t e r ' s book The Problem of 
Ch r i s t i a n i t y had not been completed u n t i l 191^5 i t was 
i n i h i s book that his theory of t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n s was 
f u l l y propounded. Marcel must have studied t h i s work 
between 191^ and 1918, which i s when Royce's triadism 
i s f i r s t mentioned by Marcel. Marcel attached great 
importance to the notion of t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n s i n his 
understanding of human dialogue i n r e l a t i o n to the 
?b. M.J. p.146 75. M.J. p.336 
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objective world. The Intersubjective bond played a c r u c i a l 
r o l e i n formulating one's experience of the external 
world. The r e l a t i o n between the subject and the objective 
world was t r i a d i c i ; 
The develppment of Marcel's philosophy has been 
traced as ^aHAJthe emergence of his theory of i n t e r -
s u b j e c t i v i t y , i n connection w i t h which. Marcel f i r s t 
shows an i n t e r e s t i n the work of Royce. But the p o s i t i o n 
that has been argued i n t h i s chapter has much more 
evidence to support i t than the one or two isolated 
references i n Metaphysical Journal. The main evidence 
i s supplied by the series of a r t i c l e s which Marcel 
published under the t i t l e La Metaphyslque de Joslah 
Royce i n the Revue de Metaphyslque et de Morale f o r 1918 
and 1919. I n t h i s c r i t i c a l study he displays a knowledge 
of a l l Royce's major philosophical works. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Marcel's "La metaphysloue de Joslah Royce". 
The circumstances of the o r i g i n of t h i s work are very 
obscure. As mentioned i n the l a s t chapter (1) i t appeared 
i n the form of four a r t i c l e s I n the Revue de Metaphyslque 
elff.de Morale ln££l8 and 1919 (2), but Marcel makes no 
reference to I t i n his d i a r i e s of that time; nor i s I t ever 
mentioned I n his l a t e r works. Therefore i t i s d i f f i c u l t to 
ascertain, exactly what i t was that prompted him to w r i t e 
t h i s work. After a l l , i f the four a r t i c l e s are taken as a 
whole, La Metaphyslque de Joslah Royce constitutes the largest 
c r i t i c a l study that he ever undertook - large enough indeed 
f o r i t to appear i n book-form i n 1945. 
Marcel conducted t h i s study a t a time when his own 
philosophy was undergoing important changes. Royce, who died 
i n 1916, did not complete his l a s t ma$or work, The Problem 
of C h r i s t i a n i t y , u n t i l 1914; so Marcel must have read t h i s 
book during the war. This would confirm our contention t h a t 
his i n t e r e s t i n Royce r e f l e c t s the 'change tha t was taking 
place i n his own pos i t i o n . There were c e r t a i n characteristics 
of Royce's philosophy that would a t t r a c t Marcel a t a time 
when he was searching f o r a new understanding of human 
experience.Before discussing these basic features I t W i l l be 
useful to give a b r i e f o u t l i n e of the work. 
The f i r s t section of Marcel's study closely follows 
the arguments set out i n the Glfford Lectures, The World and 
the I n d i v i d u a l , where Royce examined the various approaches to 
1. See pp.4?-48. 2. The f i r s t two parts were published I n 1918, 
and the l a s t two i n 1919. 
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the problem of being before he revealed his own theory, the 
i n t e r n a l meaning of ideas. He concluded th a t to be i s to 
embody "the complete I n t e r n a l meaning of a c e r t a i n absolute 
system of .Ideas - a system, moreover, which I s genuinely 
implied i n the true i n t e r n a l meaning or purpose of every 
f i n i t e idea, however fragmentary"(3). Since the i n t e r n a l 
meaning can only be embodied i n an i n d i v i d u a l Royce's 
discussion i n e v i t a b l y led him to the notion of i n d i v i d u a l i t y . 
He Was concerned to uphold the Importance of the i n d i v i d u a l . 
Marcel stresses Royce's aversion to an em p i r i c i s t understanding 
of the human i n d i v i d u a l . The d i s t i n c t i o n that he drew i n h i s 
theory of nature between the world of description and the 
world of appreciation would i n no way permit the i n d i v i d u a l 
to be treated objectively. 
"The theory of nature allows us to comprehend more f u l l y 
t h i s notion which a t f i r s t appears strange, but which 
demonstrates I n a v i v i d manner the d i s l i k e Royce had 
f o r every empirical I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the I n d i v i d u a l , 
that i s , his re f u s a l to adopt i n t h i s way an objective 
c r i t e r i o n which suggests the t o t a l misunderstanding of 
what i s I n question"(4). 
Just as the human i n d i v i d u a l cannot be objectlvlsed, so human 
l i f e as such cannot be defined i n terms of an objective soul 
or substance. I t i s not so much a question of possessing a 
soul as of simply being. I n stressing t h i s p o s i t i o n of Royce 
3. W.I. 1 p. 36. 4. R.M.M.25 p.384:"La^theorle de l a nature 
nous permettra de mieuz s a l s l r cette idee qui p a r a l t d'abord 
sin g u l i e r e , mais qui i l l u s t r e d'une faqonsaisissante l a repugnance 
de Royce pour toute i n t e r p r e t a t i o n empirlste de l ' i n d i v i d u a l l t e , 
son refus d'adopter en p a r e i l l e matiere un c r i t e r e externe qui 
implique l a me'connaissance to t a l e de ce qui est en question." 
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Mareel*s.vocabulary i s very reminiscent of his own philosophical 
language. 
" I n short, i t i s not :a question of having, but of being, 
that i s , of becomings and t h i s s e l f - c r e a t i o n i s not a 
kind of jump i n t o the dark but i t i s the adherence of 
the whole of oneself to an order that one passionately 
desires"(5). 
Human experience cannot be o b j e c t i f i e d . The world of 
description i s both inadequate and inappropriate i n t h i s respect. 
I t i s impossible to understand one's f r i e n d , as a f r i e n d . I n 
the categories of the world of description; rather, when one 
forms a deep re l a t i o n s h i p w i t h someone, one "appreciates" that 
person as a human being, and a greater u n i t y i s created i n 
t h i s bond of friendship. What i s so noticeable here i s Marcel's 
i n t e r e s t i n Royce's search f o r categories i n which to express 
the concrete experience of existence, both i n human re l a t i o n s h i p s , 
and i n aesthetical and r e l i g i o u s spheres. S c i e n t i f i c positivism 
could I n no way deal adequately w i t h such intimacies; neverthe-
less the danger of mere subjectivism must be avoided a t a l l cost. 
Rather, Marcel, saw Royce's work as a search f o r a higher 
empiricism, reaching beyond the subject-object dichotomy. 
" I n f a c t the o b j e c t i v i t y which science seeks to establish 
i s only the substitute f o r that higher o b j e c t i v i t y which 
would be being i t s e l f , and which i s to be found I n the 
d i r e c t intercommunication of s p i r i t u a l natures, which are 
5. R.M.M. 2£ pp.384~5:"En somme 11 ne s'agit pas d'avoir.mals 
d ' i t r e , e'est a d i r e de se f a l r e ; et cette cre*atlon de soi n'est 
pas une sorte d'e'lan qu'on prendralt dans l e vide: e'est 
l'adhe'sion de tout soi-mSme a un ordre passionhement voulu*" 
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open to one another"(6). 
Man's rel a t i o n s h i p w i t h God i s no absorption of the 
human se l f i n t o the divine being, nor i s i t founded on a 
p l u r a l i s t i c monadism. I t i s a rela t i o n s h i p between in d i v i d u a l s ( 7 ) . 
Nor can i t be objectively analysed. - The intimate r e l a t i o n 
between God and the believer i s not one that can be explained 
i n terms of l o g i c a l necessity. 
"Between God and myself an intimate r e l a t i o n s h i p i s thus 
established, which furthermore, where i t i s understood 
gWi^^jpperly, cannot be seen as a purely l o g i c a l connection.... 
but only as a bond based on a common goal"(8). 
That Royce was concerned w i t h the issues raised by r e l i g i o u s 
b e l i e f throughout his philosophical career impressed Marcel 
deeply. Royce had discerned a close analogy between the 
rel a t i o n s h i p between man and God, and that between human 
individuals. Throughout the Gifford Lectures he was determined 
to preserve the i n t e g r i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l , r e s i s t i n g pressures 
to allow any absorption i n t o the Absolute. 
Royce-'IB theory of being led on to an examination of c e r t a i n 
issues - the problem of the one and the many, the problem ofsev.il, 
and the theory of time. Marcel expounded these themes i n the 
second section of his work. The t h i r d part concludes his 
examination of Royce's e a r l i e r work, and then goes on .to 
introduce the notion of l o y a l t y as i t was found i n the Philosophy 
6.R.M.M. 26 p. 129:"En e f f e t l ' o b j e c t i v i t e que l a science cherche 
a re'allser n'est que l e s u b s t i t u t de cette o b j e c t i v i t e superleure 
qui s e r a i t l'Stre mime, et qui r e s i d e r a i t dans 1'intercommunication 
directe de natures s p i r i t u e l i e s transparentes ies unes pour les 
autres." 7.R.M.M. 2£p.501. 8.R.M.M. 2£ p. 386 :"Entre Dieu-
et moi s'e'tabllt a i n s i une ln-tlme s o l i d a r i t e ^ qui ne peut d ' a l l i e u r s 
blen entendu etre regardee comme une^comie^iro^&reiiaent loglque.... 
mals seulement comme, un l i e u de f i n a l i t e " . " 
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of Loyalty. Although Marcel recognised i n t h i s work the 
beginning of Royce's f i n a l period, culminating i n the Problem 
of C h r i s t i a n i t y , he did not consider the e t h i c a l theories, 
centred on the notion of l o y a l t y , a r a d i c a l departure from 
his e a r l i e r i d e a l i s t philosophy. For Royce l o y a l t y was to 
be found i n being i t s e l f , as I t was defined I n his G l f f o r d 
Lectures. Loyalty i s i n no way an external bond between the 
Indi v i d u a l and the community - quite the contrary : " i t i s 
the active p a r t i c i p a t i o n of myself i n a concrete order.which 
one undertakes to serve, and Which i n r e t u r n bestows upon one 
the only r e a l i t y to which one can aspire"(9). The notion of 
l o y a l t y came to play an important r o l e i n the community of 
in t e r p r e t a t i o n . The concrete bias of Royce's discussion of 
the nature and significance of l o y a l t y i n human experience 
did not go unnoticed by Marcel. 
" I t i s f a i t h f u l to t h a t speculative empiricism which 
s^&%ii0M%ns-s>6toeihot the dominant characteristics of his 
doctrine"(10). 
I t would be a gross d i s t o r t i o n to i n t e r p r e t l o y a l t y i n any 
s u b j e c t i v l s t manner, according to which the chosen cause 
only has i t s r e a l i t y i n the act by which I t i s chosen as an 
object of duty, service and b e l i e f . 
Royce's concern f o r concrete r e a l i t y and his respect f o r 
empiricism are already i n evidence i n his Gi f f o r d Lectures and 
Marcel did stress the importance of t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of 
Royce's work. Nevertheless, Royce's s t r i v i n g towards a 
9. R.M.M. 26 p. 139: , ,il est p a r t i c i p a t i o n vivante du inol a un 
ordre concret qu'H s'engage a s e r v l r , et qui en retour l u i 
confere l a seule r e a l i t e a laquelle 11 pulsse pretendre." 
10. R.M.M. 26 p.146:"I1 est f l d e l e a cet emplricisme speculatlf 
qui reste un des t r a i t s dominants de sa doctrine". 
eoncreteness of expression found i t s maturest formulation 
i n the theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that formed the basis of t h i s 
l a s t work, The Problem of C h r i s t i a n i t y . An exposition of t h i s 
book was undertaken i n the l a s t section of Marcel's study. The 
central importance of the community of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n 
Royce's thought was of p a r t i c u l a r significance i n Marcel's 
assessment of his philosophy, f o r i t i s evident that Royce has 
taken human experience as the formative c r i t e r i o n upon 
which to b u i l d not only a theory of knowledge, but the 
metaphysical p r i n c i p l e of social organisation. Reality i s . 
dependent upon a true i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Certainly the l a t t e r 
phase of Royce's career appeared to Marcel to be the most 
o r i g i n a l and.the most i n t e r e s t i n g . 
"Once more i t seems that Royce fiad only slowly found 
ways of a r t i c u l a t i n g his most o r i g i n a l and profound 
work "(11) " . • 
The theory of the community of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n appeared to 
Marcel as a profoundly concrete philosophical expression of 
the natureyiof human experience and of the universe i n 
general. I n t e r p r e t a t i o n was not merely a t h i r d form of 
epistemology, I n addition to conception and perception, 
but was also a basis f o r understanding the nature of r e a l i t y 
i t s e l f . Royce had made a s i g n i f i c a n t attempt to formulate 
a metaphysical theory that did not lose i t s e l f i n abstractions, 
but remained t o t a l l y f a i t h f u l to concrete human experience. 
Not only i s man to be understood i n social terms, but the 
universe i t s e l f c a l l s f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and therefore i s to 
11. R.M.M. 26 p.238:"Encore une f o i s 11.semble que l a pensee^ 
l a plus o r l g i n a l e e t l a plus profonde de Royce n'avait trouve 
que tardivement les moyens d'expression...." 
-55-
be vmderstood I n the context of the i n t e r p r e t i n g community. 
The universe i s dominated by social categories. Human 
experience furnishes the model f o r these theories, f o r 
communication and dialogue belong to the heart of r e a l i t y ; 
communion i s to be found i n the very depths of the s p i r i t u a l 
l i f e : " o u r profound existence i s always a s p i r i t u a l cocaekiaJsjjdji. n, 
a discussion or a prayer"(12). Through his study Marcel 
characterises Royce's f i n a l period as "speculative empiricism". 
This, then, i s the basic outline of Marcel's study. I n 
attempting to analyse h i s main arguments i t i s Important t h a t 
one understands Marcel's alms. However, t h i s question does 
raise a problem, f o r the u n i t y of Royce's work does present 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . I t may be argued th a t Marcel l e f t h is exposition 
of The Problem of C h r i s t i a n i t y u n t i l the. f i n a l section because 
he recognised i n i t a r a d i c a l departure from Royce's e a r l i e r 
work. Certainly I t does appear to be very much d i f f e r e n t from 
his former w r i t i n g s , and Royce himself was awaise of the apparent 
d i s u n i t y of h i s work. Hence, i n the preface.to The Problem 
of C h r i s t i a n i t y he took great pains to stress how much t h i s 
book was I n keeping w i t h his former work. " I believe my present 
book to be i n essential harmony wi t h the bases of philosophical 
idealism set f o r t h i n various e a r l i e r volumes of my own, and 
especially i n the work e n t i t l e d The World and the Individual"(13). 
Marcel traced the development of Royce's philosophy w i t h 
enthusiasm,as the l a t t e r strove towards a concreteness of 
12.R.M.M.. 26 p.213:"notre vie prpfonde est toujours nn commerce 
s p i r l t u e l , tin colloque ou une p r i e r e . " 13. P.C. p. 38 
expression. Marcel recognised i n t h i s concreteness a move 
towards his own p o s i t i o n , as he himself had abandoned the 
philosophical a t t r a c t i o n s of i d e a l i s t speculation. 
"Last, but not l e a s t , the. theory of the community of 
in t e r p r e t a t i o n made i t possible forrfartnaraVmd &nJ;7fritf]Sfe 
than the log!co-mathematical scheme to which Royce had 
recourse i n the appendix of the World and the Individual"(14) 
Certainly the Problem of C h r i s t i a n i t y , preceded by The 
Philosophy of Loyalty in.1908, marked an .important advance i n 
his philosophical career; and Marcel d i d consider gfehat t h i s 
l a t e r work "indicates a t least a considerable advance I n 
c l a r i f y i n g the basic theses of Royce"(15). But I t does not 
necessarily follow that Marcel was only interested i n the l a t e r 
work of Royce, and that there was a d e f i n i t e break i n Royce's 
philosophical development. I n a sympathetic study such as 
t h i s i t i s only natural that he should r e f l e c t Royce's concern 
to stress the u n i t y of his work. 
Marcel stated the aim of his study very c l e a r l y , and t h i s 
purpose applies to the whole of the work. 
"As the very t i t l e of t h i s study indicates our purpose 
here i s only to give an exposition and,if necessary,to tbe 
sfcacfcio^^discussion of the s t r i c t l y metaphysical ideas 
a? 3$w£®Boyce." (16). 
14. R.M.M. 26 p.2i8:"Enfin e t surtout l a theorle j l e l a commun-
aute d ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n permet de se former une ide'e plus vivante 
et plus specifiable des rapports du f i n l et de l ' i n f l n l que l e 
schematisme loglco-mathematique auquel Royce a v a i t recours dans : l'appendice du Monde e£ L'Indlyidu". 15. R.M.M..26 p.218:"marque 
pour l e molns un progres considerable dans l ' e x p l i c i t a t i o n des 
theses fondamentales de Royce". 16. R.M.M. 2£ p. 342:"Notre but 
n'est i c i , comme l'indique l e t i t r e meme de eette e^tude, que 
de donner une exposition e t au besoin d'amorcer la mdiscussion des conceptions proprement metapnysiques de Royce. 
I t i s Important to stress that Marcel did not see the structure 
and methodolggy&fif his study as determined by chronological 
analysis; that i s , he did not begin his account with an exposition 
of The Religious Aspect of Philosophy and work his way through 
to the conclusion of The Problem of C h r i s t i a n i t y . On the 
contrary, as an i d e a l i s t Royce's philosophical work evolved 
around c e r t a i n central ideas :"<&fch£s philosophy i s organised 
around a centre"(17). The un i t y of Marcel's study i s based 
the 
upon^unifyihg p r i n c i p l e of Royce's work. For the l a t t e r 
active Intercommunication was the l i v i n g p r i n c i p l e of a l l 
r e a l i t y , i n opposition to mpnadism wi t h i t s assertion that 
each e n t i t y i s s e l f - r e l i a n t ; and t h i s thesis received i t s 
f u l l e s t expression I n the theory of the community of i n t e r -
pretation. But Marcel did not suggest that t h i s theory 
originated only i n his l a t e r work. I t was a development of 
the theory of being, as I t was expounded i n his Gifford 
Lectures. Indeed, his idea of being dominates a l l of his 
philosophical w r i t i n g s . Marcel, then, detected anti c i p a t i o n s 
of h i s l a t e r philosophy i n these e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s . Unlike 
some idealism, Royce did not present an uncompromising monism; 
Indeed, i n the system propounded i n The World and the I n d i v i d u a l 
" f i n i t e consciousness appears as one of the members of a 
s p i r i t u a l community, whose futures are i n a sense c e r t a i n . . . , 
and which however, i n another sense, require improvement w i t h i n 
t h i s very world"(18). The emphasis upon social awareness i n 
the theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n implies that knowledge of s e l f i s 
preceded by knowledge of others. But t h i s i s emphasised i n 
17. R.M.M. 2£ p.3^2:"cette philosophic s'organise d'un centre". 
18. R.M.M. 2^ p.502:"la conscience f i n i e apparalt comme membre 
d • una communaute' s p i r i t u e l l e , dont les destlnees en un sens 
sont assurees..., et qui cependahtemuftautre sens comporte un 
developpement dans ce monde mime." 
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Royce's e a r l i e r work, and Marcel missed no opportunity to 
point t h i s out. I n his concluding paragraph on the theory 
of nature i n The World and the I n d i v i d u a l Marcel comments on 
the p r i o r i t y of sofcfcal consciousness: 
"consciousness i s s o c i a l , insofar as i t bVesyif'flQn&£o*i 
without suppressing them. That i s because a l l true 
r e a l i t y i s social"(19). 
The social nature of being.is evident throughout the Gl f f o r d 
Lectures, f o r a l l f i n i t e selves are closely i n t e r r e l a t e d , each 
being a unique expression of the one f i n i t e w i l l . 
The f o u r t h conception of being, as f a r as Marcel was 
concerned, was an Important stage i n Royce's pilgrimage towards 
his theory of I n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I n other words, the Gi f f o r d 
Lectures represent an attempt to understand the social nature 
of the f i n i t e s e l f , and what i s here expressed i n inadeqiiate 
language i s formulated i n more concrete terms i n The Problem 
of. C h r i s t i a n i t y . The ontology of his Idealism i s necessary 
f o r understanding his l a t e r work, and Marcel was convinced that 
i t underlies the assumptions of t h i s l a t e r period; 
"the theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s not a substitute f o r 
the f o u r t h conception of being, but, on the contrary, 
ss^fsneeds i t as i t s basis" (20). 
The roots of his philosophy of l o y a l t y are also to be found 
f i r m l y embedded i n his e a r l i e r work. To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s 
contention Marcel quotes from the Gifford Lectures a s t r i k i n g 
19. R.M.M. 26 pp. 134-5s"la consclencejest soclMe pour autant 
qu'elle v i t , s i l'on peut d i r e , de contrastes, d'oppositions 
qu'elle transeende, mais qu'elle ne supprime pas. E l l e l ' e s t 
parce que toute re*alite ve"rltable est soMale." 20. R.M.M. 26 
p.237:" l a thebrie de 1 ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ne se substltue pas 
fit l a quatrieme conception de l ' e t r e mais l a r e q u i e r t au 
contraire comme son fondement.%• 
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a n t l c i p a t i o n of his l a t e r e t h i c a l theory* 
Be somebody Have a plan; give u n i t y to your alms; 
intend something d e f i n i t e by your l i f e ; set before 
yourself etm. i d e a l . "(21) 
Although Marcel was deeply impressed by the l a t e r developments 
of Royce's philosophy, i t does not f o l l o w that he dissociated 
himself from the r e s t of his work. On the contrary, he 
continually stressed th a t the e a r l i e r theories prepared f o r , 
and found t h e i r culmination i n , the theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
Marcel recognised Royce*s idealism to be an attempt to 
abandon a r i d abstractionism and to regain a more concrete 
expression, giving a f u l l e r value to human experience. I t 
was the endeavour to f i n d a new speculative empiricism that 
Marcel considered to be the most o r i g i n a l and s t r i k i n g f a c t o r 
I n Royce's philosophy. 
Marcel's exposition of Royce does not attempt to transform 
Royce's idealism but rather recognises i t s e x p l i c i t l y I d e a l i s t 
character. What i t does, nevertheless, make' clear i s that 
i t i s i n a "general sense" that Rbyce i s "resolutely i d e a l i s t " ( 2 2 ) 
Moreover h i s method was derived d i r e c t l y from Hegelian d i a l e c t i c , 
although i t would be misleading to pronounce him a hegelian, 
even i n h i s e a r l i e s t work. Indeed he was motivated by a deep 
sjer^-jv-Ci.-i of German hegelianism w i t h a l l . i t s abstraction and 
all-embracing claims. Marcel i s quite emphatic on t h i s point. 
" I n various places he has taken great care to draw 
a t t e n t i o n to a l l that disturbs him i n Hegel's philosophy: 
the suspicion of positive science, the misuse of d i a l e c t i c s , 
21. W.I. 2pp.288.' Marcel's t r a n s l a t i o n i s found i n R.M.M. 2Ji p. 384 
"Soyez quelqu'un...c'est a d i r e ayez un plan, u n i f i e z vos flnf£; 
que votre v i e a i t pour vbus une s i g n i f l c a t i o n de'finie; ayez un 
i d e a l . " 22. R.M.M..25 p . 3^s"En ce sens general Royce est 
resolument i d e a l i s t e . " 
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and a l s o perhaps, more fundamental* a l l t h a t I s so t o 
speak inhuman I n the all-embracing l o g i c a l scheme such 
as Hegel conceived."(23) 
Marcel r e a l i s e d t h a t , despite h i s i d e a l i s t s t andpoint, Royce 
respected the importance o f the e m p i r i c a l i n understanding 
human experience. He suggested, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t Royce 
displayed c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t would place him w i t h 
the English e m p i r i c i s t s r a t h e r than the i d e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n 
stemming from Hegel. 
" I n Royce, along w i t h b o l d metaphysics which are from 
a d i f f e r e n t metaphysical c l i m a t e , there are t o be found 
t h a t cautious empiricism and t h a t ingenious and exact 
psychology which are very t y p i c a l l y E n g l i s h c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s " 
( 2 4 ) . 
The t r u t h i s t h a t Royce sought genuine and i n t e l l e c t u a l 
experience whenever i t was t o be found. I n t h i s search he 
took pains never t o lose s i g h t o f t h a t concrete r e a l i t y w i t h 
which one has contact i n everyday l i f e . Marcel spared no 
t r o u b l e t o u n d e r l i n e the deep impression t h a t Royce's empiricism 
made on him. 
" F a i t h f u l t o the e m p i r i c i s t t r a d i t i o n , although i n a 
remarkably profound and f r u i t f u l way, Royce on the 
con t r a r y i s concerned before anything else w i t h concrete 
experience, whether i t i s mine or yours, but under no 
'Axm^^'M^ZV- SB • ?vt . 
23. R.M.M. 2 £ pp. 3 3 9 - 4 0 :"II a p r i s soin en maint e n d r o i t 
d'appeler 1 ' a t t e n t i o n sur t o u t ce qu i l'inquie'ta dans l a 
philosophie de Hegel: l e meprls de l a science positive,1'abus 
de l a d i a l e c t i q u e , e t aussi peut-e^tre, p l u s profondement, t o u t 
ce q u ' i l y a pour a i n s i d i r e d'inhumaln dans l e panlogisme t e l 
que Hegel l * a concu. B 24.R.M.M. 2 £ p.340:"On re t r o u v e chez 
Royce, avec des hardiesse.s metaphysiques q u i sont d'un au t r e 
c l i m a t i n t e l l e c t u e l , c e t t e prudence e m p i r i s t e , ce psychologisme 
ingenieux e t p r e c i s qui sont b i e n des caracteres specifiquement 
a n g l a i s . " 
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circumstances I s i t experience i n general."(25). 
Royce's concern f o r concrete r e a l i t y and h i s respect f o r 
empiricism are evident i n h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l development. 
But h i s was an empiricism t h a t was t o be found w i t h i n an 
i d e a l i s t framework. His respect f o r the i n t e g r i t y o f the 
human i n d i v i d u a l * founded on an i d e a l i s t theory o f being, 
l e d him e v e n t u a l l y t o h i s theory o f the community of i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n . 
I t i s evident from h i s study o f Royce's philosophy t h a t 
Marcel recognised t h a t Royce belonged t o the i d e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n , 
but t h i s p a r t i c u l a r type o f i d e a l i s t philosophy impressed 
Marcel f o r i t d i s p l a y e d a serious concern t o explore the f u l l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e o f concrete experience and the important 
i m p l i c a t i o n s o f being an i n d i v i d u a l . Marcel noted i n Royce's 
G l f f o r d Lectures a determined s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t the dangers of 
absorbing the i n d i v i d u a l w i t h i n an a b s t r a c t system of ideas. 
Marcel saw Royce's work as a u n i t y , although he perceived t h a t 
the e m p i r i c i s t b i a s of h i s work, evident i n a l l h i s w r i t i n g s , 
a t t a i n e d a f u l l e r expression i n h i s theory o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
An a n a l y s i s o f La Me*taphyslque de Joslah Royce supports the 
c o n t e n t i o n t h a t Marcel d i s p l a y e d a warm sympathy f o r the whole 
of Royce's p h i l o s o p h i c a l w r i t i n g s , but h i s l a t e r work, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y The Problem o f C h r i s t i a n i t y , c o n s t i t u t e s the area 
where any d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e on Marcel i s t o be l o c a t e d . 
Support f o r t h i s argument can be found I n h i s other 
w r i t i n g s , although a c t u a l refernces are very few. There are 
25. R.M.M. 25 p.373:"Fidele a l a t r a d i t i o n e m p l r i s t e , 
singullerement approfondle^et e n r i c h i e , i l e s t v r a i , Royce est 
au c o n t r a l r e avant t o u t prebccupe de 1*experience c o n c r e t e , c e l l e 
q u i e s t l a mienne ou l a v o t r e , mais q u i n'est en-aucun cas 
Erfahrung uberhaupt. ** 
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two references I n Marcel*s own G l f f o r d Lectures, The Mystery 
of Being; there are two I n h i s The E x i s t e n t i a l Background o f 
Human D i g n i t y and one I n Homo V i a t o r ; the remainder (ni n e i n 
a l l ) are t o be found i n h i s Metaphysical Journal. 
I n h i s own account o f the development o f h i s thought I n . 
The E x i s t e n t i a l Background o f Human D i g n i t y he acknowledges 
the debt he owes t o Royce and American philosophy I n g e n e r a l ( 2 6 ) . 
I n h i s Metaphysical Journal he does o c c a s i o n a l l y a l l u d e t o the 
work of Royce, and t h i s can be taken as evidence supporting 
the impression given by La Metaphyslque de Joslah Royce. For 
in s t a n c e , i n an e n t r y f o r December 1st 1919 he discusses the 
place and meaning of the w i l l i n the a c t o f f a i t h and love. 
F a i t h i s a r e f u s a l t o compare. I n an i n d i v i d u a l there i s 
something t h a t transcends the scope of judgement, and anyone 
who loves t h a t person goes beyond any such judgement. Royce 
maintained t h a t love i n d i v i d u a l i s e s , f o r as an i n d i v i d u a l I s 
unique t h a t person i s beyond comparison. C l e a r l y Marcel was 
Impressed by Royce's i n t e r e s t i n the concrete. 
Nevertheless I t i s q u i t e c l e a r l y wrong t o regard Marcel 
as a t a l l s l a v i s h i n h i s a t t i t u d e towards Royce. I n h i s 
Metaphysical Journal he makes i t p l a i n enough t h a t he i s 
c r i t i c a l o f some of the p o s i t i o n s advocated by Royce I n h i s 
e a r l i e r work. For i n s t a n c e , i n an e n t r y f o r December 1st 1920 
Marcel admits t h a t Royce's n o t i o n o f the Absolute All-Knower 
pays f a r too l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n t o the importance o f human 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The same theme i s touched upon i n the e n t r y f o r 
December yrd. 1920 when Royce i s c r i t i c i s e d f o r m a i n t a i n i n g 
t h a t an omniscient thought i s i n v o l v e d I n every search f o r t r u t h . 
26. E.B.H.D.p.l 
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What we have j u s t said does n o t , however,weaken our 
argument t h a t Royce was a formative i n f l u e n c e on Marcel, f o r 
i t i s Royce'S l a t e r work t h a t represents the p o i n t of. contact. 
This i s very c l e a r from the way, i n which Marcel speaks of the 
theme of l o y a l t y . On each of the three occasions when he 
touches on t h i s theme he acknowledges the importance of Royce's 
work f o r h i s own t h i n k i n g on t h i s subject. I n a passage 
dated December 15th 1920 the value of l o y a l t y as an e t h i c a l 
p r i n c i p l e i s admitted. I n Homo V i a t o r s i m i l a r r e c o g n i t i o n 
i s given t o Royce's n o t i o n o f l o y a l t y t o a cause. The t r u e 
r e l a t i o n o f a person t o a community i s one of l o y a l t y ? Marcel 
quotes Royce's teaching t h a t t r u e l o y a l t y i s l o y a l t y t o l o ^ l t y , 
and t h i s i n t u r n i s l o y a l t y t o humanity. Marcel acknowledged 
the p r o f u n d i t y o f t h i s , but he admitted t h a t Royce may have 
ignored the e t M c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t o which i d e a l i s m runs. 
Nevertheless,iBSJspite. of c e r t a i n I n e v i t a b l e r e s e r v a t i o n s , 
Marcel was obviously deeply impressed by RoyceBs n o t i o n o f 
l o y a l t y ; i t d i d p l a y an important r o l e i n the working out of 
Marcel's own views about f i d e l i t y . L o y a l t y t o a cause i s no 
mere a l l e g i a n c e t o an a b s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e ; r a t h e r , the cause 
t o which l o y a l t y dedicates i t s e l f i s o f a supra-personal 
character. That Royce showed g r e a t respect f o r e m p i r i c a l 
r e a l i t y when f o r m u l a t i n g h i s e t h i c a l t h e o r i e s was of g r e a t 
importance t o Marcel's own p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n t e r e s t s , f o r the 
n o t i o n of- l o y a l t y appeared t o Marcel as a serious attempt t o 
come t o terms w i t h concrete r e a l i t y , w i t h o u t reducing human 
experience t o mere o b j e c t i v i s m . L o y a l t y ' s place w i t h i n the 
human community was of the utmost s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r Marcel's 
own understanding of f i d e l i t y i n the c o n t e x t . o f human r e l a t i o n -
ships. 
Indeed, i t was the s t r e s s given by Royce on s o c i a l 
awareness t h a t p a r t i c u l a r l y impressed Marcel. Royce's 
metaphysical t h e o r i e s found t h e i r c u l m i n a t i o n i n the theory 
of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i n which knowledge was understood t o be 
the possession o f a community. I n h i s G i f f o r d Lectures the 
o b j e c t of one's knowledge i s gained according t o the aims 
of the subject. I n h i s l a t e r t h e o r i e s , set out i n The 
Problem o f C h r i s t i a n i t y . o b j e c t i v e knowledge belongs t o a 
community which s e l e c t s I t s i n f o r m a t i o n according t o i t s 
needs and purposes. E t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s such as l o y a l t y are 
i n t i m a t e l y connected w i t h the n o t i o n o f community. The 
community i s maintained by the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l 
t o f o l l o w the cause o f the community. I t can be seen t h a t 
these t h e o r i e s can be traced back t o the p r i n c i p l e s under-
l y i n g h i s e a r l i e r work, although Marcel recognised t h a t they 
found t h e i r f u l l e s t expression i n The Problem of C h r i s t i a n i t y . 
Marcel d i d f e a r t h a t Royce had o b j e c t i f i e d the u n i v e r s a l 
community when i t could be b e t t e r represented as a 
d i s c u s s i o n o f ideas (27). Nevertheless, t h i s small r e s e r v a t i o n 
was v a s t l y outweighed by the f a r - r e a c h i n g impression t h a t 
Royce's work l e f t upon him. Royce's own v e r s i o n o f i d e a l i s t 
philosophy proved t o be a l a s t i n g I n f l u e n c e on Marcel because 
i t was d i f f e r e n t from the i d e a l i s m t h a t he had studied before 
the war, which was t o t a l l y incapable o f meeting h i s 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l needs. 
Marcel wished t o understand the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
our personal knowledge o f one another, found i n human 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s , a n d the area o f o b j e c t i v i t y . Royce's 
27. H.V. pp. 206-7 
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eplstemology, as I t was developed i n h i s l a t e r work, set 
out a theory t h a t coincided w i t h Marcel's own requirements. 
La Me'taph.vslque de Joslah Royce makes I t q u i t e p l a i n t h a t 
Royce's theory o f t r i a d l c r e l a t i o n s was o f c r u c i a l importance 
f o r Marcel, and t h i s c l a i m i s corroborated I n the references 
i n the Metaphysical J o u r n a l already mentioned (28). 
I n assessing the evidence o f Marcel's study o f Royce 
one can c l e a r l y see t h a t Marcel grasped the e s s e n t i a l u n i t y 
o f Royee's work. The theory o f the i n t e r n a l meaning o f ideas 
as set out i n h i s e a r l i e r work was a d e f i n i t e p r e p a r a t i o n and 
basis f o r h i s theory o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Royce was able to 
e s t a b l i s h an i d e a l i s t system t h a t could help Marcel t o 
formulate a philosophy o f existence by i t s i n s i g h t s i n t o 
the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f human relationships.. An examination o f 
La Metaphyslque de Joslah Royce does throw important l i g h t 
on the development o f Marcel's philosophy d u r i n g the p e r i o d 
o f the Great War and i t s aftermath. During t h i s time h i s 
theory o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y emerged and t h i s n o t i o n became 
c r u c i a l t o Marcel's concept o f a person. Having e s t a b l i s h e d 
i n t h i s chapter t h a t Marcel attached much Importance t o 
Royce's theory o f I n t e r p r e t a t i o n , our aim i n the f o l l o w i n g 
chapters i s t o e s t a b l i s h j u s t how he used the i n s i g h t s o f 
Royce's work i n forming the fundamental concept o f i n t e r -
s u b j e c t l v l t y . 
28. See above, page +7. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
I n t e r sub J e c t l v l t y . 
I n chapter three we traced the. o r i g i n s o f Marcel's 
theory o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . We saw how t h i s n o t i o n arose 
from the c o n t r a s t between o b j e c t i v e knowledge and personal 
knowledge. Marcel came t o - r e a l i s e t h a t the i n t i m a t e 
knowledge t h a t one gains from encounters w i t h other people 
cannot be formulated i n o b j e c t i v e terms, such as could be 
found i n the f i l e s o f the I n f o r m a t i o n Service. I n abandoning 
the i d e a l i s m o f h i s e a r l i e r years he had come t o appreciate 
the importance o f intercommunication between men i n t h e i r 
personal growth. Indeed, we saw i n the preceding chapter 
t h a t t h i s emphasis upon s o c i a l awareness found great 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n s p i r a t i o n i n h i s study o f Royce. Nevertheless, 
the impersonal nature o f modern s o c i e t y , w i t h i t s mass 
c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n , seemed t o hinder men from enjoying the 
experience o f personal communication. I n a l a t e r work 
Marcel stressed the problem o f man's i d e n t i t y i n a modern 
soc i e t y . 
"There can be no a u t h e n t i c depth except where there can 
be r e a l communion; but there w i l l never be any r e a l 
communion between i n d i v i d u a l s centred on themselves, 
and i n consequence morbidly, hardened, nor i n the 
heart o f the mass, w i t h i n the mass-state."(1) 
The dangers o f technocracy and the mass-state are only 
too apparent t o Marcel. L i f e i s becoming more and more 
organised. The S t a l i n i s t s t a t e i s an obvious example o f 
the e v er-increasing c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n o f western c i v i l i s a t i o n . 
The s t a t e f u n c t i o n s as a g i a n t b u r e a u c r a t i c machine, i n which 
1. M.A.H. p. 200 
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a l l t h a t I s human and personal f i n d s no place. The e f f e c t s 
upon man's self-understanding are calamitous. The emotive 
words " f u n c t i o n " and "machine" u n d e r l i n e Marcel's deepest 
f e a r s . I n t h i s automated s o c i e t y man i s reduced t o a 
machine h i m s e l f ; he serves a f u n c t i o n - a f u n c t i o n geared t o 
e f f i c i e n c y and p r o d u c t i v i t y . As a concrete example Marcel 
took the case o f the t i c k e t - c o l l e c t o r on the underground(2). 
This man's l i f e i s r i g i d l y t i m e - t a b l e d ; even h i s sleep I s a 
f u n c t i o n t h a t w i l l make possible h i s o v e r a l l e f f i c i e n c y . 
Everything i n h i s l i f e conspires t o i d e n t i f y him with ' h i s 
f u n c t i o n s . Even death i s seen as the scrapping of a machine 
t h a t no longer serves any u s e f u l purpose. 
There i s n o thing more grotesque than the modern s t a t e ' s 
attempt Iso reduce the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f a person t o a few 
p a r t i c u l a r s contained I n one or two pages o f an o f f i c i a l 
dossier. Such a document was meant t o account f o r a l l t h a t 
i s important i n the man's i d e n t i t y . His p e r s o n a l i t y l i e s 
open t o anyone who wishes t o look. But how can these 
p a r t i c u l a r s be divorced from the person concerned? Marcel's 
experiences d u r i n g the Great War have already been seen t o 
u n d e r l i e these observations(3). Such a f u n c t i o n a l ! s e d world 
has the e f f e c t o f overpowering the o r d i n a r y person wlth^uneasy 
f e e l i n g t h a t h i s personal l i f e has been swamped by h i s 
f u n c t i o n s , t h a t he i s o f no s i g n i f i c a n c e as a person. 
S&'.si This i n c r e a s i n g c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n o f modern s o c i e t y i s 
accompanied by a process o f atomisation. The two are c l o s e l y 
l i n k e d . For as the c o l l e c t i v e s o c i a l order s t r i p s man o f a l l 
personal s i g n i f i c a n c e , o f e v e r y t h i n g except the f u n c t i o n s he 
performs, s o ^ f i n d s himself possessing no common ground 
w i t h h i s fellow-men except I n regard t o h i s f u n c t i o n s . 
an X 
he 
2. P.E. p.2, c f . M.B. 2 p.37f. 3. See above,p.29 
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T o t a l i t a r l a n c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n produces an atomised s o c i e t y , 
th&vt cannot be considered a t r u e community. 
L i f e , under the new s o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n , has l o s t i t s 
o l d intimacy. The p e r s o n a l i t y i s g r a d u a l l y coereedf i n t o 
i d e n t i f y i n g h i m s e l f w i t h an o f f i c i a l , p u b l i c i d e n t i t y . His 
i n t e r i o r l i f e , h i s being, i s Ignored, and consequently the 
person h i m s e l f begins t o Ignore I t . The world we are now 
l i v i n g i n i s , as Marcel describes I t , a broken world ( 4 ) . 
But, I t may be objected, has there ever been a time when the 
world has been i n t a c t ? Marcel was not making such a claim. 
No matter what the h i s t o r i c a l f a c t s , however, i t I s i n d i s p u t a b l e 
t h a t the awareness o f t h i s broken s t a t e has become acute i n 
our own time. The t e c h n o c r a t i c machine has d e v i t a l i s e d man; 
he i s being compelled t o s u b s t i t u t e a f u n c t i o n f o r h i s very 
being, the community i s being replaced by a machine. Yet a t 
the same time a p r o t e s t a g a i n s t t h i s v i o l a t i o n w e l l s up from 
the very depths o f human nature. I t i s t h i s resentment t h a t 
j u s t i f i e s t a l k o f a broken world. 
The s i t u a t i o n goes deeper than t h i s . Mention has already 
been made of man's resentment o f the encroachments o f 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l thought; he f e e l s t h a t the l i n k t h a t binds him 
to h i s fellowmen i n a t r u e community i s threatened. ~¥et the 
s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n as i t i s today has so fashioned man's l i f e 
t h a t he p a s s i v e l y accepts t h i s d e v i t a l i s e d w o r l d ; i n c r e a s i n g l y 
he i s l o s i n g h i s awareness o f being threatened. The problem 
o f being no longer occurs t o him. Everything i s reduced t o 
the p u r e l y n a t u r a l , which i s no more than a degraded r e d u c t -
lonism. Indeed, t h i s a t t i t u d e has i t s f o u M a t i o n i n a wide-
spread r e f u s a l - a r e f u s a l t o r e f l e c t and imagine ( 5 ) , and i s 
^ See Le Monde Casse* published frith P o s i t i o n e t approches 
concretes du mystgre ontologlque ( E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n i n P.E.) 
-69-
a t the" h e a r t of so many contemporary e v i l s . This r e f u s a l t o 
r e f l e c t i s the p a t h e t i c outcome of the fragmentation and 
f u n c t i o n a l ! s a t i o n of mass-society. Such a r e d u c t i o n o f a l l 
r e a l i t y t o the realm o f the p u r e l y n a t u r a l i s a c e n t r a l 
f a c t o r i n the widespread degradation o f man i n our own times. 
Modern techniques, by t h e i r very nature, comprehend man 
only i n the realm o f the problematic. Anything t h a t cannot 
be placed i n t h i s category i s dismissed as being o f no 
consequence. A problem c a l l s f o r a s o l u t i o n ; when a s o l u t i o n 
i s found the problem ceases t o be a problem. I t has been 
explained away. Such a high-handed a t t i t u d e r a i s e d Marcel's 
suspicions, but t h i s i s not t o denigrate the r i g h t f u l place 
of the problematic i n s c i e n t i f i c a n a l y s i s . But he d i d p r o t e s t 
a g a i n s t i t s encroachments i n t o such f i e l d s t h a t do not admit 
of such a treatment. How can the question o f man be t o t a l l y 
subjected t o problematic a n a l y s i s , as any such o b j e c t i v l s t 
r eductlonism s t r i p s man o f e v e r y t h i n g r e l a t e d t o h i s humanity? 
The question of what i t means t o be a man cannot be r a i s e d 
i n a world from which technocracy has banished a l l wonder and 
d i g n i t y , a w o r l d where the question o f being has become 
redundant. 
Nevertheless, our t e c h n o c r a t i c world does produce i n 
some men a resentment, a vague f e e l i n g t h a t something has been 
l o s t . There i s a l a c k , an impoverishment, an a r i d i t y . Yet 
" i t i s by s t a r t i n g from t h a t p o i n t t h a t we can experience 
what I have c a l l e d o n t o l o g i c a l exigence"(6). R e d u c t i o n i s t 
thought has dominated the modern world. S c i e n t i f i c a n a l y s i s 
i s capable i n theory o f e x p l a i n i n g a l l phenomena, and t h i s 
5. M.B. 1 p. 36 6. M.B. 2 p.40 
has r e s u l t e d I n a l o s s o f mystery. Everything can be 
explained, but p o s l t i v i s t thought cannot give any metaphysical 
meaning t o the world. I t cannot d e a l w i t h the o n t o l o g i c a l 
question. Behind the apparent confidence I n p o s l t i v i s t 
methods there I s a deep l o n g i n g t o f i n d some meaning i n l i f e . 
There i s i n the modern world what Marcel c a l l s an a p p e t i t e 
f o r being ( 7 ) . This need f o r an ontology stems from a general 
a n x i e t y concerning e m p i r i c i s t techniques: "up t o what p o i n t 
does e x p l a n a t i o n a c t u a l l y possess the power t o e l i m i n a t e the 
t h i n g explained?"18). This urge t o discover an ontology stems 
from an overwhelming sense o f being threatened by the arrogant 
claims o f p o s i t i v i s m . Whereas c u r i o s i t y u n d e r l i e s s c i e n t i f i c 
research, t h i s sense o f uneasiness i s the prime motive 
behind metaphysical i n q u i r y . 
A word needs t o be said w i t h regard t o the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between c u r i o s i t y and uneasiness. C u r i o s i t y , one may say, 
i s the attltu4£gof a s c i e n t i s t i n h i s s t r i v i n g t o grasp and 
analyse an o b j e c t , t o understand and ffsolve the problems t h a t 
are posed before him, although they do not a f f e c t him as a 
person. His own i d e n t i t y I s taken f o r granted. 
"To be curious i s t o s t a r t from a p a r t i c u l a r f i x e d 
c e n t r e " ( 9 ) . 
I n c o n t r a s t t o t h i s , uneasiness i s b a s i c a l l y an u n c e r t a i n t y 
of one's own centre. When I am anxious about the s a f e t y o f 
a f r i e n d i t i s bound t o a f f e c t the s t a b i l i t y o f my own s e l f . 
C u r i o s i t y t u r n s I n t o uneasiness I n d i r e c t p r o p o r t i o n t o the 
exte n t t h a t i t i s concerned w i t h what cannot be separated from 
me ( 1 0 ) . Unlike c u r i o s i t y a s o l u t i o n cannot be a p p l i e d t o 
7. M.J. p. 288 8. B.H. p. 45 
10. H.V. p.138, P.I. p.24. 
9. H.V. p. 138 
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uneasiness. 
Metaphysical uneasiness takes r o o t I n the I n s o l e n t 
claims o f the o b j e c t i v e empiricism o f technocracy, posing 
f o r us the t e r r i f y i n g danger o f reducing e v e r y t h i n g , e s p e c i a l l y 
man, t o the pu r e l y n a t u r a l . The machine-like q u a l i t i e s o f 
modern l i f e ignore one's being, rendering i t meaningless. The 
realm o f the problematic tends t o exorcise e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s 
personal and i n t i m a t e . There i s a need, t h e r e f o r e , t o r e s t o r e 
what has been l o s t . 
" I n such a world the o n t o l o g i c a l need, the need o f being 
i s exhausted I n exact p r o p o r t i o n t o the breaking up of 
p e r s o n a l i t y on the one hand and, on the o t h e r , to the 
fcxl^#teiumph of the category o f the 'purely n a t u r a l ' and the 
consequent atrophy o f the f a c u l t y o f wonder"(11). 
The word "wonder" i s important. Marcel saw the experience 
of wonderment ( Qfnoyna^zt^ ) as a fundamental datum o f 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l research (12). This can be l i n k e d w i t h the 
n o t i o n o f r e c e p t i v i t y , which i s discussed l a t e r . I n f a c t h i s 
c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between problem and mystery helps t o 
e l u c i d a t e the nature o f the r e s t o r a t i o n o f what has been l o s t 
a t the hands o f o b j e c t l v i s a t i o n . A problem, as was seen, i s 
something which I s set before man. The n a t u r a l i s the province 
of the problematic. A mystery, on the other hand, i s something 
I n which one f i n d s oneself i n v o l v e d . I t cannot be set before 
one i n i t s e n t i r e t y (13). 
"A mystery I s a problem which encroaches upon i t s own 
d a t a " ( l M 
Of course there i s always the danger o f a mystery being 
perverted i n t o a.problem. The problem o f e v i l i s a c l e a r 
11. P.E.p.4 12. E.B.H.D.p.ll 13. B.H.p.109 .-14. P.E.p.8 
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example. One may be tempted t o view the e v i l i n the w o r l d 
from the o u t s i d e , seeing i t as the d e f e c t i v e f u n c t i o n i n g o f 
a machine. On the other hand, however, one may r e a l i s e t h a t 
one cannot step aside from the f a c t o f e v i l ; the question o f 
e v i l i n v o l v e s one's own being. E v i l cannot t h e r e f o r e be 
analysed o b j e c t i v e l y . I t i s a mystery t h a t transcends man; 
there i s no " s o l u t i o n " . However, the mysterious i s not t o 
be confused w i t h the unknowable, t o be d i s p e l l e d w i t h the 
advance of knowledge. Rather, the mysterious belongs t o the 
realm o f the metaproblematlc, where o b j e c t i v e a n a l y s i s cannot 
be p r a c t i s e d . The mysterious, the metaproblematic i s the 
o n t o l o g i c a l (15). 
The problem o f being i s t h e r e f o r e a misleading d e s i g n a t i o n ; 
" o n t o l o g i c a l mystery" i s much more p r e f e r a b l e (16). Unless the 
o n t o l o g i c a l mystery i s t o be d i s t o r t e d care must be taken as 
to how i t i s approached. The n o t i o n o f presence i s an important 
f a c t o r i n Marcel's argument (17). Presence, l i k e mystery, 
cannot be demonstrated, solved or analysed. I n the w o r l d of 
the metaproblematic presence i s revealed. Unlike the problemati 
i t cannot be reduced t o d e t a i l s . Being can be recognised or 
ignored, i t can be acknowledged or i t can be denied, and t h i s 
acknowledgement i s a f r e e a c t . 
To r e c a p i t u l a t e : metaphysical thought,according t o Marcel, 
i s r e f l e c t i o n on the f r e e l y acknowledged mystery, the mystery 
of being. I t a r i s e s from a r e c o g n i t i o n o f the need f o r being 
i n the a r i d i t y o f today's world. The s t a r t i n g - p o i n t o f such 
a proposed ontology i s what has been c a l l e d uneasiness. 
15. B.H.p. l©9i , 16. See the essay The O n t o l o g i c a l Mystery. 
17. B.H.p. 110 
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But t h i s uneasiness, as has already been poin t e d o u t , 
Involves one's very being; man i s unsure o f h i s centre. So 
there i s an understandably easy t r a n s i t i o n from the question 
of being t o the questions"What am I? What am I t h a t I should 
ask such questions about being? Why should I be l e d t o such 
questions?". The need t o answer "What am I ? " i s I n t i m a t e l y 
l i n k e d w i t h the o n t o l o g i c a l exigence. 
A l l t h i s I s c l o s e l y connected w i t h r e c o l l e c t i o n . Marcel 
i s adamant t h a t no ontology I s p o s s i b l e "except t o a being 
who i s capable o f r e c o l l e c t i n g h i m s e l f " ( 1 8 ) . The n o t i o n has 
been sadly neglected i n philosophy, and the word i s very 
d i f f i c u l t t o d e f i n e . B a s i c a l l y , however, I t i s the a c t whereby 
one re-collects''oneself as a u n i t y , a g a i n s t the fragmentation 
of p o s i t i v i s t thought. Yet t o withdraw i n t o oneself I s not t o 
be f o r oneself; i n t r o s p e c t i o n has no place here i n the centre 
of the mystery o f being i n which "the I i n t o which I withdraw 
ceases, f o r as much, t o belong t o i t s e l f " ( 1 9 ) . Metaphysical 
uneasiness, r e s o l v i n g i t s e l f i n a a c t o f r e c o l l e c t i o n , i s 
understood as a search f o r one's c e n t r e , f o r one's u n i t y . Yet 
t h i s i s not enough. This search I s not conducted w i t h i n the 
confines o f the subject. The realm o f mystery i s the realm 
i n which the subject i s embraced; the sphere o f the meta-
problematic cannot be reduced or analysed. As the subject 
p a r t i c i p a t e s i n a transcendent r e a l i t y the p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
quest understandably goes beyond the l i m t l a t i o n s o f s u b j e c t i v i t y 
i n t o t h a t very r e a l i t y i n which the subject i s Involved. 
"The most a u t h e n t i c p h i l o s o p h i c thought, i t seems t o 
me, s i t u a t e s i t s e l f a t the meeting p o i n t o f the s e l f 
18. P.E. p.12 19. P.E. p.13 
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and the othe r " ( 2 0 ) . 
This i s no c o n t r a d i c t i o n 6f Marcel's c l a i m t h a t the 
fundamental metaphysical question i s "What am I ? " The que s t i o n 
of others and the question o f oneself are one and the same 
question. I f others do not e x i s t n e i t h e r does the s e l f . 
" I f others elude me, I e l a t e myself, f o r my substance 
i s made o f them"(21). 
Marcel acknowledges h i s indebtedness t o W.E. Hocking's The 
Meaning o f God i n Human Experience f o r h i s t h e s i s t h a t we 
cannot appprehend others w i t h o u t apprehending ourselves (22). 
This does not imply t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between the domain 
of the s e l f and of the other I s not j u s t i f i e d , but r a t h e r t h a t 
i t i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y s t e r i l e . 
Although not a pragmatlst Marcel holds t h a t there i s a 
d i r e c t connection between need and metaphysics. O n t o l o g i c a l 
exigency can, of course, be swept aside and disposed o f ; on 
the other hand i t can be acknowledged and appreciated as "an 
appeal t o a more i n t i m a t e understanding, t o a more personal 
communication"(23). Only by communicating w i t h ourselves i s 
i t p o ssible t o be f r e e from the s t i f l i n g e f f e c t s o f f u n c t i o n a l i s e d 
automation, but the g r e a t e s t obstacle t o t h i s communication 
i s self-consciousness. There are only two l e v e l s where there 
i s no self-consciousness, where communication i s p o s s i b l e ; 
one i s t h a t o f the u n i n h i b i t e d c h i l d , the other i s t h a t 
transcendent l e v e l where the s e l f has i n some way overcome 
i t s e l f . Obviously the philosopher cannot go back t o childhood, 
and t h e r e f o r e he must aim a t t h a t transcendence whereby he I s 
able t o r e g a i n those modes o f communication which have been 
l o s t . 
20. P.I. p.26 23. P.I. p.27 
21. P.I. p.24, cf.H.V.p.138 22. P.I.p.26 
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The aim i s t o i l l u m i n a t e the world o f concrete r e l a t i o n s 
and communication which the impersonal o r g a n i s a t i o n o f 
t e c h n o c r a t i c s o c i e t y almost succeeds i n d e s t r o y i n g . The whole 
di s c u s s i o n of communication and l n t e r s u b j e c t i v l t y hinges 
on the need of a l i e n a t e d man t o discover h i s t r u e s e l f . 
The inadequacy of an o b j e c t i v e a n a l y s i s o f the e r u c i a l 
q uestion "What an&I?" has been touched upon. -
" £>What am I ? ' cannot be converted i n t o the question 
•What i s he? 1 w i t h o u t becoming meaningless"(24). 
But granted t h i s , are there no a l t e r n a t i v e s t o considering 
the question as i n v o l v i n g other people? For instance, i t 
may be possible f o r a person t o understand what he h i m s e l f 
i s by an a n a l y s i s o f the contents o f h i s own l i f e . But i s 
a person h i s own l i f e ? Marcel argues against such a suggestion. 
A d i a r y may be more personal than the f i l e s o f the I n f o r m a t i o n 
Service, but i t i s t o t a l l y inadequate i n answering the question 
"Who am I ? " . The d e t a i l s of a d i a r y may be very i n t i m a t e and 
may r e v e a l how the person concerned was - f e e l i n g a t t h a t time. 
But a d i a r y i s very s u b j e c t i v e and v e r y s e l e c t i v e i n i t s 
contents. Again, as a person matures h i s a t t i t u d e s and thoughts 
change. Often a person f i n d s i t d i f f i c u l t t o i d e n t i f y h i m s e l f 
w i t h what was w r i t t e n i n a d i a r y a number of years p r e v i o u s l y ; 
such a document becomes of p u r e l y h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r e s t . Many 
of Marcel's c r i t i c i s m s apply t o the a r t i s t and h i s p a i n t i n g s 
f o r they do not express e v e r y t h i n g t h a t he was. Moreover, 
Marcel poses the example of the man who leaves behind no book 
or work of a r t . I s he nothing? Marcel r a l l i e s the support 
o f Sartre's Les Mains Sales t o demonstrate the i m p o s s i b i l i t y 
24. M.J. p.276 
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of recognising oneself i n the completed act. The act i s over 
and done with, and c ;thereby any. intimate knowledge of i t i s 
impossible (25). The argument then that one i s coterminous 
with one's l i f e must be rejected. 
The impossibility of understanding one's true nature 
within Sbhe confines of one's own s u b j e c t i v i t y i s underlined 
by Marcel i n h i s c r i t i c i s m of other i d e a l i s t notions of 
consciousness. So much of the d i f f i c u l t y of finding 
transcendent experience' i s due to the prejudice that has 
dominated philosophy. 
"The prejudice consisted i n admitting that a l l experience 
i n the end comes down to a s e l f ' s experience of i t s 
own i n t e r n a l states." ( 2 6 ) 
Marcel i n s i s t s that experience i s not subjective, for one i s 
concerned with a r e a l i t y beyond oneself: "consciousness i s 
above a l l consciousness of something which i s other than 
i t s e l f . " ( 2 7 ) The fundamental error i n t h i s respect i s i n 
thinking that opacity i s related to otherness. There i s 
nothing more d i f f i c u l t than attempting to see the true s e l f . 
The i d e a l i s t s were misguided i n treating the consciouness of 
the thinking s e l f as a kind of luminous centre, trying to 
penetrate the surrounding darkness. On the contrary, the 
"obscurity of the external world i s a function of my own 
obscurity to myself" ( 2 8 ) . 
The considerations j u s t dealy with only serve to 
demonstuste why "What am I ? " inevitably involves the consider-
ation of the existence of others, and why i t i s so I n t r i n s i c a l l y 
concerned with i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . 
25. M.B. I " p . l 6 l 26.M.B.I p .^9 27. M.B. t p. 52 
28. B.H. p. 17 
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" I cannot think of myself as exis t i n g except i n so f a r 
as I conceive of myself as not being the others"(29). 
Awareness and knowledge of s e l f i s preceded by awareness of 
others. The " I " r e l i e s on i t s s o c i a l context for i t s meaning 
and expression. Marcel takes the example of a small c h i l d to 
i l l u s t r a t e t h i s a s s e r t i o n (30). When a c h i l d has picked some 
flowers h i s f i r s t reaction, when he brings, them to hi s mother, 
i s to shout " I t was I who picked these no one e l s e . " He 
i s asking for admiration and gratitude. He offers himself to 
the other i n order to receive a spec i a l tribute. A similar 
example can be taken from the adult world, although the r e a l i t y 
of the sit u a t i o n may be obscured by. subtlety and hypocrisy. 
Think of an amateur composer. When someone hears him play 
one of h i s pieces he may ask " I s that Faure?". "Ho," he 
bashfully r e p l i e s " i t * a my own composition. " The same wish 
for self-acclamation can be discerned here as i n the small 
c h i l d . . . . And so the examples could go on. 
In a l l such cases self-awareness i s a product of s o c i a l 
consciousness. But i s t h i s always the case? What about the 
statement " I am t i r e d " ? Surely that does not involve 
anyone el s e . Here i s a simple feeling,a statement i n no way 
related or mediatised. Yet Marcel would claim that even t h i s 
absolute Immediate presupposes a kind of dialogue. Someone 
i s t i r e d . Who i s ? I am. The " I " only has a meaning i n the 
context of an interlocutor for whom the " I " counts as a person. 
"And I only become a given person for myself through 
the mediating idea of the other for whom I am a given 
person"(31) - -
29. B.H. p.113 30. H.V. p.l3f', M.B. .1 pp. 175*7 " 31.M.J.p.l45 
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I t i s c l e a r that I am only a given person for myself through 
the mediation of another. Certainly self-awareness and s e l f -
love do presupposega pre-existent " I " . But i t can only be 
postulated; i n t h i s vacuum i t Cannot be defined or q u a l i f i e d . 
Awareness of the existence of others must precede awareness 
of s e l f . 
Awareness of others, then, makes knowledge of the s e l f 
possible; a dialogue with the s e l f can take place. The " I " 
i s discovered as an Indefinable presence. One i s present to 
oneself. But t h i s presence i s more than j u s t being there. 
I t i s linked to an awareness of one's existence, bound up 
with a desire to be recognised by others, to be seen as a 
person. The other acts as a means of integrating the self(32). 
Awareness of others around one i s i n t e g r a l to any intimacy 
with oneself. 
But, on the other hand, t h i s intimacy can be l o s t . 
" I can become wrapped up i n myself to the point of no 
longer communicating with myself a t a l l , much l e s s with 
others.2(33) 
This Intimacy can be l o s t because of self-consciousness. The 
young c h i l d brought flowers to h i s mother, but t h i s was not 
r e a l l y a l t r u i s t i c ; the 'action was a means of winning adulation, 
of gaining self-confidence. The others e x i s t for the sake of£ 
the s e l f . , The "poseur"', as Marcel characterises him, appears 
to take an i n t e r e s t I n others, but i n actual f a c t i s e n t i r e l y 
wrapped up with, the s e l f . Here i s a form of f l a t t e r y , a 
pretension. 
"From the moment I become preoccupied about the e f f e c t 
I want to produce on the other person, my every a c t , 
32. H.v. p. 15 33. P.I. P. 15^ 
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word and attitude loses I t s authenticity."(3*0 
There i s a basic observation to be made here. The 
self-conscious I , the egoist, t r e a t s the othergperson solely 
as a means, not as a person, an end i n i t s e l f . The other i s 
a medium whereby the egoist can form an image of himself. 
He i s not concerned with discovering h i s r e a l s e l f , he never 
faces the question "What am I ? " . On the contrary, h i s sole aim 
i s to bolster up h i s preconceived notions of what he would 
l i k e himself to bej the other person i s a means of escaping 
h i s true identity. 
Consequently the egoist i s very vulnerable. Encumbered 
with h i s own anxieties he f e e l s the world to be a threat to 
h i s self-image. He closes i n on himself, unable to open 
himself (disponiblllte') to the presence of otters. The other 
i s only a means; any idea of treating the other person as a 
person I s ruled out. This I s the very opposite of what i s 
termed i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . 
When one tr e a t s another merely as a means to one's own 
ends, then there i s no communication. I n that s i t u a t i o n one 
i s not concerned with the other person as a human being, but 
only with one's own i n t e r e s t s . Marcel saw the chief e v i l 
of modern technocratic society as fostering t h i s attitude. 
In our competitive society man I s set as r i v a l against h i s 
fellow-man. This system I n f l a t e s self-consciousness and 
perpetuates individualism, so that one's personal I n t e r e s t 
i n people i s obliterated by treating them as mere competitors. 
Marcel, as was emphasised at the beginning of t h i s chapter, 
recognised a society such as t h i s as a very impersonal one, 
3*K H.V. p. I ? 
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for no r e a l communication between persons takes place, for 
personal encounter i s ignored as of ;no significance. This 
i s a world of self-contained monads, where time self-knowledge 
i s impossible so long as men are wrapped up i n themselves. 
Authentic self-awareness does not come by introspection and 
self-consciousness. 
Marcel's theory of i n t e r s u b j e c t l v i t y i s an attempt to 
understand philosophically the importance of personal 
communication between people and i t s precise location i n 
human dialogue. I f true communication cannot be found I n 
the s u p e r f i c i a l acquaintances of impersonal mass-society, 
where i s i t to be found? In.order to answer t h i s basic 
problem. Marcel distinguished between " I - i t " r elationships 
and "I-thou" relationships. Indeed, we have seen that as 
early as h i s Metaphysical Journal he had come to understand 
the f u l l significance of the second person. Far from being 
j u s t a grammatical term, i t indicates the whole area of 
personal encounter. As an i l l u s t r a t i o n of h i s theory Marcel 
took the instance of meeting a stranger i n the train.(35) 
The conversation may at f i r s t be t r i v i a l , but as the stranger 
reveals more and more of h i s personality, he becomes l e s s and 
l e s s a "him". As one becomes aware of the unique, q u a l i t i e s 
of hts personality, one addresses him as a "thou". So long 
as two people take no account of the depth of one another's 
being, so long as they treat each other as objects, there can 
be no personal encounter, no intersubjective bond. Again, 
Marcel maintained that so long as there I s only an Impersonal 
relationship each Individual I s a prisoner of h i s own self-made 
image. We need to experience the presence of another personal 
35. M.J. p. 146, E.B.H.D. p.^0. 
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belng i n order to a t t a i n authentic self-knowledge. 
"Generally speaking the more my interlocutor i s exterior 
to me the more I am by the"same token exterior to 
myself; the morel am conscious not of what I am, but 
of my q u a l i t i e s and my f a u l t s , my 'particular 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 1 "(36). 
As long as i t i s f e l t that the other person I s treating ©:ne 
as of no personal importance, one concentrates on one's own 
public image. But when two people discover something of 
common i n t e r e s t they are made aware of a bond between them. 
When the relationship i s transformed into a dialogue between 
two subjects, who are deeply aware of one another's Inner 
s e l f , the participants discover i n the encounter with one 
another's being the hidden depths of th e i r own being. I n 
other words, the lntersubjective dialogue opens up a true 
dialogue with oneself, and t h i s i s impossible to a t t a i n so 
long as one I s shut up within oneself. 
In the " I - i t " r elationship the other person I s treated 
as a t h i r d person: what does he want? At t h i s l e v e l there 
I s suspicion, for the other person i s seen as an outsider. 
But when the ice i s broken, the relationship takes on an 
intimate character. Oae ceases to c once titrate on oneself 
and acknowledges the.presence of the other. As he ceases 
to be a th i r d person, he i s drawn into the d i r e c t encounter 
of persons. The."I-thou" dialogue can bring the persons con-
cerned so close together that they form a personal unity: 
"that i s , he par t i c i p a t e s more and more i n the absolute 
which \s unrelatedness and we cease more and more to be 
•somebody* and ^ somebody e l s e ' . We become simply 'us' "(37'). 
36. M.J. p.146 n.1 37. M.J. p.146 
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A l l human relationships fluctuate i n varying degrees 
between.the I - i t and the I-thou. Marriage I s no exception 
to t h i s . At some time or other one's wife may be Just that 
" s i l l y creature who should have, been darning socks, but there 
she was clucking round the tea-table with a l o t of old hens". &8 
On the other hand there are quite mystical momemts when she 
i s seen as the bearer of a unique value. Marcel here r e f e r s 
to a "hierarchy of invocations", "ranging from the c a l l upon 
another which i s l i k e ringing a b e l l for a servant to the 
quite other sort of c a l l which i s r e a l l y l i k e a kind of 
prayer" CSfc). 
I n many of the normal encounters of d a l l y l i f e people 
are used as objects. One may stop someone In the s t r e e t to 
ask him for directions. I n t h i s case one i s treating him 
as i f he were a reference book. No account i s being taken 
of h i s l n t e r i o r i t y , and i t I s t h i s form of relationship that 
i s being fostered by the technological society. Nevertheless, 
even i n t h i s extreme case some lntersubjective l i g h t may 
break through. The stranger one stops for help when one i s 
l o s t may show unexpected c o r d i a l i t y . The person, that was 
once merely the source of information, takes on the r e a l i t y 
of a "thou". 
"We must take care to notice that the thou appears 
when I put my emphasis not on the idea of information, 
but on the idea of answer - which has the Implication of 
community (us-ness)"(39). 
The "thou" i s someone that i s f e l t to be. capable of replying 
to oneself. But i t i s e s s e n t i a l l y something one Invokes 
rather than judges to be capable of answering one. This 
answering, involving one's i n t e r i o r ! t y , i s to oneself as a 
person, that, i s , as a "thou". 
38. M.B. 1 p.iyy 3*0.. rkiiftn. 39. M.J. p.199 
There I s nothing more i r r i t a t i n g for someone than when 
he r e a l i s e s that people are talking about ham i n h i s presence. 
The person concerned f e e l s that he i s being treated as an " 
object, a thing. One might say that he f e e l s that he i s not 
with the others. "With" i s an.operative term i n the notion 
of I n t e r s u b j e c t i v l t y ; Marcel i n f a c t compares i t to the supra-
r e l a t i o n a l r e a l i t y that Bradley thought, he had discovered i n 
"feeling" (40). Bradley considered that feeling was of 
prime importance. I n h i s i d e a l i s t philosophy f e e l i n g provided 
the foundation on which a l l higher forms of knowledge are 
constructed. Also, feeling I s an instance of what Bradley 
c a l l e d "a non-relational Immediate f e l t unity"(41) - immediate 
experience. 
The word "with" does not properly belong to the objective 
world. Probably "togetherness" expresses the r e a l i t y i t 
represents better than anything e l s e , although there i s no 
French equivalent. Maybe "entre-nous" i s the nearest one can 
get I n that language. I n a factory the c o l l e c t i v e mass of 
men may be considered objectively merely as the sum of various 
functions. Yet.there i s something that mere arithmetic cannot 
take account of. In varying degrees there may be a sense of 
common fate, a common task. 
"The fe e l i n g of community i n e f f o r t and struggle that 
such factory workers have i s quite enough i n i t s e l f to 
deprive us of any r i g h t to treat"them as simple units 
of force that can be added to each other5(42) 
4.0. E.B.H.D. pp.40-i. 41. Bradley,F.H. (1914) Essays on 
Truth and Reality p.l?6, quoted by Woilheim (1969) p.128. 
42. M.B. 1 p.180. 
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The experiences of ordeal that men were subjected to i n the 
German concentration camps served to weld them together into 
an intimate bond. This kind of r e a l i t y , whether i t i s i n the 
factory, or on the bus, or i n a prisoner-of-war camp, i s 
enriched according to the extent that the people concerned 
know themselves and know t h e i r companions both.in t h e i r 
uniqueness as persons and i n th e i r common fate. 
Obviously the "with" that cements these relationships 
together expresses something much deeper than mere Juxta-
position. When a fchair i s placed next to a table the r e l a t i o n 
between the two i s no more than one of external proximity. 
There i s no question of i t a f f e c t i n g the essence of either 
of them. I n contrast to t h i s , however, stands the Intimate 
relationship between two people mutually accepting each other 
as persons; unlike the former case here the relationship 
profoundly a f f e c t s both parties. I n t h i s case an intimate 
bond i s established between the two, by means, of a common 
in t e r e s t ; a unity i s created i n r e l a t i o n to which a l l non-
participants are " t h i r d party"* Intruders. Two men may have 
shared common experiences i n a concentration camp. Even t h e i r 
wives, not having shared t h e i r husbands' common fat e , would 
be ouMders. To a t h i r d person the two men seem to share 
a common "secret". Marcel on various occasions c i t e s h i s 
play 7'tymk'Mce fen ffirdigza^as anticipating t h i s important 
theme ( 4 3 ) . Here I s portrayed the inter a c t i o n of the .complex-
relationships that e x i s t between a woman, her f i r s t husband 
(a musician), and the musician's" brother, whom she. marries 
a f t e r the divorce. In the course of the play the woman comes 
43. M.B. 1 p. 180, E.B.H.D. pp.48-50. 
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to a r e a l i s a t i o n of a ;supra-personal unity between the two 
men, i n r e l a t i o n to which she f e e l s h e r s e l f to be an outsider. 
This close band between people could be described as 
togetherness. But t h i s togetherness i s not necessarily dependent 
on s p a t i a l considerations. Marcel i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s point with 
t h i s example: two people may be eating together, but because 
one of them i s so engrossed i n h i s food the other f e e l s a 
sense of i s o l a t i o n ; he f e e l s that h i s companion i s more 
Interested i n eating than i n fellowship. This i r r i t a t i o n can 
lead him to think of h i s greedy companion as a "him**; he 
conducts a dialogue with himself concerning t h i s other person. 
As true dialogue between these people i s impossible there can 
be no fellowhlp, such as i s to be found i n the "I-thou" 
relationship. Because one man I s uninterested i n the other 
the l a t t e r i s compelled to f a l l back on*himself. But the 
relationship w i l l be transformed into an encounter between two 
people as soon as both parti e s take notlcesof each other's 
presence and personal In t e g r i t y . 
"From the moment he takes me into consideration, he 
im&meeases to be pure object for myself" (44). 
As soon as such a rapport i s established then one can say that 
these persons are together. But the point i s that t h i s 
togetherness I s not dependent on s p a t i a l considerations. For 
Instance, a long and deep relationship can be maintained,even 
I f the two people involved are parted for some time. They 
can s t i l l f e e l that they belong together, even though many 
miles separate them. 
Marcel stresses that I t i s impossible to obj e c t i v i s e 
44. P.I. p.154 
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the "I-thou" relationship. Such an attempt i s u t t e r l y 
inconsistent with the theory of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . 
" I f we c l i n g to a mode of objective d e f i n i t i o n i t 
w i l l always be i n our power to say that the Thou 
i s an i l l u s i o n " ( 4 5 ) . 
I n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y i s to be defined i n terms of "presence" and 
"invocation", rather than i n objective categories. Only 
participants can f u l l y understand the r e a l i t i e s of the 
relationship. The imporMni&feature of the intersubjective 
bond i s the "secret". By t h i s Marcel means that factor which 
binds two people together. The I-thou relationship i s 
exclusive i n that the outsider has no knowledge of t h i s 
secret; he cannot see the e s s e n t i a l nature of the relationship. 
To use Marcel's terms, the t h i r d person i s excluded from the 
relationship, and i s i n no position to make an Informed 
judgement about i t . 
Marcel uses two extreme cases to i l l u s t r a t e h i s point ( 4 6 ) . 
I n the f i r s t , a banker has approached someone and the l a t t e r 
has entrusted him with some money. A friend of h i s informs 
him that the banker i s a suspicious character, and h i s 
warning turns out to be correct. I n the second case a mother 
refuses to despair of her son, despite the f a c t that he i s 
a crook and a layabout. On the surface the two cases seem 
sim i l a r , and yet i n the f i r s t case there i s no personal 
relationship between the banker and the other person, while 
i n the second there i s the Intimate bond between mother and son. 
The intersubjective unity i s born of f a i t h , hope and love ( 4 7 ) . 
I t cannot be asserted i n terms of a l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e . I n f a c t , 
45. B.H. p. 115. 46. M.B. 2 p . 8 0 f . 47. See below, p.93/. 
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l t cannot be asserted a t a l l , for assertion belongs to the 
world of given fact. But the intersubjefctlve nexus cannot 
be given to someone Intimately involved. 
"Without doubt the intersubjective nexus cannot be i n 
any way asserted: i t can only be acknowledged"(48).. 
The paradigm of every intersubjective relationship i s 
that between the believer and God. God as absolute Thou 
cannot be recognised by the t h i r d person. Any treatment of 
God as a "him" I s to be ruled out. The presence of God can 
only be evoked and acknowledged by the believer. 
I t i s impossible,however, to continue examining l n t e r -
s u b j e c t i v l t y without saying a l i t t l e more about presence. I t 
w i l l serve to c l a r i f y the d i s t i n c t i o n between o b j e c t i v i t y and 
in t e r s u b j e c t l v l t y . Many of the arguments, however, duplicate 
what was said concerning the significance of "with". What i s 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between an object and a presence ? I t i s 
possible for one to be i n a room with someone, but he i s not 
r e a l l y present, he does not make h i s presence f e l t . I t i s 
not because i t i s Impossible to communicate with him, for one 
may indeed do so, but there i s something missing. Marcel 
expresses i t as "communication without communion"(49). He 
may understand what i s being said to him, but he does not 
take the person who i s addressing him into consideration. 
Consequently t h i s lack of true communication a f f e c t s one's 
r e l a t i o n with oneself: " t h i s stranger interposes himself 
between me and my own r e a l i t y , he makes me i n some sense also 
a stranger to myself; I am not r e a l l y myself while I am 
with him"(50). 
48. M.B. 2 p.10 49. M.B. 1 p.205 , P . I . p.237. 50. M.B.1 p.205. 
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On the other hand, the presence of someone can r e a l l y 
make I t s e l f f e l t . I t reveals a person to himself1 "the other, 
I f I f e e l him present, renews me i n t e r i o r l y i n some way"(51). 
To Marcel t h i s was one of the most profound e x i s t e n t i a l 
experiences. I n such situations the words used are Immaterial. 
The experience of a bereavement i s illuminating here (52). 
Friends that one has known for years may only utter platitudes, 
while a comparative stranger, by a look, a gesture, an intonation 
or even a thoughtful s i l e n c e , may bear witness to h i s presence. 
A l l t h i s indicates that there are presences and l o y a l t i e s i n 
t h i s l i f e that go deeper than worldly and professional r e l a t i o n s . 
I t may be objected, however, that such cases of a f e l t 
presence or non-presence are s t i l l based on an objective r e l a t i o n . 
I s i t r i g h t then to dissociate presence and o b j e c t i v i t y ? But, 
Marcel maintains, there are cases of telepathy where presence 
i s not concerned with s p a t i a l r e l a t i o n s . Moreover, the continuing 
presence of h i s deceased mother had a profound significance for 
h i s philosophy (53). 
I s t h i s experience of presence merely private and incommun-
icable ? Certainly not. But on the other hand i t i s not open 
to anyone. Rather, i t i s an intermediary position.between the 
two: " t h i s intermediary given i s for a concrete us; i t i s an 
open communion of selves, the kind which i s formed around a 
work that I s intimately loved but which we know w i l l remain 
a closed book for an i n f i n i t y of creatures"(54). 
A l l t h i s helps to c l a r i f y the reason for the d i f f i c u l t y 
i n speaking of presence. One cannot teach a person to make 
h i s presence f e l t . The terms acquiring and grasping are 
51. P.I. p. 238. 52. E.B.H.D. p. 67. 53. E.B.H.D. pp. 24-5. 54. E.B.H.D. p. 68. 
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completely out of place here, being related to self-consciousness. 
On the contrary, presence "belongs only to the being who i s 
capable of giving himself"(55). I n t h i s respect presence i s 
closel y a l l i e d to charm, and neither can presence be abstracted 
from the personal subject. Both belong to the world of 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . I f presence i s not a quality to be acquired, 
then i t i s misleading to think i n terms of a transmission of 
presence from one subject to another. The transmission of 
objective messages and the communion i n whl;e?h presences become 
manifest to one another are not the same thing. Rather, i t 
i s to be understood as "the expression of a w i l l which seeks 
to reveal i t s e l f to me"(56). At the heart of the presence 
there i s someone who takes the depths of another person into 
consideration. 
When discussing the example of the two people eating 
together i t was evident that one's own preoccupations can 
act as a ba r r i e r between oneself and others. Moreover, one 
can be so self-conscious that one i s unable to open oneself 
to the presence of others. Indeed, true communication i s 
only possible when individuals are w i l l i n g to accept the 
presence of other beings. Marcel c a l l e d t h i s willingness 
"receptivity". 
The notion of r e c e p t i v i t y , which i s neither purely 
active nor passive, i s v i t a l to Marcel's philosophy. O'Malley 
sees a close l i n k between t h i s notion and i h t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . 
" I t also furthers the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of the person's 
di s t i n c t i v e n e s s with h i s very r e a l fellowship with 
other persons, so providing an experiential basis for 
55- P.I. P.153. 56. P.I. p.153. 
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Marcel's equally important concept of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y " ( 5 7 ) . 
This r e c e p t i v i t y is.the act whereby one opens oneself to the 
presence of another. "D i s p o n l b i l l t e " i s the keyword here. 
tRMsn d#dU be translated as " a ^ O L f c t a a f c i l i t y " rfjoi*g|»Marcel himself 
prefers "handiness". The opposite of t h i s , nnon-i«v.ai*ta>illty", 
i s . i d e n t i c a l with being occupied with the s e l f (58). According 
to Marcel, where there i s . s e l f - consciousness or fron- a&ackxblS-iby, 
there can be no intersubjective bond. 
I n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y then, i s e s s e n t i a l l y an openness.Marcel 
used a v a r i e t y of metaphors to deepen bur understanding of h i s 
theory. His d i s t i n c t i o n betvreen open and closed, found i n 
Bergson, i s probably hl:s most Important one (59), although 
he used the imagery of l i g h t as well. I n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y 
Involves being together i n the l i g h t of mutual awareness. A l l 
these metaphors seek to elucidate the notion of presence. The 
following extended passage draws out the f u l l connection 
between presence and i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . 
"The other, i n so fa r as he i s other, only e x i s t s for 
me i n so far as I am open to him, i n so f a r as he I s a 
Thou. But I can only open to him i n so igar as I cease 
to form a c i r c l e with myself, inside which I somehow 
place the other, or rather h i s Idea; for inside t h i s 
c i r c l e the other I s no longer the other qua other, but 
the other qua related to me"(60). 
The intersubjective bond i s sustained by f i d e l i t y , love 
and hope. Marcel gradually came to appreciate the importance 
of f i d e l i t y . He f i n a l l y arrived at the expression "being as 
the place of f i d e l i t y " ( 6 l ) . F i d e l i t y , he says, I s the 
recognition of something permanent. But how i s t h i s possible ? 
57. O'Malley U966) p. 11. 58. B.H. p..80. 59. P.I. p.239. 60. B.H. p. 116 61. B.H.pp.47 & 113-
How, for Instance, can I remain f a i t h f u l to someone by means 
of a promise ? Marcel has Gide i n mind when facing t h i s 
dilemma (62). Prom h i s own experience he r e l a t e s how, when 
v i s i t i n g someone i n hospital,he was moved by compassion and 
promised to v i s i t the sick person on other occasions. Yet 
he knew that h i s feelings towards the plight of the sick 
person would change. Should he remain f a i t h f u l to h i s 
promise, regardless of h i s own feel i n g s ? Or should he be 
honest with himself as Gide would suggest ? But there are 
the even more serious implications of a promise of marriage. 
How can one undertake such a betrothal without knowing the 
conditions and unforeseen events of the future ? Surely 
t h i s d e f i c i e n t knowledge of the f u l l conditions and Implications 
of such a promise makes i t b a s i c a l l y dishonest, 
d 
Understandable as t h i s dilemma may be, Marcel maintains 
that i t implies a mistaken view of f i d e l i t y . The following 
passage expounds h i s position. 
"Faithfulness i s , I n r e a l i t y , the exact opposite of 
in e r t conformlsm. I t i s the active recognition of 
something permanent, nipt formally, a f t e r :the manner 
gtf* a of a law, but ontologically; I n t h i s sense, i t r e f e r s 
invariably to a presence, or to.something which can 
be maintained within us and before us as a presence, 
but which, ipso facto, can be j u s t as we l l ignored, 
forgotten and obliterated; and t h i s reminds us of 
that menace of betrayal which to my mind, overshadows 
our whole world"(63). 
The closeness of f i d e l i t y to the notions of presence and 
62. E.B.H.D. p. 66. 63. P.E. pp.21-2, E.B.H.D. p. 66. 
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l n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y I s evident. Being i s to be found i n 
intersubjeetlvi,ty and being i s the place of f i d e l i t y . But 
i f f i d e l i t y i s linked to the presence of others what about 
f i d e l i t y to a cause ? For Marcel the l a t t e r , , i f i t I s not. 
a form of i d o l a t r y , i s at least a derivative of the former. 
F i d e l i t y i s active and creative, i t i s not passive obedience 
to some abstract p r i n c i p l e or ideology as found i n the modern 
t o t a l i t a r i a n state. I t i s the active sustaining of the l i v i n g 
presence of another. A loved one may d i e , but his presence 
w i l l not necessarily be l i m i t e d to the photograph treasured 
by the bereaved. The Image, a f t e r a l l , i s only kept f o r 
the love of the being himself. F i d e l i t y keeps a l i v e the 
lntersubjective bond between the two people. Such f i d e l i t y 
makes i t impossible f o r the loved one to be reduced to a mere 
memory or image ( 6 4 ) . F i d e l i t y , therefore, sustains presence:, 
" f i d e l i t y i s never f i d e l i t y to one^ s e l f , but i t i s referred 
to what I called the hold the other being has over us"(65). 
Later on Marcel has t h i s to say: 
"The role of f i d e l i t y consists not i n creating anything 
at a l l , but i n unrelentingly d i s s i p a t i n g the clouds 
which threaten to overcast - what? an image? Surely 
not but a presence...."(66). 
I n modern society the a l i e n a t i o n t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l 
experiences makes i t impossible f o r him to owe any allegiance 
to i t . He does not recognise society's goals as his own. 
Therefore the rel a t i o n s h i p between the i n d i v i d u a l and the 
society i s an external one. But Marcel maintained that true 
being cannot be found i n external r e l a t i o n s . Being, w i t h the 
values of f a i t h , love and f i d e l i t y cannot be found i n mass 
6 4 . P . I . p.191, H . V. p.198. 65. B . H . p.53 66. P . I . p.193. 
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society. I t i s i n the intersubjective bond, where i n d i v i d u a l s 
meet i n a s i t u a t i o n of mutual respect, that t r u s t and love 
can be established. Such relationships happen where c e r t a i n 
i n d i v i d u a l s share a common concern. They pledge themselves 
to a cause. They remain f a i t h f u l to i t , no matter what 
happens, because they recognise t h e i r own s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t 
i n t h e i r sharing of t h i s common i n s p i r a t i o n . Marcel's 
language i n the Gifford Lectures i s reminiscent of Royce: 
the more d e f i n i t e l y I am aiming a t some purpose or other, 
the more v i v i d l y I am aware of. being a l i v e " (67). 
The cause to which one.is f a i t h f u l does not merely serve 
to bind two people together. . F i d e l i t y i s creative I n that 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p i t creates allows the people concerned to 
gain an Intimate awareness of each other and of themselves. 
Knowledge of an i n d i v i d u a l cannot be separated from the act 
of t r u s t , f i d e l i t y and love. Just as i n Royce true human 
relationships are founded by an act of l o y a l t y to a cause, 
so i n Marcel the intersubjective bond I s established by 
f i d e l i t y . Creative f i d e l i t y i s bound to the consecration 
of oneself to a cause that transcends the In d i v i d u a l . The 
true being of human existence- cannot be attained by an Isolated 
individual!* but through the richness of deep relationships. 
Just as f i d e l i t y i s the unconditional act whereby the 
intersubjective bond i s sustained, so i s love. I n the 
proposal of marriage the promise of f i d e l i t y i s made no 
matter what l i e s i n store i n the futures s i m i l a r l y , the lover 
i n his proposal to the one he loves makes an unconditional 
vow: " I s h a l l continue to love you no matter what happens". 
67. M.B. 1, p.162. 
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Again, when the two lovers are parted by death the bond cannot 
be broken. Love i s i n f a c t an a f f i r m a t i o n : "Thou shalt not 
die". The departed loved one i s evoked. The act of love 
sustains the bond between them. True, the dead person i n 
t h i s evocation does not°answer, but a l l t hat can r e a l l y be 
said i s that he does not inform: "we have no grounds f o r s t a t i n g 
that he does not enrich by&his r e a l presence."(68). 
By t h i s connection w i t h presence, love or cha r i t y i s 
closely linked with iOivaibc&bility. At the heart of love i s 
a presence which i s the absolute g i f t of oneself. 
The sustaining power of f i d e l i t y and love i n the i n t e r -
subjective r e l a t i o n s h i p would not be complete without hope. 
Hope i s always to be associated w i t h communion. As a cor o l l a r y 
of t h i s Marcel i d e n t i f i e s despair with solitude. Hope i s to 
be r a d i c a l l y dissociated from desire. Desire i s the expression 
of egoism and self-consciousness f o r i t arises from an 
experience of c a p t i v i t y , or any.other ordeal, and the natural 
dangers that are entailed. 
" I s h a l l always be exposed to the temptation of shutting 
the door which encloses me w i t h i n myself "(69). 
The only remedy to such a temptation i s hope and communion. 
" I hope" cannot be f u l l y understood w i t h i n the narrow confines 
of "I". Hope i s the means of r i s i n g above the despair of 
solitude towards a more intimate and f r u i t f u l communion. 
" I hope i n thee f o r us " i s perhaps the very heart of 
hope's significance f o r i n t e r s u b j e c t l v i t y . I t i s here th a t 
the connection between the "thou" and the absolute "Thou" 
can be seen, f o r the l a t t e r i s the l i n k between "thou" and "us". 
68. M.J. p.163. 69. H.V. p.60. 
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I t I s the guarantee, the cement that holds us together. To 
despair of the s e l f , or of us, i s essentially to despair of 
Thou. (70). Nevertheless, the absolute Thou i s not to be 
deduced from the f i n i t e thou (£l)tbut rather evoked by the 
intersubjective communion as a means of sustenance and strength. 
This constant evocation of the world of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y 
from which the " I " can t r u l y emerge, by f i d e l i t y , love and hope, 
i s i n constant danger of degenerating i n t o the world of 
designation, of o b j e c t l v i s a t i o n . Marcel suggests a series 
of metaphors, especially from the world of music, as the 
best safeguard against t h i s . 
" I t i s a world i n which everything i s i n communication, 
i n which eveijfthing i s bound together. "(72) 
But t h i s i s beyond the world of pure r e l a t i o n s , i n which the 
" I " i s reduced to the "status of one element i n a numerical 
total" ( 7 3 ) . Instead, l n t e r s u b j e c t l v l t y emphasises the 
underlying r e a l i t y , a community that i s fundamental to an 
ontology. Without t h i s community, which the intersubjective 
bond evokes, i t would be impossible to understand human 
rel a t i o n s . 
Clearly t h i s community that has been invoked cannot be 
objectivised or v e r i f i e d . The secret of the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
i s hidden from the objective scrutiny of a t h i r d person. 
The world i n which the question "What am I ? " can be 
answered i s a world i n which everything i s i n communication, 
i n which everything i s bound together. This l i e s i n marked 
contrast to the mass competitive society w i t h i t s perpetuation 
of self-consciousness. Here the human world i s reduced to 
70. H.V. pp .60-i. 71. M.J. p,284. 72. M.B. 2 p .15. 
73. M.B. a p.17. 
- 9 6 -
an agglomeration of non-communicating monads. Yet i n the 
world of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , the sense of community i s brought 
to the fore. 
"Person - engagement - community - r e a l i t y : there we have 
a sort of chain of notions which, to be exact, do not 
re a d i l y follow from each other by deduction but of 
which the union can be grasped by an act of the mind."(7*0 
The "we" has p r i o r i t y over the "I" ( 7 5 ) . One cannot constitute 
oneself as i n t e r l o r i t y except i n the context of the underlying 
community that exists between oneself and others. Only when 
we are together i n the l i g h t of one another's presence do we 
gain access to each other. At the same time one i s one's true 
s e l f only i n connection with t h i s communion. I f I t were broken 
one would lose one's very s e l f . 
The significance of t h i s community, constituted by the 
i n f i n i t e interweaving of human rel a t i o n s h i p s , i s w e l l 
i l l u s t r a t e d by Marcel's understanding of sin ( 7 6 ) . Sin makes 
us aware of the community of mankind. I f we are unaware of 
the f a c t that sin involves others we can so easily become 
isolated from them. 
"Whenever sin i s misunderstood i n i t s essence I t can 
is o l a t e us. On the other hand, i t can bind us and 
become the p r i n c i p l e of communion."(77) 
The problem, or rather mystery, of si n can only be revealed, 
and r e v e l a t i o n f o r Marcel i s concerned w i t h an i n f i n i t e 
communion, while a t the same time God i s "the place' of I n f i n i t e 
communion"(78). 
I n r e l a t i o n to t h i s communion the "him" i s a t h i r d person, 
an outsider. One does not address a "him", one tal k s about 
"him" with.a "thou". "He", belongs to the world of o b j e c t i v i t y . 
7 4 . H.V. p.22. 7 5 . P.I. p.201. 7 6 . P.I. pp.99-114. 7 7 . P.I.p.109 
7 8 . P.I. p.112. 
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Indeed, a l l objective knowledge i s understood as a t h i r d party 
i n r e l a t i o n to a dialogue; Moreover, i t i s only I n t h i s 
r e l a t i o n that one can understand objective knowledge a t a l l : 
" I t i s I n function of t h i s dialogue and i n r e l a t i o n to i t that 
a he or i t can be defined, that i s , an independent world" (79) . 
Marcel concluded that knowledge i s a product of a 
community; men learn byfctheir dialogue w i t h others. Royce, 
of course, maintained that s c i e n t i s t s belong to a community 
i n which they share t h e i r findings with one another. Marcel 
recognised the importance of t h i s theory i n h is own search to 
understand the d i s t i n c t i o n between o b j e c t i v i t y and personal, 
knowledge, although i t s Implications needed to be developed. 
"The notion of t h i s i d e al c i t y I s only a h a l t , or a 
lodge, on a steep, stony, mountain path that must lead 
us much fu r t h e r on" ( 8 0 ) . 
Although he c r i t i c i s e d Royce f o r o b j e c t i v i s i n g the Ideal 
community, when i t ought to be understood as a discussion 
of ideas between men with a common i n t e r e s t , nevertheless 
he recognised his indebtedness to Royce's work on t h i s point. 
The Information forms a t h i r d party I n r e l a t i o n to a 
conversation i n which both pa r t i c i p a n t s are mutually enriched 
by t h e i r exchange of ideas. Whereas Royce saw t r u t h as the 
possession of an ideal community, Marcel argued that men were 
continually s t r i v i n g towards i t i n t h e i r continuing dialogue. 
Marcel puts i t t h i s way: 
" I t i s j u s t as i f two climbers were ta c k l i n g the same 
h i l l , up d i f f e r e n t approaches; allowing that the climbers 
can communicate d i r e c t l y w i t h each other, a t any moment, 
through portable radio or t e l e v i s i o n s e t s " ( 8 1 ) . 
7 9 . M.J. p.1 4 6 . 8 0 . M.B.l p.73. 81. M.B.lp.74. 
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To sum.up his thesis: o b j e c t i v i t y involves a dialogue, i n 
r e l a t i o n to which objective knowledge i s t r i a d i c . I t has 
reference to "an order that implies threefold i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s " ( 8 2 ) . 
In other words, when one i s concerned with a f a c t of 
information one i s involved i n a t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n , not dyadic 
(83). I f the r e l a t i o n were dyadic i t would include oneself 
and the object of i n t e r e s t . But t h i s does not happen, f o r 
Marcel has established that one i s continually i n dialogue 
w i t h someone else. For instance, i f one was wanting to learn 
about flowers, one would consult someone else or a book. I n 
a t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n there i s always a subject, an object and 
a mediator; i n t h i s case a book or someone else acts as a 
mediator between oneself and one's.object of i n t e r e s t - flowers. 
The three terms of the t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n are to be found when-
ever there i s a dialogue (I-tho.u) concerning an object (him 
or i t ) . The t h i r d party, the object, could be anything,including 
another person. One may be discussing someone wi t h a f r i e n d 
and i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n the f r i e n d acts as a mediator between 
oneself and the t h i r d party. There i s never any d i r e c t 
dialogue between subject and object. 
Of course, I t i s possible to have a dialogue with oneself 
concerning something or someone. "There I s i n me something 
in t e r s u b j e c t i v e , that i s to say, some p o s s i b i l i t i e s of intimacy 
w i t h myself."(84). But, as has been stated, there I s a constant 
danger of t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y being f o r f e i t e d by one's own s e l f -
consciouness. I n a l l these v a r i a t i o n s Marcel I s attempting 
to demonstrate the all-embracing reach of the intersubjective 
dialogue. O b j e c t i v i t y I s not an i l l u s i o n as the idealis&SS-
82. M.B.2 p.13 83. M.J. p.146 84. P.I. p.153 
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would have us "believe, but i t should not dominate our thought. 
I t i s subordinate to the sphere of personal knowledge; t h a t i s , 
to the r e a l i t y of personal communication. Wherever the t r i a d ! c 
r e l a t i o n i s to be found i t i s constituted by the three basic 
terms - the " I " , the "thou" and the "he" or " i t " . 
Marcel's central aim was not to demonstrate the importance 
of the t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n , but to establish the f a c t t h a t , 
important as i t was, i t was an i n f e r i o r form of knowledge to 
personal knowledge. The l a t t e r can only be found w i t h i n the 
dyadic r e l a t i o n - the Intersubjective bond. Oh many occasions 
the t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n i s merely a prelude t o the dyadic r e l a t i o n . 
Within the dyad there i s no mediator. The "thou" of course 
can act as a mediator to a t h i r d party, but the l a t t e r l i e s 
outside the relat i o n s h i p . $ l t h l n the I-thou encounter there 
i s a d i r e c t awareness of two subjects. Two people can become 
t o t a l l y aware of the depths of another soul as w e l l as t h e i r 
own. This, f o r Marcel, i s the pinnacle of human knowledge. 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to' see how a t r i a d i s transformed i n t o 
a dyad. One may have been discussing someone wi t h oneself 
or a f r i e n d . But when one becomes aware of t h i s person as 
a thou the former dialogue i s no longer necessary, f o r one 
can gain a deeper knowledge of him personally. 
Moreover, as long as t h i s person was a t h i r d person a 
dialogue continues w i t h i n oneself. One i s not a f u l l y 
integrated personality. Yet i n the presence of a thou an 
in t e g r a t i o n takes place w i t h i n the se l f . Marcel i s more 
e x p l i c i t I n the follo w i n g v i t a l passage. 
"Instead of a l l o b j e c t i v i t y , especially that of 'him 1, 
being related to a certain dialogue between me and myself, 
which Implies a t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n , when I am i n the 
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presence of a thou, an Inner Int e g r a t i o n takes place 
w i t h i n me, by means of which a dyad becomes possible" (85 ) . 
A t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n , formed between two people, I s only stopped 
from becoming a dyad because of the self-consclouness of one 
or both of them. Once a dyadic r e l a t i o n I s established 
f i d e l i t y , love and hope can be discovered. I n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y 
i s dependent on a l l those concerned possessing the q u a l i t y 
" d l s p o n l b l l i t e " . The t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n , consisting of " I " , 
"me" and "him" becomes i n the Intersubjective bond a dyad, 
comprising "I" and "thou". The t r i a d has become a dyad. 
Within the community there I s a dyadic r e l a t i o n , while, i n 
regard to o b j e c t i v i t y , the community forms a t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n . 
Within the dyadic r e l a t i o n there i s no place f o r the t h i r d 
party. The t h i r d party l i e s outside the dyad. 
Obviously the Integrating process that takes place w i t h i n 
the subject i s c r u c i a l . Human r e l a t i o n s tend to o s c i l l a t e 
between the t r i a d i c form and the point where two people become 
"one", when the primacy of the"we" i s asserted. 
At the outset the p r i o r i t y of the question "what am I ? " 
was asserted. What bearing do the above conclusions have on 
this? Clearly the c r i s i s , the metaphysical uneasiness w i t h 
regard to the question "What am I ? f came about because of a 
confusion between the personal and the objective. Only when 
a true perspective can be restored w i l l the question be 
answered. An objective analysis was inadequate; but a t the 
85. R.I. p. 53:"Au l i e u que toute objectivite", e t notamment c e l l e 
dtf l u i , se refere a un ce r t a i n dialogue entre moi et moi-m@me, 
ce qui lmplique. une r e l a t i o n t r l a d l q u e , lorsque je suis en 
presence du t o i , une u n i f i c a t i o n i n t e r i e u r e s'opire en moi, a 
l a faveur de laquelle une dyade devient possible". 
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same time t h i s i s not to deny a r i g h t f u l place to o b j e c t i v i t y . 
The question.then, f i r s t demands that o b j e c t i v i t y be 
placed w i t h i n I t s true perspective. I t i s to be understood 
only w i t h regard t o a world of communication, a world of 
dialogue. Here l i e s the profound significance of a d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the t r l a d l c r e l a t i o n and the dyadic. I n in t e r s u b j e c t -
i v i t y the t r l a d l c r e l a t i o n does not have a "person" as a t h i r d 
party; t h i s i s reserved f o r the f i e l d of objective knowledge. 
True human relationships and persons are to be found w i t h i n 
the intersubjective dyad. The objective independent world 
can only be understood I n r e l a t i o n to t h i s dialogue. By f i r m l y 
understanding the significance and l i m i t s of the t r l a d i c 
r e l a t i o n s and the intersubjectlve bond. Marcel hoped t o 
discover a means of expressing what I t r e a l l y means to be a 
person, to answer the. question "What am I ? " , while a t the same 
time t r y i n g to f i n d a true perspective f o r the world of 
o b j e c t i v i t y . 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Theory of I n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
I t has already been shown that Marcel, I n his attempts 
to d i s t i n g u i s h between the realms of objective knowledge and 
human existence, found i n Royce's theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
a way through the impasse (1). Knowledge does not merely 
involve a subject and a object, but includes a t h i r d party. 
I t was t h i s conclusion, that knowledge i s t r l a d l e , not dyadic, 
that provided Marcel with so much help. I t remains, then, 
to understand more f u l l y what Royce meant when he said th a t 
knowledge I s t r l a d i c . 
I n The Problem of C h r i s t i a n i t y Royce's concern was to 
give a detached appraisal of the issues raised by C h r i s t i a n i t y , 
namely those of the i n d i v i d u a l , the community and atonement. 
But these were not to be confined to the Church's dogma, no 
matter how basic they were to the Christian f a i t h . These were 
questions that had deep roots i n human existence. I n other 
words, even i f C h r i s t i a n i t y as a f a i t h did not e x i s t , i f 
there were no Christians i n the world, the questions that 
Royce raised would s t i l l be asked. What i s the place of the 
in d i v i d u a l i n the wider community? How does the community 
survive i f i t s members are disloyal? A true community i s one 
that enables i t s i n d i v i d u a l members to r e l a t e to one another, 
and f o r Royce C h r i s t i a n i t y meant the establishing of such a 
community. The book,then, was. concerned mainly w i t h examining 
the nature of t h i s community, and i t was his theory of 




I n surveying the general trends of western philosophy 
Royce saw eplstemology dominated by two basic schools of 
thought. Knowledge was derived ei t h e r from one's perceptions . 
or one's conceptions, and philosophers had usually f a l l e n on 
one side of the fence or the other. Cognition could be 
interpreted i n either way, but there was no consideration 
given to a t h i r d way. This basic c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of philosophies 
sees them as either an i n t u i t i o n a l empiricism or a rationalism. 
I n c l a r i f y i n g his argument Royce chose two philosophers to 
represent these a l t e r n a t i v e modes of thought - Bergson and 
Plato. The former maintained that unlimited perception would 
render conception superfluous, while the l a t t e r considered 
perception to be a vain show since conception alone could 
bring one face to face w i t h r e a l i t y . 
I n e i t h e r case the dual c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of perception 
and conception was thought to be an exhaustive account of 
man's cognitive processes. But i s t h i s r i g h t ? Royce did 
not think so. Both approaches to the problem of knowledge 
did not take i n t o account important aspects of human existence. 
I f everything can be known by perception then a l l knowledge 
stems from observable data. On the other hand, I f conception 
i s the primary means of knowledge then everything springs 
from abstract ideas. But there are some aspects of experience 
that cannot be explained ei t h e r as data or as abstract ideas. 
One of the most central facts of human experience i s the contact 
w i t h , and understanding of, one's fellow-men, and yet t h i s 
cannot be understood i n terms of perception or conception. 
Knowledge of one another i s not a question of observing 
objective facts about other human beings; nor can intercourse 
between people derive from preconceived ideas. To fathom the 
-104-
thoughts of someone else Involves comprehending his or her 
a t t i t u d e s , behaviour, f a c i a l expressions and so on. There 
i s no d i r e c t way i n which tw©' people can understand one another. 
Communication between humans always involves f o r Royce a 
process of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
Royce goes f u r t h e r than t h i s analysis of the special 
case of the knowledge of other selves and makes the notion 
of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n the key to his whole theory of knowledge. 
As communication and dialogue stand a t the very heart of human 
experience, then the theory of knowledge that seeks to 
understand t h i s process must take precedence over other 
epistemologles. I n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s not merely a t h i r d means 
of approach to epistemology, i t i s the most important. The 
f a i l u r e of philosophy i n the past to do f u l l Justice to a l l 
aspects of human experience was due to I t s insistence on 
seeing the problem of knowledge i n dyadic terms. 
Before proceeding f u r t h e r i n the argument a question arises. 
Can i n t e r p r e t a t i o n be understood as a synthesis between 
conception and perception? To c l a r i f y the peculiar nature 
of I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Royce took up an i l l u s t r a t i o n from Bergson's 
discussion of conception, f o r i n the course of his argument 
f o r viewing conception as a derivative of perception Bergson 
used the analogy of a money transaction. The hard ,cash of 
gold coins corresponds to perceptions, while conceptions are 
represented by mere bank notes. The l a t t e r have value only 
so long as they can be cashed i n t o hard currency. 
"The notes are promises to pay cash. The conceptions 
are useful guides to possible perceptions"(2). 
2. P.C. p.282. 
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Bergson's poiint was clear, and i t i s c e r t a i n l y true that I n 
some way perceptions do Indeed correspond to cash values and 
conceptions to c r e d i t values. But Royce made an important 
observation here: " I n the world of commercial transaction 
there are other values than simple cash-values and c r e d i t 
values. Perhaps, therefore, I n the realm of cognitive processes 
there may be analogous v a r i e t i e s " ( 3 ) . I n order to adapt 
Bergsbn's i l l u s t r a t i o n to his own thesis Royce took the 
example of the t r a v e l l e r crossing the boundary of a foreign 
country. On traversing the border both h i s coins and his 
bank-notes are no longer the l e g a l tenders I t i s necessary 
f o r him to exchange his money f o r the currency of the country 
he I s about to enter. This.procedure i s neither the presentation 
of cash values nor the o f f e r i n g or accepting of c r e d i t values. 
I t i s a process of i n t e r p r e t i n g the cash values of one country 
i n t o the cash values of another;this constitutes a much 
d i f f e r e n t style of transaction from the one conceived by Bergson. 
By taking up the challenge of the l a t t e r ' s analogy Royce was 
merely demonstrating th a t a man's communication w i t h himself 
and with others involves a mode of cognition very d i s t i n c t 
from ei t h e r perception or conception. 
"Each .of us, i n every new e f f o r t to communicate w i t h 
our fellow!-men, stands, l i k e the t r a v e l l e r crossing 
the boundary of a new country, I n the presence of a 
lar g e l y strange world of perceptions and conceptions" ( 4 ) . 
Certainly i t I s often the case tha t one's neighbour's thoughts, 
intentions and desires can often be regarded w i t h a ce r t a i n 
amount of p r o b a b i l i t y as i d e n t i c a l w i t h one's own, but usually 
3.P.C p.2 8 2 . 4 . P.C. p.2 8 3 . 
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one's thoughts and fears are highly I n d i v i d u a l , i n which 
case i t I s d i f f i c u l t to compare them with a neighbour's. 
Just as the exchange of baiaksnisnfeBS f o r cash d i f f e r s from 
the exchange of one's own coins f o r foreign ones, so the 
process of v e r i f y i n g concepts by obtaining corresponding 
percepts d i f f e r s from the process of i n t e r p r e t i n g the mind 
of a fellow human being. 
The t r a d i t i o n a l epistemologies involved a dyadic 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , seeking to define the i n t e r a c t i o n between 
subject, and object; but the I l l u s t r a t i o n above underlines 
Royce's d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h i s approach. As long as 
philosophy i n s i s t e d on defining the problem of knowledge 
i n dyadic terms a c r u c i a l feature of human existence would 
be sadly neglected. I n discussing the r e l a t i o n s h i p of one 
human being to another any attempt to explain i t i n terms 
of one lonely subject alone w i t h i t s object would be completely 
Inadequate, as f a r as Ro-yce was concerned. Dialogue between 
people involves persons confronting the i n d i v i d u a l i t y of one 
another and t r y i n g to understand each other, and t h i s involves 
a process of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I n other words, when dealing 
with human existence and relationships one I s concerned, not 
with a series of i n d i v i d u a l subjects each with t h e i r objects, 
but with a community. Before the process of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
i s defined i t would be as w e l l to elucidate the significance 
that Royce placed upon the concept of "community 
A community formed by persons Involved I n i n t e r p r e t i n g 
one another i s no mere agglomeration of i n d i v i d u a l s , but a 
harmonic unity. Indeed, Royce saw the nature of a community 
as behaving i n very much the same way as an i n d i v i d u a l , and i n 
t h i s respect he was deeply impressed by the work of Wundt (5). 
5. P.C. p . 8 l f . 
- 1 0 7 -
Wllhelm Max Wundt ( 1 8 3 2 - 1 9 2 0 ) held the Chair of Philosophy 
at Leipzig f o r 4 5 years, and i n 1 8 7 9 he founded the f i r s t 
laboratory f o r psychology i n the world, the SBsychologisches 
I n s t i t u t . I t was i n the years 1 8 7 3 - 7 4 that Wundt published 
his monumental Grundzuge de Physlologischen Psychologle, _.ln 
whlfeh he set out the findings of his research. His Influence 
was tremendous and to him i s a t t r i b u t e d the establishment of 
the study of psychology as an experimental science (6). I n 
his experimental approach Wundt was greatly concerned to bring 
psychology int o r e l a t i o n w i t h anthropology and sociology. 
Indeed he believed th a t experimental psychology would have to 
be supplemented by "Volkerpsychologie", and i n a long series 
of volumes i n the l a s t twenty years of his l i f e he set himself 
too t h i s task as he had done f o r experimentation. This great 
work d e f i n i t e l y brought modern psychology i n t o r e l a t i o n w i th 
c u l t u r a l anthropology, to the advantage of both sciences. I n 
his analysis of the workings of the mind he considered the 
community as Important as the i n d i v i d u a l f o r our understanding 
of human behaviour. Wundt saw the human community as behaving 
' l i k e an e n t i t y w i t h a mind of i t s own, and t h i s was f o r him 
an empirical conclusion, not a mystical opinion. Languages, 
customs and religions are a l l i n t e l l i g e n t mental products, whihh 
can be psychologically analysed. 
Wundt's work equipped Royce for. h is own theory of the 
community Involved i n I n t e r p r e t a t i o n . How i s a community to 
be distinguished from a mere crowd ? A crowd I s a c o l l e c t i o n 
of individuals w i t h no i n t e r n a l coherence, but a community 
behaves l i k e an In d i v i d u a l . Just as the l a t t e r has a past,a 
6. The information here i s based upon Shipley (196l) and Plugel 
(1933). 
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present and a future, so has the former. Both possess a 
memory. The community has tr a d i t i o n s and customs that are 
an i n t e g r a l part of i t s behaviour; i t i s t h i s that decides 
what i s a mob and what i s a community. 
"A community requires for i t s existence a history and 
i s greatly aided i n i t s consciousness by a memory"(7). 
A mere crowd, or even mass society as i t i s found i n modern 
c i v i l i s a t i o n , has no such past to share i n , nor common future 
to look forward to. I t does not function organically: "hope 
and memory constitute, i n communities, a basis for an 
unquestionable consciousness of unity, and that t h i s common 
l i f e i n time does not annul the v a r i e t y of the individual 
member at any one present moment"(8). Royce argued, i n 
applying these c r i t e r i a to contemporary experience, that modern 
society ceased to be a true community as soon as i t l o s t i t s 
common identity. Unlike the l i f e l e s s impersonal q u a l i t i e s of 
mass society the true community i s a l i v i n g organism; here men 
can experience constant communication and dialogue, which i s 
e s s e n t i a l to true human l i v i n g . 
I f a community possesses an i d e n t i t y , then a l l i t s 
individual members can i d e n t i f y themselves with i t , andithis 
i s something that members of a crowd cannot do. I t follows 
that when a community enjoys a r i c h history and culture i t s 
members take the i r I n s p i r a t i o n from t h i s , identifying t h e i r 
own past, present and future with that of the community. Hence, 
when the individual members of a society are unable to i d e n t i f y 
t h e i r pasts and t h e i r futures with the past and future of 
society, then that fellowship degenerates into the c o l l e c t i v i s m 
7. P.C. p. 2^3. 8, P.C. p. 260. 
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o££ mass.society, where unity i s maintained by external 
coercion. The continuity of the true community depends on 
the ongoing interpretation of i t s past to i t s anticipated 
future,in which process the present acts as mediator. 
"A community requires for i t s existence a history and 
i s greatly aided i n i t s consciousness by a memory"(9). 
Like an individual, the values of a community have t h e i r 
source i n common i d e a l s , and t r a d i t i o n s and customs. 
In h i s e a r l i e r work Royce had already understood s e l f -
awareness as a product of the contrast of oneself with others. 
The individual becomes aware of h i s own q u a l i t i e s , p e c u l i a r i t i e s 
and d e f i c i e n c i e s by h i s experiences of society. As f a r as 
Ro&ce was concerned the s e l f was to be understood i n e t h i c a l 
terms, and not as some kind of substance. I t i s an i d e a l , not 
a datum. 
" I am whatever my remembered or anticipated powers, fortunes 
and plans, caused me to regard with emphasis as myself 
i n contrast with the r e s t of the world".(10) 
Social awareness, then, must come before self-awareness. However, 
i t was h i s l a t e r work, e s p e c i a l l y i n The Problem of C h r i s t i a n i t y 
i n which t h i s theme was developed. Here knowledge of oneself 
i s s t i l l the r e s u l t of the contrast between the s e l f and the 
s o c i a l milieu. To take an obvious example, the person who has 
a limp w i l l only become aware of h i s deficiency when he sees 
other people walking normally: *'all such more elaborate s e l f -
knowledge i s , d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , a s o c i a l product, and 
a product of s o c i a l contrasts and oppositions of one sort or 
another" (11) . Only by a comparison with others i s i t possible 
9. P.C. p.2^3. 101 W.I. 2 p.288. 11. P.C. p.10?. 
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fpr a person to discover who he I s and for what he i s aiming. 
The individual, then, a t t a i n s self-consciousness as a 
moral being i n d i r e c t proportion to h i s awareness of himself 
as a s o c i a l being. But a d i s t i n c t i o n has already been made 
between what constitutes a true community and what i s merely 
a crowd. The individual i s able to Identify himself with a 
community, but how does a person behave when he becomes aware 
of himself as belonging to a crowd ? According to Royce 
experience of contemporary society involved many tensions 
and strained relationships. The individual not only Imitates 
the trends and attitudes of modern mass society, but also reacts 
against what he f e e l s to be a threat to h i s own i n d i v i d u a l i t y . 
Unlike a true community, the crowd, f a r from helping the 
individual to find h i s true Identity, alienates him. Such a 
society can teach i t s members to be I t s servants, but as i t 
becomes more cultivated the s o c i a l w i l l becomes increasingly 
vast and oppressive. I t breeds more and more highly s e l f -
conscious Individuals, who see the contrast between t h e i r own 
w i l l and the overwhelming power of the s o c i a l w i l l . His s e l f -
a ssertion as an individual i s a product of the conform!sm of 
c o l l e c t i v e society. 
"Cultivation breeds c i v i l i z e d conduct; i t also breeds 
conscious independence of s p i r i t and deeper inner 
opposition to a l l mere external authority" ( 1 2 ) . 
An advanced c i v i l i s a t i o n , such as western society, produces 
individual r i v a l r i e s , as each s t r i v e s to a s s e r t i t s e l f . 
C o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n , for Royce, goes hand I n hand with s o c i a l 
fragmentation. 
" I t I s the o r i g i n a l s i n of any highly developed c i v i l i z a t i o n 
12. P.C. p.113. 
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th&t i t breeds cooperation at the expense of a l o s s of 
i n t e r e s t i n the community"(13) 
The vicious c i r c l e caused by the constant tension 
between mass society and the individual creates within the 
s o c i a l order both individualism and c o l l e c t i v i s m , and t h i s 
s i t u a t i o n leads individuals into increasing i s o l a t i o n and 
s e l f i s h n e s s as they attempt to escape the grip of society's 
impersonal power. Not only does c o l l e c t i v i s m and tyrannical 
conformism s t r i p the individual of a l l personal significance, 
but the ensuing individualism cuts him off from that kind of 
s o c i a l environment i n which he can discover himself. I f the 
impersonal nature of mass^society i s not conducive to forming 
and nurturing human bonds, then where i s the individual to 
find the f u l l n e s s of human experience ? Where can he discover 
h i s identity ? Maybe h i s relationships with other people provide 
a solution. But surely a l l other individuals are j u s t as 
much Isolated. 
"Escape through any mere multitude of loves for other 
Individuals i s impossible. For such loves, unless they 
are united by some supreme lo y a l t y , are capricious 
fondnesses for other Individuals, who, by nature and 
by s o c i a l training, are as lonely and as distracted as 
th e i r lover himself"(14) . 
People who share no common i n t e r e s t or cause are i n no way 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the same experience, for there i s no bond 
between them. Collectivism i n t e n s i f i e s s e l f - a s s e r t i o n and 
introspection. Therefore, only where there i s a common factor 
l i n k i n g people can there be found a true relationship. 
13. P.C pp. 253-*K 14. p.c . pp.131-2. 
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Royce was s u f f i c i e n t l y impressed with Schopenhauer to 
lay s t r e s s on the importance of expressing the human w i l l ; 
but cultivated society f o s t e r s the individual's w i l l i n reaction 
against the s o c i a l w i l l . I n other words, the individual f e e l s 
that contemporary society s t i f l e s any individual w i l l . Royce 
saw the necessity of the individual w i l l to transcend the 
confines of the s e l f i n order to a t t a i n i t s own fulfiljoekfe^ 
However, c o l l e c t i v e society i s Incapable of accomplishing 
t h i s task; man must d i r e c t h i s w i l l towards a cause, a s o c i a l 
purpose, to which he can be Icyal. For loy a l t y i s the means 
whereby the individual s e l f can break out from the confines 
of self-consciousness w h i l s t retaining h i s i n t e g r i t y . Loyalty 
makes possible a unity among individuals and i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
s o c i a l . 
"You can love an individual. But you can be l o y a l only 
to a t i e that binds you and others into some sort of 
unity, and l o y a l to Individuals only through the tie " ( 1 5 ) . 
Through l o y a l t y to a cause i t i s possible to resolve the 
tension between the need to be s o c i a l and the desire to be 
an individual. To be l o y a l i s to succeed i n uniting private 
passion and outward conformity. 
But l o y a l t y i s more than Just a question of controlling 
the urge to a s s e r t oneself; nor does the cause to which one 
i s l o y a l act merely as a useful channel for excessive passions. 
The i d e a l which a person pursues and the goal for which he 
aims give that same person a unity around which h i s w i l l can 
build h i s l i f e . Royce, i n f a c t , defined a person as a l i f e 
l i v e d according to a plan. 
i$. P.L. p. 20. 
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Loyalty to a cause not only provides the basis for an 
individual's unity, but i t i s also of great s o c i a l significance. 
The cause to which one i s l o y a l provides a unity for two or 
more individuals, for i t welds them knto a higher unity, into 
a state to which they could not aspire as mere individuals. 
But one i s always l o y a l to a thir d factor, never j u s t to 
another individual, for th&s would not offer a basis for 
true unity. I n h i s Philosophy of Loyalty Royce attacked the 
American mistrust of the notion of lo y a l t y with t h i s 
i 
r h e t o r i c a l question. 
"Can they come to see that loyalty does not mean the 
bondage of one individual to another, but does mean the 
exaltation of individuals to the rank of true p e r s o n a l i t i e s 
by v i r t u e of thei r free acceptance of enduring causes, and 
?«[f by virtue of th e i r l i f e - l o n g service of thei r common 
personal t i e s ? " ( l 6 ) . 
The relationship of two individuals remains on the l e v e l of 
individualism, but the relationship of two people both 
committed to a common cause, a thi r d factor, provides a true 
and l a s t i n g human bond. I n other words, the unity that a 
common cause or purpose establishes i s much more than the m&me 
Juxtaposition of two individuals; i t i s more than the sum 
tota l of individuals concerned. Here Royce found the heart 
of the true community. Collective society, being the juxta-
position of individuals, presents no inner cohesion, for i t 
i s held together by external pressure. U n t i l society I s 
united by an inner purpose the individual w i l l not be able 
to Identify h i s w i l l with i t . 
16. P.L. p. 227. 
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As f a r as Royce was concerned neither:!individualism nor 
col l e c t i v i s m were able to provide a way of understanding the 
needs of man's w i l l . The former considers the w i l l as waiting 
to override the w i l l of others, while the l a t t e r appears to 
demand the s a c r i f i c e of the individual's w i l l . Loyalty i s a 
way through t h i s impasse, for i t appeals to the individual's 
enthusiasm w h i l s t c a l l i n g for personal s a c r i f i c e a t the same 
time. 
"That union of s e l f - s a c r i f i c e with s e l f - a s s e r t i o n which 
loy a l t y expresses becomes a consciousness of our genuine 
re l a t i o n s to a higher s o c i a l unity of consciousness i n 
which we a l l have our being" (17) . 
This "higher s o c i a l unity of consciousness" resolves the tension 
between the need for s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t and the duties of l i v i n g 
i n a society, between the duty to s e l f and the duty to others. 
Royce, i n h i s Philosophy of Loyalty, went on to consider 
the various problems that the concept of loy a l t y r a i s e s . For 
instance, where there are c o n f l i c t i n g demands for l o y a l t y 
what i s the c r i t e r i o n for the ri g h t choice? His answer was 
to be l o y a l to lo y a l t y i t s e l f . I f the choice made f a c i l i t a t e s 
the growth of a s p i r i t of loy a l t y i n humanity, then i t i s the 
rig h t choice. The true Unity of mankind does not reside i n a 
co l l e c t i v e uniformity, but with t h i s very s p i r i t of loyalty. 
"The unity of the world i s not an ocean i n which we 
are l o s t , but a l i f e which i s and which needs a l l our 
one. Our loy a l t y defines that unity for us as a 
l i v i n g , active unity"(18). 
The unity of the world i s ensured by the establishing of the 
true community, founded on a s p i r i t of loyalty. 
17. P.L. p.311. 18. P.L. p.395. ~~ 
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But what i s t h i s higher s o c i a l unity of consciousness"? 
Two individuals without anything i n common cannot enter into 
a proper human relationship; but i f there i s a common in t e r e s t 
or cause mediating between the two, then a unity can be found. 
Loyalty establishes a community and t h i s I s made possible by 
the cause of lo y a l t y acting as a t h i r d party. I n other words, 
Royce understood the true human community as being t r i a d i c 
as opposed to the normal dyadic view. Knowledge of others, 
and even oneself, involves.a t h i r d factor which acts as an t 
interpreter. 
Royee saw the f u l l potential of human existence brought 
about as the true community of human beings, founded on the 
s p i r i t of l o y a l t y , i s established and developed. This 
community i s characterised by a continuing process of i n t e r -
pretation which makes possible a true understanding and 
knowledge between the individual members. I f there i s to be 
a true community, i f human beings are to enrich their experience, 
then the i r knowledge of one another, of themselves and of the 
world, must proceed by way of Interpretation. 
The reasons for Royce's concern to e s t a b l i s h the c r i t e r i a 
of a true community and the importance of loyalty have been' 
discussed. I t i s now possible to face the c r u c i a l question: 
what exactly i s interpretation ? In other words, what i s 
meant when i t i s claimed that knowledge-is t r i a d i c , not dyadic? 
I t has been seen that both conceptual and perceptual 
cognition are dyadic, i n that they involve only the conceiver 
and., the concept, or the percelver and the datum. Royce saw 
t h i s dyadic view of knowledge as being responsible for the 
s p i r i t u a l = d e s o l a t i o n so prevalent i n contemporary society. 
Indeed, theology*s current d i f f i c u l t i e s were understood by him 
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as due to i t s use of dead conceptual language when expressing 
something that i s a l i v e and i n need of interpretation. The 
hegemony of t h i s dual c l a s s i f i c a t i o n has had dire consequences: 
"every philosopher whose sole principle i s perception 
i n v i t e s us to dwell i n a desolate wilderness where 
neither God nor man e x i s t s . For where either God or 
man i s i n question, interpretation i s demanded"(19). 
Where man or God i s concerned a community i s involved, and 
the community functions "by a process of interpretation. Hence 
when the communication of two people i s i n question, the 
si t u a t i o n i s not dyadic. No d i r e c t contact can be made with 
another'1;.;? person's mind. Nor, when a person i s concerned with 
knowing himself, i s he i n a dyadic r e l a t i o n with himself. I n 
both cases the s i t u a t i o n demands Interpretation, involving a 
thi r d person. John E. Smith sums up the necessity for a theory 
of interpretation: 
"Interpretation i s appropriate for the knowledge of 
selves and communities, for each i s a l i M n g unity of 
understanding and l o y a l t y and neither can be known as 
i f i t were a datum of perception or an abstract universal" 
(20) . 
A straightforward example of t h i s argument makes t h i s clear. 
A man trying to learn the intentions of another person has 
no d i r e c t way of acheiving t h i s ; for t h i s he needs to consult 
otherffactors that would help him to make up h i s mind. These 
may be that person*s actions or even f a c i a l expressions, or 
someone e l s e ' s experiences, and these are termed "signs", which 
allow the subject to interpret another's intentions. Hence, 
19. P.C. pp.290-1. 20. P.C. p.31. 
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i&he process involves three p a r t i e s ; or, as Royce puts i t : 
"interpretation i s a t r i a d i c relation" ( 2 1 ) . Unless human 
existence i s to %1-ack a l l s p i r i t u a l depth and v i t a l i t y the 
c r u c i a l Importance of interpretation must be stressed. 
To say that the t r i a d involves three p a r t i e s i s a 
truism, but the difference between a dyadic r e l a t i o n and a 
t r i a d i c i s not j u s t a numerical question. Unlike the act of 
perception whose subject i s alone with h i s object, interpretation 
involves the subject i n a dialogue with an interpreter 
concerning the object. As&there i s no d i r e c t i n t u i t i o n or 
perception of the self,'the subject i s not an isolated 
individual confronted by i t s object. As Royce puts i t : 
" interpretation i s a conversation, and not a lonely 
exercise" ( 2 2 ) . 
The three p a r t i e s are involved i n the act of interpretation. 
However, "an interpretation i s a r e l a t i o n which not 
only involves three terms, but brings them into a determinate 
order" (23) . I n i l l u s t r a t i n g what he meant Royce drew upon 
the example of the work of a translator. The translator acts 
as a mediator between the material he i s studying and those 
who w i l l benefit from h i s work, the readers. I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n 
the three p a r t i e s concerned are i n no way Interchangeable, for 
the translator i s the only one who can carry out the role of 
interpreting. I t may be that i n another case he may take the 
place of the readers, for he may require some material translated 
from a language that he does not understand. Like t h i s ' 
instance of trans l a t i n g Royce understood a l l knowledge as 
taking place within the context of a human dialogue. There 
ZK P.C. p.28t ZX. P.C p.28fiT. 23. P.C. p.285f. 
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are three terms involved - the interpreter, the object 
interpreted and the person for whom the Interpretation i s 
intended. Knowledge Involves an a c t i v i t y i n which a dialogue 
takes place. The major mistake of a l l dyadic views of 
knowledge i s that area where d i r e c t cognition i s out of ibhe 
question, that i s , human dialogue, i s ignored$ these also do 
not r e a l i s e that a l l human knowledge must eventually take 
place within the milieu of human Intercommunication and 
experience. There i s a world of difference between the l i m i t s 
of dyadic knowledge and the scope of t r i a d i c knowledge. 
In the deepening of h i s understanding of tra d i c 
knowledge Royce admitted h i s debt to Feirce. During h i s l i f e 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) was esteemed I n various 
expert c i r c l e s for h i s o r i g i n a l work i n mathematical l o g i c , 
the philosophy of language, the history of the physical 
sciences and the theory of errors of observation. To readers 
of philosophy he was known, through the acknowledgements of 
William James, as the inventor of the word "pragmatism". 
Peirce himself had read and admired Royce's early work, but 
he was quick to r e a l i s e that Royce suffered lamentably from 
a lack of knowledge of logic. However, a f t e r the completion 
of h i s Philosophy of Loyalty. Royce made a close study of 
Pelrce's e a r l i e r papers--? (24) which were to. furnish him with 
the l o g i c a l ammunition with which to develop h i s theory of 
the l o y a l community. Cotton considers that Royce was indebted 
to Peirce for four basic propositions: namely, h i s theory of 
signs, h i s view of the human s e l f , h i s conception of truth, 
and h i s theorypf induction (25) . Through these studies Royce 
24. For a f u l l e r account of Royce's study of Peirce see Cotton 
(1954), chapter 5. 25. Cotton (1954) p.224f. 
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corroborated h i s e a r l i e r conclusion concerning the s o c i a l 
o r i g i n of knowledge and found a way forward to h i s theory 
of interpretation set out i n The Problem of 'Christianity. 
Peirce's r e f u s a l to understand the human s e l f as a s e l f -
explanatory datum, open to the d i r e c t apprehension of a l l 
those that care to perceive, proved an invaluable a l l y i n 
h i s own search for an epistemology. 
"Charles Peirce, i n the e a r l i e s t of the essays to which 
I am c a l l i n g your attention, maintained (quite r i g h t l y , 
I think) that there i s no d i r e c t i n t u i t i o n or perception 
of the s e l f " (26)". 
Peirce, then, played an important part i n the development of 
Royce's understanding of the t r i a d i c structure of knowledge. 
I t might be thought, however, that Royce's view of the 
human community as a s e r i e s of interpretations, or t r i a d i c 
r e l a t i o n s , r e f l e c t s the philosophy of Hegel. I t i s well known 
that Hegel saw human history as the development of Ideas along 
a d i a l e c t i c a l pattern - t h e s i s , a n t i t h e s i s , synthesis; t h i s 
progression i s a t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n . But Royce repudiated any 
such influence, and In s i s t e d that h i s view of the t r i a d i c 
r e l a t i o n was indebted to the pragmatic philosophy of Peirce.. 
The l a t t e r was a l o g i c i a n , who was highly suspicious of 
idealism, including Royce's own "Absolute" I n h i s e a r l i e r 
work; there was no room for metaphysical speculation. The 
triad!sm of Peirce and that.of Hegel are not to be contused. 
"Peirce's concept of interpretation defines an extremely 
general process, of which the Hegelian d i a l e c t i c a l t r i a d i c 
process i s a very spe c i a l case."(27) 
Far from being attracted by Hegel's Idealism, Royce was deeply 
impressed by Peirce's empirical approach, and indeed he 
26. P.C. p .285. 27. P.C. p. 305. 
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recognised i n the theory of t r i a d l c r e l a t i o n s a strong 
empirical foundation for h i s own philosophical theories. 
The empirical orientation of Peirce's triadism opened up 
for Royce f i e l d s unknown to Hegelian speculation. 
"Peirce's theory.with i t s e x p l i c i t l y empirical o r i g i n 
and i t s very exact l o g i c a l working out, promises new 
l i g h t upon matters which Hegel l e f t profoundly problemati 
(28). 
Royce saw the development of h i s l a t e r w^©rk as a combination 
of t h i s deep influence of Peirce and h i s v o l u n t a r i s t tendencie 
i n 
"My present i n t e r e s t lies^applying the s p i r i t of my 
absolute voluntarism to the new problems which our 
e m p i r l c i a l study of the Christian ideas, and our 
metaphysical theory of interpretation, have presented 
for our scrutiny."(2 9 ) 
Clearly, Royce applied the insights of Peirce's l o g i c to h i s 
own needs. 
? 5 I t was Peirce's own "theory of signs" that enabled 
Royce to develop and deepen h i s understanding of the t r i a d i c 
structure of knowledge. Not that Royce merely transplanted 
Peirce's views without modification. Peirce may have been 
a formative influence, but Peirce's own notion of a sign 
was j u s t part of a l o g i c a l theory of categories, and Royce 
r e a l i s e d that h i s own development was peculiar to himself. 
"My own metaphysical use of Peirce's doctrine of signs, 
i n my account of the World of Interpretation a t the 
l a s t time, i s largely independent of Peirce's 
philosophy" (30) . 
28. P.C. p. 305. 29. P.C. p. 350. 30. P.C. pp. 3 ^ - 5 . 
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Pelrce pointed to the peculiar l o g i c of a sign. A datum 
or object of sensory experience i s understood by a process 
of perceptions a thought or abstract universal i s an object 
of conception; but a sign belongs to neither cognitive process. 
The sign i s related to interpretation, for a sign needs and 
determines an act of interpretation. 
"A sign, then, i s an object whose being consists i n 
the f a c t that the sign c a l l s for an interpretation" ( 3 1 ) . 
But what i s a sign, as Royce understood I t ? He 
defined i t as expressing a mind, or as a mind i t s e l f , or 
what he c a l l e d a "quasi-mind". The sign belongs to the world 
of human dialogue and not to the sphere of impersonal object-
i v i t y . For instance, a clock i s an obvious sign i n that i t 
expresses man's way of c a l c u l a t i n g the time and r e l i e s on 
other people being capable of interpreting what i t means. 
Similarly a sign-post expresses the Intention of someone else 
to help others to find t h e i r way,and therefore requires 
another mind to interpret i t . 
The sign by i t s presence establishes ah interpreting 
situ a t i o n i n which the scope of either perception or conception 
i s very limited. In the t r i a d i c s i t u a t i o n the interpreting 
mind acts as mediator between the sign and the mind for whom 
i t i s intended. For example, a cartographer sees the map 
that he has drawn as an interpretation of h i s knowledge of a 
geographical area* and t h i s Interpretation becomes a sign 
which needs to be interpreted by another interpreter i f the 
map i s to be of use. The translator stands as a mediator 
between what he sees i n front of him and the Interpretation 
31. P.C. p.3^5. 
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he I s to give and t h i s interpretation, or i n h i s case, 
t r a n s l a t i o n , becomes another sign or object to be interpreted. 
Peirce expressed h i s view of the function of a sign i n the 
following way. 
" I t (the sign) addresses somebody, that i s , creates i n 
the mind of the person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a 
more developed sign. That sign which i t creates I c a l l 
the •interpretant• of the f i r s t sign."(32) 
Peirce was using the word •interpretant• to signify any such 
development of a sign, for i t i n no way duplicates the sign, 
for simple r e i t e r a t i o n does not constitute interpretation. 
The sign does not stand i n a dyadic r e l a t i o n l i k e an object 
and i t s meaning. The sign functions as a sign only insofar 
as i t i s part of a working system of signs. G a l l i e explains 
Pelrce's t h e s i s ; 
" i t (the sign) means what i t does only i n v i r t u e of 
the f a c t that other signs belonging to the same system 
mean the s l i g h t l y - or immensely - d i f f e r e n t things that 
they do"(33). 
Royce recognised Peirce's category of the sign as a 
corroboration of h i s theory of s o c i a l experience. Of course 
he was f u l l y aware that Beirce was interested i n i t primarily 
as a category of l o g i c , but he foresaw i t s value and importance 
for h i s own theory of "The World of Interpretation".' The world 
can be perceived and i t can be conceived, but i t can also be 
interpreted, and t h i s i s made possible by means of signs. 
"The universe consists of r e a l Signs and of t h e i r 
interpretation". (34) 
32. Gallie (1952),p.110. quoting from Collected Papers of Charles 
Sanders Peirce,vol.2,p.231,ed.by Hartshorne and Weiss,Harvard.(1931 
-ITT 33. Gallie(1 9 5 2)p. 125. 34. P.C. p.3^5-
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Men are always Interpreting t h e i r experiences; t h i s may 
involve relationships with others, or knowledge of themselves, 
or they may be seeking to understand the world beyond themselves, 
which i s the object of s c i e n t i f i c enquiry. These acts of 
interpretation produce further needs of interpretation i n an 
ongoing^ a c t i v i t y . This steady sequewee of signs and t h e i r 
interpretations constitutes the history of the universe. 
Where Bergson saw the world i n a constant state of f l u x i n 
which i n t u i t i o n was the appropriate mode of cognition, Royce 
understood the knowledge of the world as an ongoing process, 
i n which mankind progresses from past experiences through the 
present towards a deeper knowledge i n the future. I n t h i s 
process the memory i s the sign of the past and one's anticipations 
are the sign of the future. Man's knowledge of the universe 
i s governed by these signs. 
To return to the example of the sign-post; i t s function 
can never be understood i f i t i s seen merely as an object. As 
a sign i t I s used to help other human beings and therefore 
requires interpretation. I n other words, i t s function as a 
sign depends on human beings understanding i t ; I t would not 
be a sign i f i t was only understood by one individual, as i t 
would then be superfluous. I t needs a community to interpret 
i t , and the minimum number here i s three. F i r s t l y , there i s 
thesihind whose intention i s expressed i n the sign; secondly, 
there i s the person for whom the sign I s intended; t h i r d l y , 
there must be a th i r d who w i l l Interpret the sign, for i t i s 
not self-explanatory. Signs are important factors i n the l i f e 
of the community. 
At t h i s point i n the argument c e r t a i n points can be 
summarised. As a theory of knowledge Interpretation has proved 
to account f o r human experience more f u l l y than the usual 
mod;es of cognition. Instead of the subject being alone w i t h 
his object, as i n a l l dyadic processes, the object i s understood . 
w i t h i n an.act of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and t h i s implies a community. 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the world of human dialogue and 
the world of knowledge i s a t r i a d i c one, i n that knowledge 
involves three parties. What then i s t h i s t r i a d ? Peirce's 
theory of signs enabled Royce to solve t h i s problem. The 
object of one's knowledge, whether i t be inanimate nature 
or other people or even oneself, behaves as a sign Sm that 
i t points to and needs an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and hence requires 
an i n t e r p r e t e r . I f these three basic areas of knowledge -
of other people, of oneself, of objective data - belong to 
the context of a community, i f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s the 
fundamental mode of cognition, then man's knowledge i s the 
possession of a community, never merely of an in d i v i d u a l . 
I f man i s seeking greater self-awareness, then he must 
learn from his fellow-men, and t h i s can only be achieved by 
entering i n t o a deeper rel a t i o n s h i p w i t h .them. I n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
can succeed here where the usual dyadic epistemologies are 
whollfrfinadequate. Once t h i s unity i s achieved and a 
community i s operating, then i t can share i t s common experiences 
and i t s common knowledge. How, then, does the t r i a d function 
i n these regions ? 
F i r s t of a l l , I n t e r p r e t a t i o n binds individuals together 
i n a t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n . When one i s endeavouring to I n t e r p r e t 
a neighbour's mind the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s never perfect. The 
in t e r p r e t e r , the person to which the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s 
addressed, and the person who i s the object of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , 
may be i n our social world three d i s t i n c t persons, and i t i s 
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l l k e l y that the gulf between these individuals may appear 
impossible to bridge. Certainly, i n contemporary society 
t h i s gulf between persons has been described as aliena t i o n . 
One's neighbour, although not t o t a l l y incomprehensible,is 
estranged from one to a ce r t a i n extent. But, as social 
beings, human persons could not allow t h i s s i t u a t i o n to 
continue. 
" I am discontent w i t h my narrowness and wi t h your 
estrangement. I seek unity with. you. " (35) 
One p a r t i c u l a r act of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may no* bring those 
concerned very faj?, but the continuing i n d e f i n i t e process 
of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n does have as i t s goal the harmonisation 
of mankind i n a true community, although t h i s may be very much 
an ideal. 
" I am Ide a l l y aiming a t an ideal event - the s p i r i t u a l 
u nity of our community"(36). 
The aim of the i n t e r p r e t i n g community i s nothing less than -
the u n i t y of humanity, and t h i s unity i s a unity of conscious-
ness. Royce saw the aim of. i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n 
of those who were once estranged. 
Collective society w i t h i t s faceless numbers could i n 
no way achieve a uni t y of consciousness. Nor can the dyadic 
modes of knowledge, so prevalent i n technological society, 
bring people closer together. Fragmented society contains 
individuals who continually misunderstand one another, and 
such f a i l u r e s stem from an i n a b i l i t y to recognise the intention s , 
i n t e r e s t s and motives of t h e i r fellow-men. The in t e r p r e t e r 
can be, quite l i t e r a l l y , anything or anybody. I t has already 
been seen that a common l o y a l t y brings men of d i f f e r e n t 
backgrounds and int e r e s t s together. The common l o y a l t y of 
35. F.C p.314. 36. P.C. p. 317. 
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two individuals acts as a mediator between them. Formerly, 
when they were strangers, they were unable to understand 
one another as persons, because the dyadic r e l a t i o n made i t 
impossible to bridge the gap between them; but i n t h i s new 
t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n I n which l o y a l t y functions as mediator, they 
are able to meet on a new p l a i n of discernment. Royce 
maintained that only through these mediating processes.can 
men come to understand one another i n a true community. Where 
any number of Individuals meet together with a common i n t e r e s t 
acting as mediator, then a community i s formed based on the 
t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n s that can be found. The founding of a true 
community of men i s dependent on the r e a l i t y of such r e l a t i o n s , 
and on the effectiveness of mediating ideas and Interests to 
bring about mutual understanding. Such a community with i t s 
basic t r i a d i c structure I s only possible when the ind i v i d u a l s 
Involved I d e n t i f y themselves w i t h these mediating ideas. 
This common denominator may be a friendship, i n which 
case two lovers are l o y a l to t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p . But i t may 
also be a social cause, a common task or an Interest. When 
two men a c t i v e l y cooperate i n a common task, as t h e i r 
involvement increases,so the task becomes part of them. 
Cooperation becomes more than mere juxtaposition of men when 
the task involved becomes part of t h e i r l i v e s . 
"They form a community, i n our present l i m i t e d sense, 
when they not only cooperate, but accompany t h i s 
cooperation w i t h that i d e a l extension of the l i v e s of 
In d i v i d u a l s w ( 3 7 ) . 
Loyalty and i t s cause not only grant an i n d i v i d u a l his s e l f -
f u l f i l m e n t , but also weld a l i v i n g bond between him and his 
37. P.C p. 263. : "~ 
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followers. The l o y a l t y , or common cause, that a person sees 
i n another acts as a sign, pointing to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of his or her mind. 
The community i s unlimited i n i t s scope.- The aim of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s the.unity of the whole world, even though 
the f i n a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of a l l men could only be achieved, 
as f a r as Royce was concerned, by the mediation of God. This 
i s indeed how he viewed the r o l e of Christ - as the i n t e r p r e t e r 
of the universal community. 
Of course, the community, with i t s l o y a l cause, not only 
provides knowledge of other people; i t also acts as an 
in t e r p r e t e r f o r oneself. Not only i s each i n d i v i d u a l i n 
dialogue w i t h his fellow-men, but he i s also I n constant 
dialogue w i t h himself. The community provides him with s e l f -
knowledge, because his companions act as mediators between 
himself and his s e l f . To r e t u r n to the example of the lame 
man: he i s not wholly aware of his impediment u n t i l h is contact 
w i t h other men has shown him how others walk. The same 
pr i n c i p l e applies to his knowledge of his personality. The 
closer to a true community that human relationships reach, 
the more successful they are I n aiding self-awareness. Royce 
maintained that c o l l e c t i v e society could reveal to the 
i n d i v i d u a l merely the s u p e r f i c i a l aspects of his person,whilst 
the true community was capable of making him f u l l y aware of 
the innermost depths of his being. The sel f I s not a mere 
s t a t i c nature that can be scrutinised by the s c i e n t i f i c 
analyst, but i s a constant process of I n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Man 
has a memory and an^ntlcipated future to look forward to. His 
present s e l f cannot be separated from his past"and his f u t u r e ; 
the s e l f comes down from i t s own past. I t i s I t s e l f i t s own 
histor y . Royce sets out his theory i n the follo w i n g words: 
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"the s e l f I s no mere datum, but i s i n I t s essence a 
l i f e which i s interpreted, and which i n t e r p r e t s i t s e l f , 
and which.apart from some sort of ideal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , 
i s a mere f l i g h t , of ideas, or a meaningless flow of 
fe e l i n g s ^ or a v i s i o n that sees.nothing, or else a 
barren abstract conception"(38). 
The constant i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that goes on w i t h i n an i n d i v i d u a l 
i s p a r a l l e l to the behaviour of a community. I n f a c t each 
Ind i v i d u a l I s himself a microcosm of the universal community. 
Since the i n d i v i d u a l i s so much i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the community 
i n that he shares the l a t t e r ' s past and f u t u r e , both are 
dependent on one another. I n other words, the community 
needs I t s members to partake f u l l y I n the process of 
in t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
"The concept of the community depends upon the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which each i n d i v i d u a l member gives to 
i t s own sel f - to his own past - and to his own future"(39). 
According to Royce, knowledge I s mediated through the 
i n t e r p r e t i n g community. F i r s t l y , i t has been seen that the 
l o y a l t y of the community i s the sign that points towards a 
knowledge of others; and secondly, the community ae,tsta'te?K;i:v»; 
i n t e r p r e t e r of oneself. I n both cases the l o y a l community 
constitutes the t h i r d party i n the t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n . 
This,then, I s how knowledge of people as Individuals i s 
i s 
structured. But according to Royce, not only^human dialogue 
t r i a d i c in&structure, but a l l knowledge I s t r i a d i c also. 
So how i s s c i e n t i f i c knowledge to be understood ? Surely 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a subject and his object I s a s t r a i g h t 
38. P.C.p.253. 39. P.C pp. 248-9. 
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dyadlc one, as Bergson Insisted. But Royce maintained that 
t h i s was not enough. A l l knowledge belongs to people and 
people belong to a community, I n which true dialogue i s 
already taking place. I t I s true that individuals do discover 
s c i e n t i f i c f a c t s , and they often reach t h e i r conclusions by;fta 
laborious process of induction and deduction, w i t h perception 
and conception playing an important part. But Royce, Inspired 
by a paper.Problem of Age. Growth and Death, by Minot (40), 
suggested that although I n d i v i d u a l research i s es s e n t i a l i 
nevertheless these new discoveries must be corroborated and 
confirmed by the s c i e n t i f i c community - that i s , by those who 
are bound together by a l o y a l t y to s c i e n t i f i c t r u t h . I n t h i s 
way s c i e n t i f i c knowledge becomes not so much the possession 
of the i n d i v i d u a l concerned, but the heritage of a community, 
so that future generations can draw on these sources. Since 
i t i s obvious that empirical knowledge requires observation 
and experimentation, perception and conception have t h e i r 
place. At the same time, Royce f u l l y appreciated the value of 
the pragmatlst's p o s i t i o n i n t h i s context, since the s c i e n t i s t ' s 
theory must be seen to work. For s c i e n t i f i c discovery to 
become s c i e n t i f i c knowledge i t must be used, tested and v e r i f i e d 
by the s c i e n t i f i c community. Science does more than simply 
provide perceptual answers f o r conceptual questions? i t involves 
a process of i n t e r p r e t i n g data w i t h i n a community so that i t 
can be assimilated and used. Minot's own b e l i e f i n the 
paramount importance of the community served to support Royce's 
theories. For j u s t as a common cause can act as mediator i n 
a t r i a d ! c r e l a t i o n between men, so a common object of knowledge 
40. P.C. p. 321. 
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can perform the same function. 
"Our social consciousness i s , psychologically speaking, 
the most deeply rooted foundation of our whole view of 
ourselves and of the world."(41). 
Because objective knowledge operates w i t h i n the context of 
a community Royce stressed that i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , not perception 
or conception, i s the p r i n c i p a l mode of cognition. Any 
objective f a c t becomes the experience.of the community. I n 
Royce's philosophy his chief category was the community, not 
the s e l f nor the one and the many, f o r one's experience of the 
whole world was dependent on the community: 
"the physical world i s an object known to the community 
and through i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " ( 4 2 ) . 
Royce, following the i d e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n , saw the 
r e l a t i o n between the knower and the object of knowledge as 
an i n t e r n a l one. I n other words he disagreed with the r e a l i s t 
standpoint that r e a l i t y i s t o t a l l y independent of the act of 
knowing. Indeed, Royce maintained th a t an object of knowledge 
I s selected according to one's own purpose. Ewing, i n his 
Idealism;A C r i t i c a l Survey, emphasises the importance of 
purpose i n Royce's epistemology. 
"According to Royce, progress i n knowledge consists i n 
the advance from a less determinate to a more determinate 
purpose"(43). 
Royce saw the p o s s i b i l i t y of error a r i s i n g from a f a i l u r e to 
f i n d one's true purpose, and a purpose i s true only i f I t 
confoinas to the w i l l of the Absolute. Knowledge I s dependent 
on the w i l l of the i n d i v i d u a l . I t can be seen tha t t h i s 
41. P.C. p. 330. 42. P.C. p. 361. 43.Ewing,A.C.(l934) p. 50.. 
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l d e a l l s t p r i n c i p l e l i e s behind his epistemology i n the theory 
of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Here knowledge, as the t h i r d party, i s 
dependent upon the purpose and i n t e r e s t of the community. 
Reality i s neither independent of human dialogue, nor i s i t 
purely subjective. Rather, I t i s attained through the constant 
process of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . This theory was indeed the 
culmination of a l l h is e a r l i e r work. 
What, then, i n summary are the conclusions of Royce's 
thesis ? Knowledge i s t r i a d i c i n structure I n t h a t an 
i n d i v i d u a l needs the mediation of a t h i r d party i n order to 
reach the object of his knowledge. I f a man i s t r y i n g to 
understand his companion then he heeds a t h i r d f a c t o r , such 
as a common cause or love between them, i n order to penetrate 
through to him. Again, I f he wishes to learn more about his 
natural environment he needs the help of other members In.his 
community. The work of the t r a n s l a t o r i s an example here. Or 
f i n a l l y , I f he wishes to gain greater self-awareness he needs 
the mediation of othergpeople to i n t e r p r e t himself to his s e l f . 
Royce's theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , as i t i s found i n 
the Problem of C h r i s t i a n i t y , was the culmination of his 
philosophical career, and i t was t h i s which was his main 
contribution to the philosophy of Marcel. Inasmuch as that 
i s a philosophy of the meaning of social existence, a concrete 
philosophy of knowledge - neither r a t i o n a l i s t nor empiricist -
and an ontology of personal re l a t i o n s h i p s , i t has clear l i n k s 




As we followed the development of Marcel's philosophy 
we were able to see how his acquaintance w i t h Royce's 
philosophy was the i n t e l l e c t u a l counterpart to the powerful 
influence on him of his experience as a Red Cross worker 
during the Great War. What we have t r i e d to show i s how 
Royce's peculiar brand of idealism was precisely the kind 
of philosophy which at one and the same time- made contact 
with Marcel's i d e a l i s t background and spoke to his philosophical 
condition. U n t i l then he had accepted an essentially i d e a l i s t 
outlook, the aim of which, was to transcend the l i m i t a t i o n s 
of mundane existence, but the events of the war. shattered 
these assumptions. From t h i s period onwards his philosophical 
work was characterised by a concern to understand the 
significance of human existence. 
However, chapter three showed us that Marcel, even i n 
his i d e a l i s t phase, was not unconcerned about personal values. 
He soon rejected hegelian idealism because i t immersed the 
i n d i v i d u a l i n t o an abstract absolute, although he eagerly 
read the works of post-Kantian philosophers such as .SefceLling. 
But Marcel himself realised that his philosophical attempts 
were worked out i n d u l l and abstract language, although he 
saw i n his plays.an i n t e r e s t i n g a n t i c i p a t i o n of his l a t e r 
philosophical work. 
The tragedy of the Great War Was a turning point i n his 
career f o r these events forced Marcel to look f o r a new 
philosophical language. Wahl was mistaken i n ignoring the 
importance of Marcel's war experiences, f o r his philosophical 
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development was not a smooth progression from hegelianism 
through post-Kantian Idealism as he maintained. The 
autobiographical passages i n Marcel's w r i t i n g s make i t quite 
p l a i n that he rggarded his work I n the Information Service 
as a c r u c i a l factor i n the formation of his philosophy of 
existence, and i t i s equally manifest that philosophers such 
as Bradley and Bosanquet could not adequately help him to 
answer the c r i t i c a l questions that the war brought to the 
fore. I n his e f f o r t to establish the significance of human 
relationships and the sphere of personal knowledge he followed 
neither an i d e a l i s t nor a m a t e r i a l i s t approach. He was 
enough of a r e a l i s t to recognise the v a l i d i t y of objective 
knowledge, but t h i s was not to be confused w i t h personal 
knowledge, which only comes from the d i r e c t encounter between 
people. I t was at t h i s point i n his development that he studied 
Royce and discovered i n the l a t t e r ' s w r i t i n g s a philosophy 
that had struggled w i t h the very problems that he himself 
was then facing. 
There are various general considerations that can help 
us to understand why Marcel was so impressed by Royce, even 
though the l a t t e r was an I d e a l i s t . F i r s t l y , Royce's idealism 
bore the stamp of a highly independent mind. Marcel f u l l y 
appreciated t h i s , f o r he continually emphasised Royce's 
respect f o r the empirical i n understanding human experience. 
Indeed he suggested i n his Metaphyslque de Joslah Royce that 
c e r t a i n characteristics of Royce's philosophy could place 
him w i t h i n the t r a d i t i o n of the English empiricists. Moreover, 
we have seen that the empi r i c i s t tendencies of Royce's thought 
were r e f l e c t e d I n his use of Peirce's i n s i g h t s , Secondly, 
Marcel was searching f o r a philosophical understanding of 
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personal relationships, and t h i s was a central theme of 
Royce's work, especially his Problem of Ch r i s t i a n i t y . I n 
the l a t t e r work Royce demonstrated the Inadequacies of 
t r a d i t i o n a l epistemologies, whether r a t i o n a l i s t or e m p i r i c i s t , 
i n dealing w i t h the complexities of human dialogue. Neither 
conception nor perception could account f o r that Intimate 
knowledge of others and of oneself that i s gained from 
personal relationships. This was precisely the experience 
of Marcel, f o r he too realised that neither idealism nor 
empiricism could make sense of personal experience. Royce's 
theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n showed Marcel the way forward by 
corroborating his own view that the most pressing task of 
philosophy was to reinstate the importance of personal 
knowledge, as d i s t i n c t from o b j e c t i v i t y . Thirdly, and t h i s 
i s closely connected w i t h the second point, both philosophers 
considered social awareness to have p r i o r i t y over self-awareness, 
i '• 
f o r the former determined the l a t t e r . Indeed, Marcel saw 
t h i s theme as pervading the whole of Royce's work, f o r 
social awareness was to be found I n the Giff o r d Lectures, 
although i t was i n the theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that i t 
reached i t s culmination. 
These, then, are the general reasons f o r Marcel's 
appreciativeness of Royce's work. I t i s now possible to 
state the precise nature of Royce's Influence on Marcel's 
philosophy. We have argued already that Royce's philosophy 
of social relationships, culminating i n the theory of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , provided i n s p i r a t i o n f o r Marcel's own work, 
especially h i s theory of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . I n the l a s t 
two chapters we considered the arguments of both philosophers 
separately, so we can now summarise the extent of Royce's 
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lnfluence. 
Both Marcel and Royce engaged i n a vigorous c r i t i c i s m 
of the impersonal nature of modern society, f o r they both 
saw that the d r i f t towards c o l l e c t i v i s m produced a fragmented 
and I n d i v i d u a l i s t i c society. Behind the observations of 
both philosophers a common aim can be detected - to def&ae 
the nature of authentic human relationships and to c l a r i f y 
the.distinctiveness of personal knowledge, which they saw 
as being threatened by the impersonal structure of society. 
Marcel and Royce saw the need f o r a fresh theory of knowledge 
f o r both recognised that the arrogant claims of empiricism 
were the chief cause of the diminished status of personal 
values. Throughout our study of Marcel's development i t i s 
possible to detect a struggle to make a clear d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the realms of o b j e c t i v i t y and personal knowledge, 
f o r only by d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g the two modes of cognition can 
one safeguard the v a l i d i t y of empiricism and the d i s t i n c t i v e 
r e a l i t y of personal knowledge. The encroachments of 
objectivism on the personal I n modern society have created 
a c i i s i s of I d e n t i t y f o r many Individuals. Certainly i n 
our study of Marcel's notion of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y we saw the 
importance of the question "What am I ? n . I t was Royce's 
theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t provided Marcel with the means 
of a r t i c u l a t i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n between the objective and . 
the personal. We have seen that Royce saw the re l a t i o n s h i p 
between subject and object as t r l a d l c , I n that the object 
of one's in t e r e s t s needs t o be Interpreted by a mediator. 
Objective r e a l i t y i s always a t h i r d party i n r e l a t i o n to 
a dialogue. Marcel seized upon t h i s as a solution to his 
own problems. 
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I t I s a t t h i s stage i n our argument that we can see 
how Marcel has used Royce's work and how they d i f f e r from each 
other. Royce's theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was an epistemology 
that t r i e d to do f u l l j u s t i c e to a l l types of knowledge. 'Both 
objective and personal knowledge need to be interpreted and 
are t r l a d i c i n structure. But Marcel wished to make a bolder 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the two modes of knowledge. Unlike Royce, 
Marcel r e s t r i c t e d the t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n to objective knowledge. 
Personal knowledge cannot be t r l a d i c , f o r i t cannot be 
interpreted. The I-thou dialogue i s a d i r e c t encounter between 
two people involved i n an intersubjective bond - i t i s dyadic 
ingstrueture. This i s not the dyad that can be found between 
subject and object, but a much more intimate dyad that i s 
formed between subject and subject. Marcel's thesis was 
based upon the observation that objective knowledge, that i s 
the I - i t r e l a t i o n s h i p , i s i n d i r e c t i n tha t i t i s dependent 
upon human dialogue, whereas personal knowledge I s the mosfe 
d i r e c t and intimate mode of cognition, f o r i t i s achieved 
when men are w i l l i n g to acknowledge the depths of one 
another's being. Marcel saw the v a l i d i t y of both types 
of cognition, but he maintained that personal knowledge took 
p r i o r i t y over empirical data. But, to admit these c r u c i a l 
differences i s not to undermine the importance of Royce's 
trladism f o r Marcel's own philosophy. Rather, the theory 
of t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n s made i t possible f o r Marcel to 
a r t i c u l a t e the d i s t i n c t i o n between the two modes of knowledge, 
and hence he was able to formulate h i s notion of the 
intersubjective dyad. Rpyce's theory of t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n s 
and his observations on the characteristlcsssf a true community 
made I t possible f o r Marcel to reach t h i s important conclusion. 
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Although Royce's trjae comnninity and Marcel's i n t e r -
subjective bond are not the same, i n that the foa*raer i s t r i a d i c 
w h i l s t the l a t t e r i s dyadic, they do have many common 
characteristics. Both theories acknowledge the aim of 
authentic relationships - the attainment of personal u n i t y , 
a f e e l i n g of togetherness, i n which a l l those concerned are 
t r u l y aware of each other as unique individuals. I n Royce's 
argument l o y a l t y was a c r u c i a l f a c t o r i n t h i s u n i f y i n g process, 
f o r without l o y a l t y Royce saw that a community would degenerate 
Into a c o l l e c t i v e society. Marcel agreed w i t h Royce's 
observation that the u n i t y of mass society i s f a l s e , I n that 
i t i s maintained by external pressure, and he followed .Royce's 
argument that an authentic u n i t y of persons i s based on an act 
of w i l l on the part of the i n d i v i d u a l . I t i s natural,then,that 
we should f i n d i n Marcel a p a r a l l e l notion to that of Royce's 
l o y a l t y . Indeed, we saw i n chapter f i v e that Marcel's 
description of f i d e l i t y I s very reminiscent of Royce's 
language concerning l o y a l t y . Naturally Royce's theory of 
l o y a l t y and Marcel's notion of f i d e l i t y are not i d e n t i c a l , 
i n that Marcel does not understand- f i d e l i t y as playing the 
r o l e of I n t e r p r e t e r i n a t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n , f o r we have seen 
that he r e s t r i c t e d the t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n to objective knowledge. 
But he did f o l l o w Royce i n seeing f i d e l i t y as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of personal relationships. Just as Royce saw l o y a l t y as 
binding people together i n t o a true community, so Marcel 
realised t h a t the intersubjectlve bond r e l i e s on f i d e l i t y f o r 
i t s continuance. The intersubjective bond, as the place of 
being, i s where personal values, are to be found. We saw t h a t 
to enter i n t o a close re l a t i o n s h i p w i t h someone involves 
being f a i t h f u l to a bond, and t h i s i s an act of personal f a i t h . 
i 
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hope and love. I t can be seen that both Royce and Marcel 
maintained that s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t l i e s i n establishing 
personal relationships, and t h i s needs an act of commitment 
on the part of the i n d i v i d u a l . 
Differences indeed there were between the two 
philosophers, f o r , a f t e r a l l , Marcel had abandoned idealism 
while Royce*s work never strayed from that t r a d i t i o n . But 
we have shown that there i s plenty of evidence to indicate 
that Royce's brand of idealism was of a highly o r i g i n a l 
s t y l e and was concerned with many of the issues that were 
preoccupying Marcel during the war. Royce's work, especially 
his theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , was without doubt a major 
formative influence on Marcel, f o r he was able to draw upon 
the insights of Royce's philosophy of personal relationships 
i n order to formulate his own philosophy of existence. 
Marcel's study of Royce at a c r u c i a l moment I n his l i f e 
gave him a fresh understanding of the depths of human 
existence, whereby he was able to acknowledge the j u s t claims 
of empiricism w h i l s t r e i n s t a t i n g the central importance of 
personal values. The c l a r i f i c a t i o n of these issues became 
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